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Rape Reform: An Empirical Study
In the past six or seven years, the subject of forcible rape' has captured
national attention. Since the enactment of the Criminal Sexual Conduct
Act of Michigan in 1974,2 the first comprehensive reform of rape legisla-
tion in the nation, some forty states have modified existing or passed new
statutes on rape.3 Substantive law changes have been matched by efforts
to strengthen the capabilities of law enforcement4 in order to increase the
apprehension, conviction, and sentencing of offenders, and to brake the
rising incidence of the crime. 5 Service organizations to aid victims such
as rape crisis centers, 6 victim advocates 7 and specialized hospital units8
have spread across the country. Indeed, the swiftness and momentum of
these changes have outpaced social attitudes of the citizenry and of some
criminal justice officials. 9
1. In this article, "forcible rape" refers to nonconsensual sexual intercourse by force or threat of
force, and "statutory rape" refers to sexual intercourse with an underage person conclusively pre-
sumed incapable of consent. In some instances, "rape" will be used to encompass both types of
offenses, but this broader usage can be readily ascertained from the context. The rare cases of nonfor-
cible sexual intercourse that are legally presumed to be nonconsensual due to mental defectiveness or
unconsciousness of the victim, or because of the fraudulent or deceptive conduct of the perpetrator,
are not dealt with here. See generally Puttkamer, Consent in Rape, 19 ILL. L. REV. 410 (1925).
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520(a)-(1)(Supp. 1977-78).
3. See Report by BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE LAW AND JUSTICE STUDY CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JusncE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,
FORCIBLE RAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES I (1978)[hereinafter cited as BATrELLE-LEAA FORCIBLE
RAPE]; Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV.
1500, 1502 n. 16 (1975) [hereinafter cited at VA. Note].
4. See generally reports by BATTELLE MEIMORIAL INSTTmTE LAW AND JUSTICE STUDY CENTER FOR THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN-
ISTRATION: FORCIBLE RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY POLICE (POLICE VOLUME I)
(1975)[hereinafter cited as BATrELLE-LEAA POLICE SURVEY]; FORCIBLE RAPE: A MANUAL FOR PATROL
OFFCERS (POLICE VOLUME II)(1978); FORCIBLE RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OFTHE RESPONSE BY PROSECU-
ToRs (PRosECUToRs' VOLUME I) (1975) [hereinafter cited as BATrELLE-LEAA PROSECUTOR SURVEY];
FORCIBLE RAPE: PROSECUTOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLICY ISSUES (PROSECUTOR'S VOLUME III) (1978)
[hereinafter cited as BATTELLE-LEAA PROSECUTOR PROSECUTOR'S VOLUME III]; FORCIBLE RAPE: FINAL
PROJECr REPORT (1978) [hereinafter cited as BATTELLE-LEAA FINAL REPORT.]
5. See text accompanying notes 169-78 infra.
6. See, e.g., Hardgrove, An Interagency Service Netvork to Meet Needs of Rape Victims, 57
SOCIAL CASEWORK 245 (1976); Rape Crisis Center in Washington, D.C., How to Start a Rape Crisis
Center (August 1972, mimeographed); NEW YORK RADICAL FEMINISTS, RAPE: THE FIRST SOURCEBOOK
POR WOMEN 177-80 (1974).
7. See, e.g., BATrELLE-LEAA FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 3, at 38-41; Berger, Man's Trial,
Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 84-87 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Bassuk, Savitz, McCombie, & Pell, Organizing a Rape Crisis Program in a Gen-
eral Hospital, 30 J. AM. WOMEN'S A. 486; M. GATES, S. SINGER, M. TUCKER&R. WHITE, RAPEAND ITS
VIcnMs: A REPORT FOR CrrItzENs, HEALTH FOUNDATIONS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 55-92 (1975).
9. See J. Reich & D. Chappell, The Prosecutorial Response to Michigan's Criminal Sexual Con-
duct Law: Business as Usual 22-23 (1976) (unpublished paper on file at the University of Washing-
ton Law School Library).
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The legal commentary on the reform of rape legislation developed dur-
ing this period is extensive. 10 Commentators have attended primarily to
doctrinal analyses of statutory and decisional developments in rape law. "
The significance of criminal law rules, however, lies not only in their
formulation but also, in Justice Jackson's terms, in their "delivered
value" 12-- that is, in their day-to-day implementation and administration.
10. The lion's share of the literature pertains to unique evidentiary rules in rape prosecutions. For
a list of commentaries on the admissibility of the victim's prior sexual history, see Berger, supra note
7, at 12 n.83. On the corroboration rule, see Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal,
Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972) and articles cited therein.
On the definitional elements of rape, see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 152-171 (2d ed. 1969); Com-
ment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as CHICAGO Comment]; Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. RE'.
680 (1966) [hereinafter cited as STANFORD Note].
For statutory analyses of new reform laws, see, e.g., Ireland, Reform Rape Legislation: A New
Standard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 185 (1978); Comment, Rape Reform Legis-
lation: Is it the Solution? 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CLEVELAND STATE
Note]; Comment. Washinton's Attempt to View Sexual Assault as More tian a "Violation" of the
Moral Woman-The Revision of the Rape Laws, 11 GoNz. L. REV. 145 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
GONZAGA Comment]; Legislative Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 217 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MICH. Note]; VA. Note, supra note 3.
Historical and general overviews of rape legislation are contained for example, in B. BABCOCK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 820 et seq. (1975) [hereinafter
cited as BABcocK]; Gold & Wyatt, The Rape Svstem: Old Roles alnd New Times, 27 CATH. U. L. REV.
695 (1978); Comment, Rape and Rape Law's: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919
(1973) [hereinafter cited as CALIF. Comment]; Smith, History of Rape Laws. 60 WOMEN L. J. 188
(1974).
On trial strategies, see Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analvsis of Corroboration,
Consent, and Character, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (1973).
A bibliography of non-legal literature on rape is found in Fogarty, A Selective Bibliography, in
FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE Vicris, AND THE OFFENDER, 356-382 (D. Chappel. R. Geis, & G.
Geis, eds. 1977) [the book of readings is hereinafter cited as Chappell].
11. Only two systematic, empirical studies have been done on the exercise of discretion in rape
cases. One deals with the prosecutor and the other with the police, and both are based on case files.
See Weninger, Factors Affecting the Prosecution of Rape: A Case Study of Travis County, Texas. 64
VA. L. REV. 357 (1978), and Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been
Committed-Rape il Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PENN. Com-
ment]. Neither study, however, compares the effect of the old and the reform rape statutes on dis-
cretionary decisionmaking or on the disposition of rape cases.
In addition, there have been two national surveys of prosecutor and police opinions about rape law
enforcement. BArTELLE-LEAA PROSECUTOR SURVEY and BATrELLE-LEAA POLICE SURVEY, supra note
4. Respondents were asked what factors they take into account in charging or investigating rape.
respectively. As might be expected, the responses given on an attitude questionnaire are not always
consistent with actual practices based on the information in case files. See note 329 and accompany-
ing text infra. Nonetheless, the studies are useful for the complementary perspective they provide to
the statistical data from the case records. These two studies also do not compare the impact of the old
and new rape statutes or their opinions.
12. Jackson, Criminal Justice: The Vital Poblem of the Future, 39 A.B.A.J. 743 (1953). A draft-
er of reform criminal codes has also proposed that it would be "wise to provide that no change in the
penal law be enacted unless it is accompanied by some provision for determining, over some appro-
priate period of time what the effect of the law turns out to be." Fox. Reflections otn the Law Reform-
ing Process, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 443,460 (1971).
Rape Reform: An Empirical Study
The actual impact of the reform legislation on prosecution, an issue which
to date has not been systematically studied, is the focus of this article.
In July 1975, riding the crest of the national reform movement, the
Washington State legislature enacted a new rape law 13 that repealed a
centenarian, common law-based statute. 14 This article presents the results
of an empirical study of the effects of the common law and reform rape
statutes on prosecution in King County (Seattle), Washington, and
assesses the implications of the findings for the law of rape and for prose-
cutorial discretion in the charging of rape. To the extent that definitional
elements of the new Washington law have parallels in reform statutes of
other states, and the statistical profile of the incidence and circumstances
of the crime in King County is similar to that found in other jurisdictions,
the findings and conclusions of this study have broader significance.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this Part is to lay the statutory foundation for the empir-
ical analysis presented later in the Article. It begins with an overview of
the main substantive elements and social policies of forcible rape legisla-
tion, and then briefly considers statutory rape legislation.
A. Forcible Rape
There are three major issues in any system of forcible rape' 5 law: (a)
definition of the crime-the legal standard of criminalization and grada-
tions, if any, of culpability; (b) penalty structure; and (c) proof of occur-
rence of the crime-evidentiary rules with respect to corroboration of the
complaining witness' allegation of rape, and admissibility on cross-exam-
ination of the complaining witness' prior sexual history.
13. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.79 (renumbered by 1979 1st Ex. Sess. to WASH. REV. CODE ch.
9A.44.)
14. 1973 Wash. Laws ch. 154, 1st Ex. Sess. (repealed 1975). See note 21 infra.
15. The use of "forcible" in modifying rape should be clarified. It does not mean that use or
threat of force is necessarily present in every case. In fact, most forcible rapes involve no, or only a
minimal amount of extrinsic violence beyond the act itself, and usually result in no physical injury.
See text accompanying notes 252-257 infra. But in addition to actual force or a threat thereof, "forc-
ible" refers to the psychological degradation of the victim, and connotes violence to her personhood.
Feminist writers thus define rape as a crime of assault and violence. See, e.g., Griffin, Rape: The All-
American Crime, RAMPARTS Sept. 1971 at 33. Some courts, too, view rape as "forcible" because it is
an act of personal outrage: "The essence of the crime is not the fact of intercourse but the injury and
outrage to the feelings of the woman by the forceful penetration of her person." Commonwealth v.
Goldenberg, 338 Mass. 377, 381, 155 N.E.2d 187, 191-92 (1959). Modem rape law recognizes the
violence inherent in every instance of nonconsensual or forcible sexual intercourse, irrespective of
actual use of physical force, by proscribing it and attaching strong penalties upon conviction.
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The basic substantive element of rape is nonconsent of the victim. This
is what renders criminal otherwise ordinary conduct. Statutes, judicial
opinions, 16 legal commentators, 17 and trial attorneys 18 have long recog-
nized the role of nonconsent in rape law. Despite the centrality, of the
concept, the legal community "has yet to develop a principled standard
of nonconsent that reflects the interests protected by criminalization of
rape." 19 Instead of articulating the nature and scope of nonconsent, it has
concentrated on fashioning subsidiary rules of evidence unique to rape
law. This places the proverbial cart before the horse. The legal standard
of rape-more precisely, the standard adopted by law as the objective
indicator of nonconsensual intercourse--determines the type and quan-
tum of evidence needed to prove the crime. If the actor's conduct (physi-
cal force or threat of force) is the legal criterion, then evidence pertaining
to the victim's prior unchastity becomes mostly irrelevant for proving that
element. But if victim's conduct (resistance) is determinative, past sexual
conduct can be material. Consequently, the definitional standard is the
most important conceptual issue in rape law and is the primary focus of
this Article. 20
Four approaches to forcible rape legislation are summarized next. They
span the continuum of victim-actor orientation, with the Washington
common law statute and the Michigan reform statute at the respective
ends, and the Washington reform law and the Model Penal Code both in
the middle.
1. Definition and Penalty Aspects
a. The Washington common law-based legislation.
Under the prior Washington law, "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse
with a person not the wife or husband of the perpetrator committed
against the person's will and without the person's consent.' '2 Derived
16. See. e.g., Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 715 (1946).
17. See, e.g., CHICAGO Comment, supra note 10.
18. "No matter how rape is defined, my job is the same: to persuade the jury that there was no
consent." Interview with Greg Canova, chief of the Sexual Assault Unit. King County Prosecuting
Attorney office (May 16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Canova Interview].
19. CHICAGO Comment, supra note 10, at 645.
20. Only the principal definitional elements of the old and new Washington law, the Michigan
reform law, and the Model Penal Code are presented here. Issues of evidentiary proof and penalties
are mentioned in passing insofar as they are relevant to the definitional aspect of the statutes. A
number of important but specialized topics in rape law such as interspousal rape, defense of mistake.
and rape by fraud or economic coercion are beyond the scope of this article.
21. 1973 Wash. Laws (1st Ex. Sess.) ch. 154, § 122, at 1198 (repealed 1975). It provides fur-
ther:
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from the common law, the definition is representative of those in pre-
reform rape statutes in other jurisdictions. 22 "Sexual intercourse" con-
sists of penetration of the female sexual organ, however slightly, by the
male sexual organ.23 "Against the person's will" and "without the per-
son's consent" are synonymous in common law, 24 and are defined in
terms of the victim's action, namely, "resistance . . . forcibly over-
come" or "resistance . . . prevented by fear of immediate and great
bodily harm."25 Despite the use of physical force by the actor, unless the
victim resists or is overcome by such fear as to excuse resistance, there is
no rape. The actor's force thus is gauged and deemed criminal according
to the victim's conduct. 26 Washington courts have required only "reason-
able" resistance, 27 but early decisions elsewhere expected an "utmost"
or "terrific" exertion. 28 The penalty for rape under the Washington stat-
Every perpetrator of such an act of sexual intercourse with a person of the age of ten years or
upwards not his wife or husband:
(1) When, through idiocy, imbecility or any unsoundness of mind, either temporal or perma-
nent, the person is incapable of giving consent; or
(2) When the person's resistance is forcibly overcome: or
(3) When the person's resistance is prevented by fear of immediate and great bodily harm
which the person has reasonable cause to believe will be inflicted upon her or him; or
(4) When the person's resistance is prevented by stupor or weakness of mind produced by
intoxicating narcotic or anaesthetic agent administered by or with the privity of the defendant; or
(5) When the person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act and this is known to
the defendent;
Shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than five years.
This rape statute, which is typical of others, contains no mens rea language because once forcible
conduct is shown, mental culpability is presumed.
22. See, e.g., 1895 Wis. Laws ch. 370, §2, at 753: "Any person who shall ravish and carnally
know any female of the age of fourteen years or more, by force and against her will, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison not more than thirty years nor less than ten years .... "
23. "Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete sexual intercourse or car-
nal knowledge." 1973 Wash. Laws (1st Ex. Sess.) ch. 154, § 124, at 1199 (repealed 1975). "Pene-
tration means that the sexual organ of the male entered and penetrated the sexual organ of the fe-
male .... State v. Snyder, 199 Wash. 298, 301, 91 P.2d 570, 571 (1939).
24. R. PERKINS, supra note 10, at 160-61.
25. 1973 Wash. Laws (Ist Ex. Sess.) ch. 154, § 122, at 1198.
26. A commentator has proposed a statute defining forcible rape solely in terms of resistance. It
requires an actor to use force or guile, and then evaluates the sufficiency of the force or guile in terms
of a standard of victim's resistance that must be overcome. STANFORD Note, supra note 10, at 688-89.
At least one reform statute continues to define rape in terms of the victim's conduct: "[T]he amount
of force necessary to negate consent is a relative matter to be judged under all the circumstances, the
most important of which is the resistance of the female." Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.02,
Practice Commentary at 308.
27. See, e.g., State v. Pilegge, 61 Wn. 264, 112 P. 263 (1910).
28. R. PERKINS, supra note 10, at 161. Starr v. State, 205 Wis. 310, 311, 237 N.W. 96, 97
(1931) ("utmost resistance"); Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644, 648-49 (1897) ("to the extent
of her ability").
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ute was harsh: "not less than five years" imprisonment. 29 Many states
imposed the death penalty or life imprisonment. 30
b. The Washington reform legislation
The new Washington rape law, like other reform legislation, changes
the definitional and penalty aspects of the prior law in several respects.
First, it focuses more on the actor's use or threat of force rather than the
victim's conduct as the external criterion of nonconsent. The criminaliza-
tion of rape is thereby made consistent with that of other violent offenses
such as assault. Second, it recognizes the crime ranging from brutal at6
tacks by strangers to "half won arguments of couples in parked cars," 31
and these different factual situations cannot be subsumed under a single
legal standard. And third, it renders more equitable the penalty structure
by matching the types of conduct reflecting different degrees of culpabil-
ity over a range of available punishments.
Rape is divided into three degrees according to the extent of force or
threat. 32 The basic elements of a first degree offense are sexual inter-
29. 1973 Wash. Laws (lst Ex. Sess.) ch. 154, § 122, at 1198 (repealed 1975).
30. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at 241 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Prior to Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). sixteen states permitted the death penalty for rape. Since then.
several have enacted ostensibly less discretionary schemes. See CLEVELAND STATE Note. supra note
10, at 491. Some 30 states imposed life imprisonment. BABCOCK, supra note 10. at 863 n.56.
31. Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of
the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L. J. 55, 56 (1952) [hereinafter cited as YALE Comment].
32. The sections on rape are as follows:
WASH. REV. Coo § 9A.44.040(1979):
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when such person engages in sexual inter-
course with another person not married to the perpetrator by forcible compulsion where the
perpetrator or an accessary:
(a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon: or
(b) Kidnaps the victim: or
(c) Inflicts serious physical injury: or
(d) Feloniously enters into the building or vehicle where the victim is situated.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1979):
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when. under circumstances not constitut-
ing rape in the first degree, the person engages in sexual intercourse with another person. not
married to the perpetrator:
(a) By forcible compulsion: or
(b) When the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or men-
tally incapacitated.
WASH. REV. Coot § 9A.44.060(1979):
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when, under circumstances not constituting
rape in the first or second degree, such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person.
not married to the perpetrator:
(a) Where the victim did not consent as defined in RCW 9A.44.010(6). to sexual intercourse
with the perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly expressed by the victim's words or
conduct, or
550
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course (with a non-spouse) 33 by forcible compulsion under aggravated
circumstances. It is punishable by a minimum sentence of 20 years and a
minimum confinement period of 3 years, with no deferred or suspended
sentence permissible except for inpatient treatments. 34 Second degree
rape requires only sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion. The penalty
upon conviction is a maximum of 10 years. 35 Third degree rape is defined
as sexual intercourse without consent or with threat of substantial harm to
property rights, with a sentence of "not more than 5 years." 36
The new, sex-neutral definition of "sexual intercourse" broadens the
range of conduct constituting forcible rape. It expands prior law to in-
dlude penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus "by an object"
as well as by a sexual organ, and "sexual contact" (without penetration)
between a person's sexual organ and the anus or mouth of another. 37 This
formulation makes the law applicable to homosexual rape, previously
prosecutable only under a sodomy statute.3 8 However, mere "contact"
between two sexual organs and "touching" of the intimate parts of a per-
son for sexual gratification is not rape. It is proscribed as "indecent liber-
ties," a felony punishable by a sentence approximating that imposed for
second degree rape. 39
The new concept of "forcible compulsion" 40 is substantively similar
to the prior Washington statute's definition of physical force as resistance
forcibly overcome. 41 The first two degrees of rape make no mention of
consent in order to deflect attention away from the victim, thereby
(b) Where there is threat of substantial unlawful harm to property rights of the victim.
33. The new statute continues the common law notion that marriage justifies continuing assent to
all marital sexual relations. For critical views, see Comment, Rape and Battery Benveen Husband
and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1954); CHICAGO Comment, supra note 10, at 641; GONZAGA Com-
ment, supra note 10, at 149-51.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040(2)(1979).
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1979) and §9A.20.020(b)(1975).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.060(1979) and § 9A.20.020 (c)(1975).
37. Id. § 9.79.140(l)(a)-(c)(1977).
38. Ch. 249, 1909 Wash. Laws § 204, at 950, as amended ch. 74, 1937 Wash. Laws § 3, at 322
(former WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.100) (repealed 1975). One of the reasons for bringing sodomy
under rape law is that "the majority of our victims report that these sexual acts [vaginal and anal
penetration, including by physical objects] are occurring together. They find that sodomy and anal
intercourse are much more degrading and much more devastating .. "Testimony of Carol Kling-
bill, Director of the Sexual Assault Program, Harborview Hospital, Seattle, in Jud. Comm. Hearings,
infra note 78. The assertion about the frequency of these acts, however, is not born out by the avail-
able data in case files. See text following note 254 infra.
39. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A.88.100(1977). See also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
9A.20.202(b)(1977).
40. " 'Forcible compulsion' means physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, ex-
press or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or
another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.79.140(5)(1977).
41. The definition in the Washington statute is virtually identical to that in the New York Penal
Washington Law Review
prompting one commentator to say that nonconsent has been removed as
an element of the crime. 42 On the other hand, by defining forcible com-
pulsion in terms of the victim's resistance and using the same language
that under the prior statute defined "against the person's will," arguably
the element of nonconsent has been slipped in through the backdoor. 43
Conceptually, then, the new law represents a compromise approach, one
that emphasizes the actor's conduct but does not exclude the victim's re-
sistance as an objective indicator.
The "common denominator" to the three degrees of rape is lack of
consent. 44 When in addition to forcible compulsion there is present at
least one of the four itemized aggravating criminal circumstances, non-
consent can be said to be conclusive in a rape I offense. 45 The law does
not allow freedom of choice in a situation potentially dangerous to a per-
son's physical safety and to society's sense of collective security. Under
circumstances of physical force or threat of force constituting rape 2, lack
of consent is only presumptive. To this extent, the second degree offense
"[embodies] the essence of the prior rape statute.'46 Only in rape 3 is
nonconsent expressly stated as an element of the crime, but absent aggra-
vating factors and forcible compulsion, it is unclear what other objective
evidence based upon "the victim's words or conduct" 47 the state can pre-
sent as proof. The definitions of the first two degrees preempt the content
of rape 3 and render its prosecution difficult.
c. The Michigan reform legislation.
Unlike legislation patterned after the common law, reform statutes dif-
fer significantly in the legal standard employed to define the crime. The
most sweeping revision of prior law is the Michigan reform law. 48 It has
served as a model for twelve states49 and was at least "seriously exam-
Law, except that New York requires that the resistance be "earnest. " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8).
(McKinney 1975) (adopted 1965).
42. GONZAGA Comment, supra note 10, at 155.
43. A recent article argues that force and nonconsent are "'separate and distinct" elements, and
"one does not necessarily constitute evidence of the other." Consequently a rape victim is a "co-
defendant charged with the crime of consent." Gold & Wyatt, supra note 10, at 695. It may well be
that complaining witnesses who undergo skeptical questioning by law enforcement officials and harsh
cross-examination by defense counsel come to feel that they are the ones on trial. But what may be
experientially true is not necessarily conceptually correct. Modern statutory and decisional law do not
treat force and nonconsent as separate formal elements. Indeed, if force (or resistance) is not an
objective indicator of nonconsent, it is unclear how else the subjective state would be determined.
44. CRIMINAL CODE MANUAL, infra note 79, at 9.79.140-44.
45. WASU. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.170(l)(a)-(d).
46. CRIMINAL CODE MANUAL, infra note 79, at 9.79.170-74.
47. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.190(1)(a)(1977).
48. MICH. CoMp. LAWS 88 750.520(a)-(l)(Supp. 1977-78).
49. BATrELLE-LEAA FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 3, at I.
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ined" by Washington legislators. 50 Using sexually neutral terminology,
the statute even eschews the word rape, probably because of its outmoded
social and sexual connotations. 51 Any reference to the victim's conduct is
expressly eliminated. 52 Instead, it goes further than any other statute in
detailing the kinds of conduct that constitute criminal sexual behavior. 53
Four types of sexual assaults are proscribed as four degrees of "crimi-
nal sexual conduct." The first degree offense, 54 which carries a maxi-
50. Interviews with Rep. Ed Seeberger, a sponsor of House Bill 208 (the Seattle Women's Com-
mission's proposed rape law) and Sen. Pete Francis, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, by
James Nelson, on February 8-9, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Seeberger Interview and Francis Inter-
view.]
51. In Washington, many women opposed removing the word rape from the statute. The testi-
mony of one rape center counselor summed up the prevailing sentiment:
I think rape is a particular crime. I think that it's different than assault. People who commit rape
commit it for different reasons than people who commit assaults. Changing the name of the
crime isn't going to do any good. It's going to be throwing the issue under the rug, so to speak. I
think this would be very detrimental to our work with rape victims, because rape is not simply a
form of assault.
Jud. Comm. Hearings, infra note 78.
52. MICH. Cosip. LAws § 750.520i (Supp. 1977-78).
53. A definitional scheme as comprehensive as Michigan's is not initially without statutory inter-
pretation problems. Key definitions, for example, are vague due to the complexity of the statutory
scheme, drafting weaknesses, and the imprecision of language to capture subtle behavioral nuances.
"Penetration" is defined so broadly as to be almost indistinguishable from "contact" (see note 56
infra). Thus, does intrusion ("however slight") of the actor's finger into another person's sexual
organ constitute "penetration" or "contact"? The distinction is important because the respective
penalties upon conviction are not equally severe.
Another ambiguous definition is that of "personal injury" to the victim, which encompasses both
bodily injury and mental anguish. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(f) (Supp. 1977-78). On circum-
stance of a first degree offense (penetration with force or coercion causing personal injury, id. §
750.520(b)(1)(f)), is the same as a circumstance of the third degree offense (penetration with force or
coercion under "any of the circumstances listed in section 520(b)(1)(f)," that is, personal injury; id.
§ 750.520d). Since any unwanted penetration may cause anguish and the statute does not define
degrees of anguish, the two offenses are indistinguishable except in penalties. Other states adopting
the Michigan model consequently require "great" mental anguish for the first degree offense. See,
e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9.11 .A(2)(1978).
To define the actor's conduct in terms of the degree of the victim's emotional state introduces
problems of psychological measurement and proof. Given the modem shift away from the victim's
conduct (degree of resistance) as an indication of nonconsent, the reliance now on the victim's sub-
jective response (ungraded anguish) seems to dilute the new statutory focus on the actor's conduct.
The reason for including mental anguish in the definition is understandable, since rape is perceived as
a crime of psychological violence. See note 15 supra. But the law already recognizes the emotional
trauma inherent in all instances of forcible rape by proscribing the act in the first instance, even if
unaccompanied by actual extrinsic force, and by prescribing severe penalties upon conviction. Hence
it does not need to insist upon further proof of the degree of anguish at trial. Attempts at proof could
open up examination of the victim's past experiences, including sexual history, which reform statutes
(including Michigan's) takes pains to exclude. See notes 85-95 and accompanying text infra. For this
reason, the Washington reform law and most other reform legislation do not incorporate mental an-
guish into their definitional framework.
54. MIcH. CoMP. LAws § 750.520b (Supp. 1977-78).
553
Washington Law Review Vol. 55:543, 1980
mum sentence of life imprisonment, is an aggravated 55 act of sexual pen-
etration. 56 Second degree criminal sexual conduct, 57 punishable by a 15-
year maximum sentence, is an aggravated act of sexual conduct. 58 The
third and fourth degree offenses, carrying 15- and 2-year maximum sen-
tences, respectively, repeat the pattern of penetration (3rd degree) and
contact (4th degree) under less aggravated circumstances.
d. The Model Penal Code.
The 1955 draft on sexual offenses of the Model Penal Code was the
first major restatement of the common law. Its innovative standard of
rape 59 had widespread effect in the early and mid-1970's on state and
proposed federal criminal codifications. 60 The culpable conduct occurs
when a male 6' compels a female not his wife to submit to sexual inter-
course by force or threat of death or serious bodily injury. For the first
time, a rape law deliberately avoided nonconsent language in the text.
Nonetheless, the drafters acknowledged in the Comments that "the cen-
tral issue is likely to be the . . . consent . . . of the female . . . 62
55. Among the aggravated circumstances varying from the four offenses are the youth of the
victim, a familial or authority relationship between actor and a young victim, commission of another
felony, participation of more than one actor, the actor's possession of a weapon. personal injury to
the victim, mental defects or physical helplessness of the victim, and the actor's use of force or
coercion. Id. § 750.520a-e. Force of coercion is objectively indicated by any of five non-exclusive
criteria ranging from use or threat of physical force to deception. Id. § 750.520b( 1 )(f)-(v).
56. " 'Sexual penetration' means sexual intercourse . . . or any other intrusion, however
slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal opening of another
person's body .. "Id. § 750.520a(h).
57. Id. § 750.520c.
58. Id.
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (10 UNIFORMi LAws ANNOTATED 1974). Rape and related offenses.
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if:
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury.
extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone;
Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious
bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social companion of the actor
upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties, in which
cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.
(2) Gross Sexual Imposition. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife
commits a felony of the third degree if:
(a) he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of
ordinary resolution; . . .
60. See VA. Note, supra note 3, at 1512.
61. The substantive offense was not defined in terms of a female actor because, according to the
drafters, "[it seems more realistic . . . of morals, rather than sexual aggression." The commen-
tary did not discuss homosexual rape. MODEL PENAL Coo § 207.4, Comment (2)(Tent. Draft No. 4.
1955).
62. Id. Comment (I).
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and consequently defined "compels to submit" as requiring more than "a
token initial resistance, but less than the "utmost resistance" of common
law. 63 The fact that some resistance was still thought necessary to prove
the crime points to the difficulty of framing a legal test exclusively in
terms of one party's conduct.
The Code provides for two degrees of culpability. 64 The basic substan-
tive offense is a second degree felony, and the added presence of either
one of the aggravating conditions-serious bodily injury or involuntary
social companion-elevates the felony to the first degree. 65 Rape 1, then,
represents the stereotyped, public image of the crime: a brutal assault by a
stranger leaping out from behind the bushes. 66 Most rapes, however, do
not fit that mold; they do not result in physical injury and do not involve
strangers. 67 The relative importance of the involuntary companion factor
consequently increases. When the victim and actor have engaged in social
interaction prior to the offense, juries tend to bootleg informal notions of
contributory negligence or assumption of risk by the victim in determin-
ing the culpability of the actor.68 The formal inclusion of the antecedent
social relationship in the definitional scheme indicates a recognition on
the part of the drafters that assumptions of "victim precipitation" 69 color
prosecutor and jury determinations of nonconsent. In light of the record
of jury leniency in these circumstances, the Code emphasizes that forcible
sexual intercourse by a social companion is still a crime, albeit only in the
63. Id. Comment (6).
64. Grading the actor's conduct was one of the two major issues faced by the drafters. The other
was drawing the line between illicit intercourse and rape-seduction. Id. Comment (1).
65. In addition, the Code provides for two sexual offenses which it does not categorize as rape.
One is "gross sexual imposition," or sexual intercourse compelled by threat that prevents resistance
(the common law definition of nonconsent). MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(10 UNIFORi LAws ANNO-
TATED 1974). See note 59 supra. This is equivalent to Washington's and Michigan's third degree
rape. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.190(1977); MICH. Co,%iP. LAws § 750.520d (Supp. 1977-78).
The Code drafters, however, did not believe it warranted the stigmatizing label of rape and provided
for lower penalties upon conviction for that offense. MODEL PENAL COD § 207.4, Comment 1 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). The other non-"rape" offense is unwanted "sexual contact" which is categor-
ized as sexual assault. MODEL PENAL CODa § 213.4 (10 UNIFORmi LAWS ANNOTATED 1974). Under
Washington law, these acts are defined as indecent liberties or assault, respectively. WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 9A.88. 100; Id. ch. 9A.36 (1977). Michigan law defines them as rape 2 and 4, respec-
tively. MICH. Coip. LAWS 88 750.520 c,e (Supp. 1977-78).
66. According to the drafters, "[t]he community's sense of insecurity (and consequently the de-
mand for retributive justice) is especially sharp in relation to [unknown assailants]." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.4, Comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In other words, when a stranger randomly
selects a victim, general security is threatened-everyone is a potential victim. The probability and
fear of victimization in the population at large is less, however, when crimes occur between ac-
quainted couples.
67. See text accompanying note 252 infra.
68. KALVEN & ZElSEL, infra note 82, at 249-51.
69. See note 381 infra.
Washington Law Review
second degree of gravity. The Washington and Michigan reform statutes,
in contrast, ignore this social dimension of rape and define the offense
solely in terms of physical conduct.
2. Definitional Standards and Prosecution Effectiveness
Rape law was reformed in large measure to enhance the effectiveness
of prosecution. Changing the definitional component of the law-refor-
mulating the standard of criminalization and creating gradations of culpa-
bility-was thought to be instrumental in this regard. Determining
whether these changes actually facilitate prosecution is one of the main
purposes of this study.
The gravamen of criminal sexual intercourse in nonconsent. Under the
common law legislation, nonconsent was determined by examining the
victim's conduct. This standard was prejudicial to and weakened prosecu-
tion. Women generally have not been socialized to be aggressive and
many are afraid to and do not resist an assailant. Indeed, resistance to
rape or other violent crimes often results in greater injury to the victim. 70
Under the common law statutes, a jury could acquit when it determined
that the victim did not resist sufficiently; that is, the victim was deemed to
have consented. A court could dismiss prosecution or reverse a convic-
tion upon finding that resistance did not rise to the required level. 71 For
this reason, the consent standard has been criticized as "inflammatory
and mistaken" and its removal from reform legislation welcomed. 72 The
adoption, instead, of actor's force as the new standard of criminalization
led to the comment that "under the new [Michigan] law it is clearly no
longer necessary for the prosecution to prove nonconsent. ,73
It is doubtful that this feature of reform will have an appreciable impact
on prosecution. The difficulty in securing rape convictions under com-
mon law statutes was not created by the consent standard as such. Highly
publicized cases that are seen as travesties of justice usually involved the
application of an utmost resistance or high fear standard. 74 Such acquit-
70. Data on victim resistance and the relationship between resistance and injury are presented in
notes 253-257 and accompanying text infra.
71. Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 201, 106 N.W. 536,539 (1906) (conviction reversed because
complaining witness failed to prove utmost resistance).
72. VA. Note, supra note 3, at 1514.
73. MicH. Note, supra note 10, at 226.
74. In one case, for example, the physician who examined the complainant testified that -she
was absolutely terrified; she was shaking like a leaf and so incoherent it almost took half an hour to
make out anything she said. She was ver" hysterical .... finally she told me she had been out.
been raped." The jury convicted. The Wisconsin supreme court reversed because of its perception
that her fear was not so great as to excuse utmost resistance. State v. Hoffman. 228 Wis. 225. 240.
280 N.W. 357, 361 (1938).
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tals were less frequent when the law set a lower threshold of resistance.
The problem lies in the practical unattainability of the required level of
resistance or fear, and not in nonconsent itself.
In addition, consideration of victim resistance as a legal standard coin-
cides with attitudes in the criminal justice system. Unless there is evi-
dence of resistance, it is less likely that police will investigate, prosecu-
tors will charge, and juries will convict. 75 Nonconsent is one of the main
evidentiary issues around which the trial revolves. 76 As a practical mat-
ter, a prosecutor still must demonstrate nonconsensual intercourse
whether this was because of actor's force, victim's resistance, or both.
The same kinds of evidence are used to establish the crime regardless of
the statutory formulation and language. As a legal matter, though, a pros-
ecutor under the new legislation no longer has the burden of proving vic-
tim resistance or nonconsent. He is relieved of the risk of nonpersuasion
as to that element.
Thus, although nonconsent is the basic substantive element of the
crime and its evidentiary proof at trial remains unchanged, the standard
chosen as its operational indicator has important legal implications. The
new law channels the jury's focus, via instructions, on the culpability of
the actor rather than the response of the victim. It may render the jury's
exercise of its nullification power less likely because of stereotypes about
rape and rape complainants. In addition, with victim's conduct no longer
a separate formal element of the crime, there is less legal justification for
evidentiary rules unique to rape law based on the victim's past sexual
actions. The symbolic value of the shift should not be minimized. The
reform statutes announce society's interest in accurately identifying
perpetrators of rape, not in reinforcing traditional assumptions regarding
appropriate behavior of (virturous) women.
The single-degree definition of the crime and the accompanying severe
penalties for offenders that characterized common law statutes arguably
hampered prosecution. Harsh sanctions operated to discourage convictions
when there is a perceived sense of disproportion between culpability and
75. A New York City detective noted, "A lot of officers, especially the old-timers, believe that
unless a woman comes in bruised, there's no rape." Quoted in Cohn, Succumbing to Rape, in RAPE
VICnMOsIOGY 1 (L. Schultz ed. 1975). In one case, the jury acquitted a defendant for raping two
women despite the medical evidence of their bruised condition. One juror later revealed that the jury
did not believe the women had resisted sufficiently. Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A
Feminist View. 11 M. CRIM. L. R-v. 335, 346 (1973).
76. The two most common defenses are mistaken identification and consent. The former is more
likely when the circumstances of the crime indicate extreme force or that the victim's opportunity to
observe the defendant was limited. When identification is positive and the force used was limited, a
consent defense is probable. Less frequently, psychiatric defenses are raised when the facts of the
rape are heinous and identification evidence is irrefutable.
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the prescribed sentence. 77 Without gradations of rape, juries exercised
their nullification power by acquitting of the rape charge, or by convicting
of a lower offense if the option was available, in instances of "simple"
rather than "aggravated" rape. 78 Prosecutors who anticipated such jury
responses were more inclined to charge or accept a plea to a lesser of-
fense 79 in order to maximize their conviction records.
The legislative purpose in calibrating degrees of rape and punishment
was to facilitate prosecution and thereby enhance the general deterrent
effect of the law. 80 Proponents of the Washington reform statute expected
it would allow greater flexibility in charging (e.g., filing rape 3 in a weak
case rather than simple assault) and in negotiating (e.g., reducing a rape 2
charge to rape 3 instead of assault in exchange for a guilty plea). 8l More
rape convictions after trial were anticipated. Since a lower degree of rape
is a lesser included offense in a higher degree, this standard coincides
with the jury's intuitive notion of a continuum of culpability. 82 Proper
identification of offenders as rapists would also provide a more accurate
record of the incidence of the crime and enable them to qualify for sexual
offender treatment programs. 83 The new definitional scheme was ex-
77. Experience seems to show that excessively severe penalties may actually reduce the risk of
conviction, thereby leading to results contrary to their purpose. When the penalties are not rea-
sonably attuned to the gravity of the violation, the public is less inclined to inform the police, the
prosecuting authorities are less disposed to prosecute and juries are less apt to convict.
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949.970 (1966).
78. The Seattle Women's Commission drafted a proposed rape law. Senate Bill 2196 and House
Bill 208, that was enacted in 1975 as the new Washington rape statute. A Commission member
(Jackie Griswold) criticized the old law's one degree definition of rape as follows:
We believe that one significant reason for jurors' reluctance to convict for rape is that current
law requires that we consider under one category rapes of the most hideous variety as well as
those in which far less obvious harm has occurred. This results in a situation in which rapists
who commit grievous, shocking crimes are seen as rapists and convicted, and other rapists go
free because they do not compare in brutality.
From tape recording of hearings on the proposed law on January 21, 1975. before the Washington
Senate Judiciary Committee [hereinafter cited as Jud. Comm. Hearings].
79. '[T~he prior law, containing only one degree of rape, encouraged plea bargaining, resulting
in assault convictions in cases where a rape prosecution under a lower degree of rape would have
been pursued if available." WASHINGTON STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING COMISlSISON REVISED CRIMII
NAL CODE TRAINING AND SEMINAR MANUAL 9A.79.190-93 (January 1. 1976)[hereinafter cited as CRi6u
NAL CODE MANUAL].
80. There is no formal record of the legislative history and purposes of the new Washington law.
The formulation presented here is derived from extensive interviews conducted by my research assis-
tant. James Nelson, with various state legislators, attorneys. and representatives of women's groups
involved in the legislative reform process (described more fully in section 11.B of the text infra) and
from tape recordings of the legislative hearings on the proposed law (see Jud. Comm. Hearings.
supra note 78). See generally Part 11.B & C. infra.
81. Interview with Pat Aiken, assistant chief deputy prosecutor, criminal division. King County.
by James Nelson, on January I1. 1979 [hereinafter cited as Aiken Interview].
82. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL. THE AMERICAN JURY 250 (1966).
83. Testimony of Carol Klingball. in Jud. Comm. Hearings. supra note 78.
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pected to produce, according to a defense attorney, "a better mousetrap"
for the prosecution. 84
3. Evidentiary Rules
Rules pertaining to the admissibility in evidence of the victim's chas-
tity85 and the requirement of corroboration of her testimony86 evoke again
the issue whether rape law should focus on.the conduct of victim or actor.
They are among the most controverted and commented upon aspects of
rape law. 87
Under the common law, general reputation for chastity and specific in-
stances of prior sexual activity were deemed probative of consent88 and,
84. Testimony of Murray Guterson, a prominent defense attorney and chairman of a State Bar
Association task force that drafted a proposed rape statute (which was eventually rejected by the
legislature; see note 144 and accompanying text infra), in Jud. Comm. Hearings, supra note 78. His
exchange with Pete Francis, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, reflects the opposing view-
points on the calibration of culpability in rape:
Guterson: "Is it your feeling . . . that what you are going to ultimately come up with will
include some kind of third degree rape or is that still open for debate? If there is going to be a
third degree, how will it be defined?
Francis: "It's certainly something we probably need to discuss more. It could be of some
significance and I don't think we are at all aware of the potential differences between having just
two degrees or three degrees.
Guterson: "As a defense attorney, I always feel that it's harmful to the defendant to be ac-
cused of a crime that has a number of lesser included offenses. If the prosecutor can give the jury
different ways of convicting, then it makes it a lot easier for a jury to compromise. That's basi-
cally why I oppose the third degree of rape.
Francis: "On the other side of the coin, you have definitely given [the Seattle Women's Com-
mission's] argument for three degrees because what we're trying to do is convict more rapists.
Guterson: "I'm not trying to convict more anythings than I possibly can. And I don't like the
notion that people who are very considerate of the constitutional rights of the accused and who
are very liberal in quotes . . . when it comes to sex offenses become overwhelmingly prosecu-
tion minded."
Third degree rape in the original Seattle Women's Commission proposal included only sexual in-
tercourse without consent (now WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.190(1)(a)(1977)). Another group, the
State Women's Council, then proposed extending the offense to encompass intercourse compelled by
a person in authority, such as a landlord or employer (now WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.79.190(l)(b)(1977). Interview with Jackie Griswold, chair of the drafting committee, Seattle
Women's Commssion, by James Nelson, January 15, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Griswold Interview].
85. Chastity is abstention from premarital or extramarital sexual intercourse. See State v. Bird,
302 So. 2d 589, 592 (La. 1974).
86. For an enumeration of types of corroborative evidence (e.g., medical evidence, breaking and
entering, tom clothing, prompt complaint, emotional state, etc.), see Allison v. United States, 409
F.2d 445, n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
87. Most of the legal literature on rape pertains to evidentiary rules. See note 10 supra. This
aspect of rape law is mentioned here in passing only as background for the discussion of the role of
corroboration in prosecutorial decision making. See discussion at III E infra.
88. "Fortunately, the character of the woman as to chastity or unchastity is admissible in evi-
dence because of its probative value in judging whether she did or did not consent to the act in
question." R. PERKINS, supra note 10, at 158 (footnotes omitted). One court put it more colorfully:
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in some jurisdictions, of credibility. 89 Harsh cross-examination of com-
plaining witnesses often produced "character assassination in open
court" 90 and discouraged victims from prosecuting for fear of being
"twice traumatized." 91 In revising rape laws, over one half of the states
enacted "shield laws" for victims. 92 The new Washington law steers a
middle course between exclusion93 and discretionary admission94 of such
evidence. The statute excludes it for impeaching credibility and admits it
for showing consent, pursuant only to a pretrial motion, offer of proof by
affidavit, and an in camera hearing. 95
Since there are rarely witnesses to rape and physical evidence is not
always available, corroboration often was required96 to safeguard against
false accusations 97 under common law statutes. 98 The requirement, strad-
"And will you not more readily infer assent in the practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in the
reserved and virtuous Lucretia?" People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. 1838).
89. Promiscuity imports dishonesty. Brown v. State, 50 Ala. App. 471, 474, 280 So. 2d 177.
179 (1973). Many courts, however, do not allow nonchastity to impeach victim's credibility. 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 923-24 (Chadboum rev. 1970).
90. Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. 605, 610, 328 N.E.2d 496, 501 (1975)(Brauchner.
J., dissenting).
91. Bohmer & Blumbwerg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Courts. 58 Jro. 391
(1975).
92. See Berger, supra note 7, at 32 nn. 196 & 197.
93. See, e.g., MICH. CoMiP. LAWS § 750.520j (Supp. 1977-78). It excludes evidence of victim's
chastity, sexual reputation, and sexual conduct, except for evidence of prior sexual activity with the
defendant, and evidence of specific instances of sexual activity to show the origin of pregnancy,
disease, or semen. Even the excepted evidence is admitted only after a hearing. For a discussion of
the constitutionality of this provision of the Michigan statute on sixth amendment grounds, see Note,
Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Com-
plaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process? 3 HOFS-
TRA L. REV. 403, 417-25 (1975). See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 52-83.
94. At common law, admission was at the court's discretion upon a finding that probative value
outweighed prejudice. Some modem codes continue this permissive approach to admissibility. See.
e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-26A (1978).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020(1)-(39 (1979). See generally'. Note, Evidence-Adn issibil-
it, of the Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washington's Rape Evidence Law-Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9.79.150 (1976). 52 WASH. L. REV. 1011 (1977). In 1975 the Washington Court of Appeals held
that specific acts of sexual misconduct were inadmissible as to consent. State v. Greer, 13 Wn. App.
71, 73, 533 P.2d 389, 391 (1975). On its face, the new statutory procedure could let in more sexual
history evidence than is possible under existing case law. In fact, in the four years since the enact-
ment of the shield law, there have been only two or three instances in which defense counsel has even
requested a pretrial hearing. They seem to recognize that such evidence is inapposite and, in any
event, the Washington courts are unlikely to admit in light of the Greer decision. Canova Interview.
supra note 18.
96. Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal not Reform. supra note 10. and BAB-
COCK, supra note 10, at 853-55.
97. Fears of false accusations expressed by courts and commentators typically rest on Wigmore's
authority. Relying on "modem psychiatry" (five case studies from a 1915 textbook), he stated the
following about "women coming before the courts":
Their psychic complexes are multifavious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by disease
derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary
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dling the line between substantive law and evidence, was believed to im-
pair prosecution and deter victims' reporting. 99 Washington courts, how-
ever, have not required corroborated testimony' 00 and the new statute
codifies existing case law for both forcible and statutory rape. 101 Reform
statutes elsewhere have largely abrogated the requirement, 102 recognizing
that ordinary safeguards of the adversarial process suffice to protect
against false witness. 103
physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these complexes, is that of contriving
false charges of sexual offenses by men ...
, * . Judging merely from the reports of cases in the appellate courts, one must infer that
many innocent men have gone to prison because of tales whose falsity could not be exposed.
3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924(a), at 736 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Nonetheless, Wigmore opposed a
corroboration rule in rape because it was inadequate to determine credibility, and a court can always
set aside a conviction for insufficient evidence. 7 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061, at 464 (Chadbourn
rev. 1978). He proposed instead that "[n]o judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury
unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified
to by a qualified physician." 3A J. WtGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924(a), at 737 (Chadboum rev. 1970)(foot-
notes omitted). Nevertheless, Wigmore's quaint ideas on women's psychology have been relied upon
to support the corroboration rule.
98. Under early common law, rape was not treated differently from other crimes with respect to
corroboration: the testimony of a rape victim, like that of an assault victim, needed no formal corro-
boration. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 2061, at 451 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). There were, however, alter-
native testimonial safeguards. One was the cautionary jury instruction derived from Lord Hale's oft-
quoted remark that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OFTHE PLEASEOFTHE
CROWN 635 (London 1800)(n.p. 1680). This instruction was struck down in California in People v.
Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975). Another common law
safeguard was the requirement of prompt reporting by the victim, sometimes also considered as an
indicator of credibility. See Greenfield, The Prompt Complaint: A Developing Rule of Evidence, 9
CRIM. L. Q. 286 (1967).
99. Partly as a result of the corroboration requirement, there were only 18 rape convictions out of
thousands of complaints in New York City in a "recent typical" year. N.Y. PENAL LAW note §
130.16 (McKinney 1975). This, in turn, was further said to discourage reporting. See, Lear, Q. If you
Rape a Woman and Steal Her T.V., What Can They Get You For in New York? A. Stealing her T. V.,
N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 55 (quoting Governor's Approval Memoradum No.
16, May 22, 1972).
100. Since the turn of the century the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness has
been sufficient for rape conviction. State v. Roller, 30 Wash. 692, 695, 71 P. 718, 719 (1903).
101. The new statute states: "In order to convict a person of any crime defined in this chapter it
shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated." WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.44.020(!)(1979).
102. E.g., MICH. Co,%ip. LAWS § 750.520h (Supp. 1977-78). But see MODEL PENAL CODE §
213.6(5), requiring corroborated testimony for rape conviction and a cautionary charge to the jury to
evaluate the victim's testimony "in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the diffi-
culty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private." Curi-
ously, the drafters did not elucidate why they included these requirements. MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.4, Comment (22)(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Code's focus on actor's conduct in the defini-
tion of the crime is inconsistent with its focus on victim's conduct with respect to evidentiary rules.
103. The presumption of innocence, the government's burden of proof, the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses have been consid-
ered sufficient safeguards against testimonial falsehood in all other crimes (except perjury). A corro-
boration requirement is perhaps understandable if rape is a one degree offense as in common law-
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The absence of a legal requirement does not mean that corroboration as
a factual matter at trial is of less significance. 104 A study of rape prosecu-
tions in Texas found medical corroboration to be the most determinative
factor in securing indictments, despite the abrogation of the corroboration
requirement. 105 The author concluded that prosecutorial reliance on cor-
roboration was "misguided" since their decisions were made on a basis
"only partly acceptable in light of legislative policy." 0 6 This statement
fails to distinguish between the formal requirement of corroboration (to
sustain a conviction) and its practical necessity at trial (as evidence of
victim's credibility). 107 With the requirement, a trial court must sustain a
motion to dismiss at the end of the state's case unless corroborative evi-
dence has been adduced. An appellate court can overturn a conviction
rendered in an uncorroborated case. Prosecutors will not file charges if
they anticipate the case cannot get to the jury because of a lack of corro-
boration. Without the requirement, a jury would probably still not convict
unless there is corroboration, but at least the prosecution would not be
dismissed outright. As with the concept of nonconsent, corroboration
need not be elevated to a legal standard because of its potency in point of
fact at trial.
4. Social Reform of Rape Legislation
Rape laws mirror values regarding the social position of women and
the nature of the crime. In the view of radical feminists, rape is "an of-
fense one male commits upon another-a matter of 'abusing his
woman,' "108 and rape laws are designed accordingly to safeguard male
based statutes. The severe penalties associated with rape impelled courts to guard against wrongful
convictions. With gradations of the crime, however, the requirement is less compelling since the fact-
finder can convict of a less included offense which carries a lower penalty.
104. After the abrogation of the California corroboration requirement. a Los Angeles deputy
prosecutor stated: "Legal theory is not legal reality . . . and in California, just like anywhere else in
the country, a woman who hopes to win a rape case better have plenty of corroboration." Chappel &
Singer, Rape in New York City: A Study of Material in the Police Files and its Meaning. Chappell.
supra note 10, at 266.
105. Weninger, supra note 1I, at 390.
106. Id. at 391-92.
107. Prosecutors in most small counties require rape victims to undergo polygraph examinations
at least "'sometimes" before deciding whether to file charges against the alleged perpetrator. BAT-
TELL-LEAA PROSECUTOR SURVEY, supra note 4, at 65 (Table 39). Because polygraph results are not
usually admissible at trial without stipulation by both parties, the purpose of the test is not principally
to obtain corroboration, but rather assess the victim's cooperativeness and determination to prose-
cute. Interview with Jay Reich, Chief of the Juvenile Division. King County Prosecuting Attorney
(June 19. 1979)[hereinafter cited as Reich Interviewl.
108. K. MILLET, SEXUAL POLITics 44 (1970).
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property rights in women. 109 One need not subscribe to some of their po-
lemical excesses 110 to agree that common law statutes on rape embodied
and reinforced Victorian morals of the times. The social status of women
was defined in terms of premarital virginity and marital fidelity. Chastity
was a legally protected property value because it helped channel sexuality
into marriage. 1 ' By protecting chastity, the law buttressed the institution
of monogamy; by criminalizing rape, the law deterred threats to family
and social organization.
In this value system, moralistic and absolute, the law recognized only
one gradation of rape. A woman was either defiled or not; violations of
chastity did not come in degrees. Harsh penalty was prescribed for "de-
spoiling" a chaste woman because rape diminished her marketability and
threatened the institutions of marriage and family. A woman was ex-
pected therefore to protect her social status by utmost resistance.
Reform legislation reflects the judgment that individual self-determina-
tion in sexual choice is a protected interest in and of itself. A corollary
policy is protection of bodily security. When sexual intercourse is accom-
panied by extrinsic violence, reform statutes in effect presume noncon-
sent. The dangerousness of the actor's conduct requires a "strict liabil-
ity" approach. By discarding assumptions of chastity, the law can
recognize degrees of culpability (and of victim nonconsent) and abrogate
the special evidentiary rules premised thereupon.
The reform of rape laws, then, reflects a shift in both social policy and
legal methodology-from a policy of protecting a tangible, property in-
terest to one of safeguarding an intangible, personal right; from an abso-
lute approach based on fixed legal categories (one crime, one penalty) to a
relativistic one that calibrates culpability and social harm along a contin-
uum.
B. Statutory Rape
Criminal proscription of sexual intercourse with underage persons who
are conclusively presumed incapable of consent does not seem to stir as
much public clamor or official diligence as does nonconsensual inter-
course. Most doctrinal and empirical analyses of rape laws exclude statu-
tory rape from the scope of their coverage. 112 One reason is that the cir-
109. S. BROWNSMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 377, 379 (1975). See CALIF. Comment, supra note 10,
at 924-25.
110. Brownsmiller, for example, states: "[Rape] is nothing more or less than a conscious pro-
cess of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear." S. BROWNSMILLER, supra
note 109, at 15.
111. YALE Comment, supra note 31, at 70.
112. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 3 n.8; CALIF. Comment supra note 10, at 919; CHICAGO
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cumstances of statutory and forcible rape are dissimilar. The former
offense typically involves a continuing relationship, without physical
force, between a willing underage girl and an older male acquaintance or
relative. 1 3 Neither the public" 14 nor the criminal justice system, 1 5 tends
to regard this conduct as "rape."
Washington's common law statute on carnal knowledge, 116 like similar
statutes elsewhere, 117 set a single age of nonconsent (under 18 years) and
provided penalties inversely proportional to the victim's age. The new
statutory rape law" 18 lowers the ceiling to under 16 years and defines three
gradations of the offense based upon the age differential between the par-
ties. 119 The penalties for the degrees of statutory rape are equivalent to the
Comment, supra note 10, at 613 n.1: VA. Note, supra note 3, at 1500 n.1; CLEVELAND STATE Note,
supra note 3 1; Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 979 (1969). There has been no systematic, empirical study of statutory
rape prosecution.
113. Studies based on court records estimate that this particular fact pattern accounts for 40 to 95
percent of child victims. Schultz, The Child as a Sex Victim: Socio-Legal Perspectives, RAPE Vtc-r.
MOLOOY 257, 259 (L. Schultz ed. 1975). Many of the participant victims are products of broken
homes or have a background of family conflict. T. GIVVENS & J. PRINCE. CHILD VICTIMS OF SEX OF-
FENSES 7 (1963).
114. YALE Comment, supra note 31, at 75 n. 134.
115. In a recent nationwide survey, sex offenses against women aged 12 to 17 years were found
most likely to be declined for prosecution or dismissed by the court. Prosecutors Find Victim's Role
Makes or Breaks Case, 8 LEAA Newsletter No. 5, at 6 (May 1979).
116. 1973 Wash. Laws (lst Ex. Sess.) ch. 154, § 123 (repealed 1975) provided:
Every male person who shall carnally know and abuse any female child under the age of
eighteen years, not his wife, and every female person who shall carnally know and abuse any
male child under the age of eighteen years, not her husband, shall be punished as follows:
(I) When such an act is committed upon a child under the age of ten years, by imprisonment
in the state penitentiary for life;
(2) When such an act is committed upon a child of ten years and under fifteen years of age. by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than twenty years:
(3) When such act is committed upon a child of fifteen years of age and under eighteen years
of age, by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than fifteen years.
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comments at 250-51 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
118. In the process of legislative reform, statutory rape got relatively little attention from the
main women's lobby. In fact, their proposed reform statute initially dealt exclusively with forcible
rape. At the instigation of legislators, a new statutory rape law was eventually drafted. Griswold
Interview, supra note 84; Francis Interview, supra note 50.
119. WASH. REv. CODE§ 9A.44.070(l)(1979):
A person over thirteen years of age is guilty of statutory rape in the first degree when the person
engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is less than eleven years old.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.080( l)( 1979):
A person over sixteen years of age is guilty of statutory rape in the second degree when such person
engages in sexual intercourse with another person, not married to the perpetrator, who is eleven years
of age or older but less than fourteen years old.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.090(1)(1979):
A person over eighteen years of age is guilty of statutory rape in the third degree when such person
engages in sexual intercourse with another person, not married to the perpetrator. who is fourteen
years of age or older but less than sixteen years old.
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respective penalties for forcible rape. The Model Penal Code' 20 and the
new Michigan law' 2' differ from Washington's law both in the labelling
of the offense and in the number of steps in the grading system.
The lowering of the age of nonconsent is significant. It symbolizes the
modem policy of safeguarding self-determination in sexual choice, sub-
ject to the individual's capacity to comprehend that choice. The drawing
of actual age lines itself is somewhat arbitrary, a product of legislative
compromise. Practically, the result is to increase the pool of cases in
which the prosecution must now prove the fact of nonconsent in order to
secure a conviction. The impact of this statutory age change on the rate of
overall convictions and decline of prosecutions in forcible rape cases will
be assessed in this study.
The purpose common to all legislative formulations making consent
legally inoperative is to protect the immature from sexual exploitation. 122
Immaturity is identified objectively and in advance by age. The new
Washington statute' 23 recognizes three distinct age groups; pre-puberty
(under 11 years), early adolescence (11-13 years), and middle adoles-
cence (14-15 years). Retribution is harshest when a pre-pubescent child
is used as a sexual object because such acts manifest in the adult male
actor a "mental aberration, called pedophilia." 124 At puberty the child
arrives at physical capacity to engage in intercourse. However, the act is
proscribed because an early or middle adolescent may not comprehend
the meaning of sexuality and, therefore, is likely to be exploited. In addi-
tion, the conduct is regarded as a "contravention of the moral standards
of the community." 125
Age of victim is treated in tandem with age of actor. Unlike reform
statutes on forcible rape, such as Michigan's that focus only on the actor,
the law of statutory rape recognizes that both parties must be taken into
account in defining the crime. As a result of the strict liability approach,
the object of focus is age rather than conduct. The new Washington law
criminalizes sexual intercourse only when the age differential exceeds
120. The Model Penal Code labels the offense "corruption of minors and seduction," a third
degree felony, and sets a single age of consent (tentatively, under 16 years). The label and grading
indicate that the drafters do not consider this offense as serious as a "rape" offense. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.3 (1962).
121. In the Michigan scheme, age is one of the aggravating circumstances that define a first,
second, or third degree offense. The critical age is drawn at below 13 years, and exploitation is
conclusive if the victim is between 13 and 15 years of age. MICH. Co,%ip. LAws §§ 750.520(b)(l),(a)-
(b); 750.520(c)(l)(a)-(b); 750.520(d)(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1977-78).
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comments at 251 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
123. VAsH. REv. CODE §§ 9.79.200(1); 9.70.219(1); 9.79.220(1)(1977).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comments at 252 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
125. Id.
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two to four years. 126 Sexual experimentation between members of
roughly the same age cohort is not considered an exploitative relation-
ship.
Implicit in the victimization protection policy is the assumption of
long-lasting psychological harm to children, especially in the first two age
categories. Clinical interviews of children 27 and retrospective studies of
adults (victimized at childhood) 128 indicate that in the absence of physical
violence, this concern is exaggerated. In fact, "it is not the sexual act per
se that creates trauma, but the parents' behavior toward the child victim
on discovery of the offense, and how this parental behavior affects the
child.' 129 Parental punishment and expressions of revulsion by adults
and peers are greater causes of stress. 130 It forces the child to adjust her
perception of the act as play or affection-seeking behavior to the adult
view as criminal activity. Proscribing the conduct, then, serves not only
to protect the child but to prevent the affront to parental and community
feelings.
Also more potent than the act itself as a source of ill effects is the pro-
cess of prosecution. 131 The victim is subjected to questioning by police
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.220(1)(1977).
127. Schultz, supra note 113, at 260.
128. See, e.g., Landis, Experiences of 500 Children with Adult Sexual Deviation, 30 PsYCHIAnc
Q. 91-99 (Supp. 1956). In a college sample, 35% of the women and 30% of the men reported being
sexually victimized during childhood by adults. Of the women, 4% reported that they suffered long-
term damage from the experience. Another study of college women found 5% were seriously harmed
by pre-puberty sexual exploitation. Gagnon, Female Child Victims of Sex Offenses, 13 Soc. PROB.
176, 189 (1965).
129. Schultz, supra note 113, at 264. One study found that child victims involved in criminal
proceedings suffered more behavioral disturbances and recovered less quickly than a random group
of child victims. GIBBENS & PRINCE, supra note 113, at 13-14.
The conclusions of these studies need to be accepted with caution for several reasons. First, there
are inherent biases in self-selected samples. Second, reported cases are likely to be different from the
larger pool of unreported cases. Third, the measure of psychological harm is not the same in every
study. Some studies use the criterion of responsiveness to treatment; others consider the victim's
adjustment to society many years later as an adult. See Bender, Offended and Offender Children,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAw 687-89 (R. Slovenko ed. 1965). However defined, the harm may be
the product of a combination of sources. The sexual incident, for example, could aggravate a pre-
existing emotional disturbance in the child, so that the particular source of the trauma is difficult to
trace. Gagnon, supra note 128, at 188. Despite these methodological limitations, there is a general
consensus among psychiatrists that the psychological damage is due at least as much (if not more) to
societal reactions after discovery of the offense, as to the offense itself. See M. GUTrMACHER. SEX
OFFNSES: THE PROBLEM, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 118-119 (1951).
130. GIBBENS & PRINCE, supra note 113, at 5-6. Studies also indicate that sexual conduct dis-
closed by the children to parents result in more trauma than those not reported to anyone. This led one
social worker to suggest that "[Non-reporting of the offense may be the best choice in terms of the
child's welfare." Schultz, supra note 113, at 263.
131. "Legal proceedings are not geared to protect the victim's emotions and may be exception-
ally traumatic." GUTrMACHER, supra note 129, at 118. See also DR FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD
VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES 12-13 (1965).
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and prosecutors usually untrained in interviewing child witnesses. 132 If
the case goes to trial, the child is treated as an adult prosecutrix in the
adversarial process. Current statutory schemes contain no provisions for
"shielding" child victims from such impact. In actuality, however, most
children are already shielded by the fact that statutory rape cases seldom
go to trial unless there is physical violence.
The important and unexamined issues in statutory rape thus pertain
more to implementation rather than formulation of the law. Here, more
than in forcible rape, prosecutorial discretion is the central issue. The
broad legislative proscriptions based on age require sensitive judgment,
tuned to prevailing community values and realities, in order to translate
them into pragmatically satisfactory policy. The present study attempts to
determine the factors, in addition to age, relied upon in prosecution of
statutory rape, and compares them with the discretionary factors in prose-
cution of forcible rape. The results can elucidate the role of consent in the
administration of rape law.
II. PROCESS AND CONTEXT OF REFORM
The proponents of rape law reform were drawn from three movements
that gained national prominence in the mid-sixties to mid-seventies: the
movement to codify state criminal laws, the women's rights movement,
and the crime control movement. The three movements had distinct but
overlapping interests. Together, they forged a powerful, non-traditional
alliance that pushed reform bills through state legislatures with uncom-
mon swiftness and political acumen. To understand the reasons behind
some of the provisions of the new statutes and to assess the impact of
these rapidly instituted changes, it is useful to examine the process and
social-political context of legislative reform. There are some consistent
patterns of reform from state to state, and the particular circumstances of
the Washington experience will be used to highlight them.
A. Codification of State Criminal Law
The Model Penal Code official draft published in 1962 served as a cata-
lyst in most states for the consolidation of criminal statutes into one inte-
grated whole. The Code was a massive effort to bring a sense of order to
the antiquated, prolix body of criminal legislation by establishing general
principles of liability, a systematic structure for offenses, and penalties
132. In some jurisdictions, social workers conduct questioning of child victims on behalf of the
police or prosecutors, but this is the exception. DE FRANCIS, supra note 131, at 11.
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proportional to the crimes. 133 By the late 1960's, over 30 jurisdictions
had started or completed revisions modeled after the Code. 134
The reform of rape laws in some instances began as a part of the larger
overhaul of the entire state criminal code. In 1967, the Washington State
legislature resolved to revise the criminal code and delegated the under-
taking to the Washington Legislative Council's Judiciary Committee. 135
The project consultant and reporter were left largely free to express their
own "libertarian principles" while also relying on the Model Penal Code
and reform legislation of other states. 136 The final product, known as the
Orange Code after the color of its cover, was published in December
1970.137 The chapter on sex offenses used the "approach" of the Model
Penal Code in devising a grading scheme for culpable conduct, but the
"definition and organization of offenses"' 138 were modeled after Michi-
gan and New York statutes in setting forth three degrees each of rape 139
and of sexual contact. 140 In addition, like the Model Penal Code' 4' and
unlike Michigan's law, 142 it required corroboration, which would have
reversed existing Washington case law, and did not include a shield law
for victims. By adopting wholesale the legislation from other jurisdictions
without tailoring it to the local context, and by neglecting to involve inter-
est groups and legislators in the political and educative aspects of the
drafting process, the two drafters practically ensured that the published
proposal would be met with nearly unanimous rejection. Prosecutors ob-
jected to the mens rea approach of the entire proposed code, 143 and
133. See generally Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097
(1952).
134. Baldwin, Criminal Law Revision in Delaware and Hawaii, 4 J. L. REF. 476, 481 (1971).
For an analysis on the process of revising criminal codes in other states, see. e.g., Fox. supra note
12.
135. S. Res. 1967 Ex-38. Senate Journal, State of Wash. 1639 (1967).
136. The consultant was Professor John Junker of the University of Washington Law School.
and the reporter was a former student of his, Richard Holmquist. Interviews with Professor Junker by
James Nelson, January 20, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Junker Interview].
137. REvtsEO WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE (December 3, 1970) published by the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the Washington Legislative Council [hereinafter cited as Orange Code]. Strictly speaking. it
was not a "proposed code" at the time of publication because it had not been approved by the Judici-
ary Committee of the Washington Legislative Council. It was published by the Committee "'for the
sole purpose of inviting comments from members of the public." Id. at ii.
138. Id. at 173.
139. Id. §§ 9A.44.040-060.
140. Id. §§ 9A.55.070-090.
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(6)(1962).
142. MicH. CoMP. LAws § 750.520h (Supp. 1977-78).
143. See Washington Criminal Code (1973), Prosecuting Attorney's Draft, Washington State
Prosecuting Attorneys' Association. A major innovation of the Model Penal Code was the definition
of four levels of criminal intention, and the allocation of a specific mens rea requirement to each
crime (and sometimes to different elements within a crime). Prosecutors felt this scheme was unne-
cessarily complex.
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women's groups were incensed at the evidentiary provisions of the rape
section. The state bar association assembled a blue-ribbon committee,
representing a balance of prosecution and defense interests, to mediate
the conflicting viewpoints. 144 All three groups proceeded to draft counter-
proposals to the Orange Code. In the end, it was the proposal of a
women's group-a broadly-based, well-organized, single-issue lobby
that focused on only one segment of the criminal law rather than the re-
form of an entire code-that prevailed. The legislature enacted it fully
one year before passage of the remainder of the new criminal code.
B. Women's Rights Movement
The main force behind the awakening of public consciousness to rape
and the reform of rape laws was the feminist movement. It re-emerged as
an influence in American politics in the latter half of 1960.145 Incident to
its drive for social and economic equality, feminists sought equal enforce-
ment of anti-prostitution laws. They insisted that soliciting men, not just
prostitutes, be subject to prosecution. This issue, however, turned out to
be ideologically divisive and failed to rally a broad cross-section of
women. 146 Feminists had to search for a different cause in the area of
criminal justice. They found it in rape law reform.
In consciousness-raising group sessions across the country, women be-
gan to discover in rape a common concern that cut across class and
race. 147 They saw rape not only as isolated instances of criminal conduct,
but as a societal problem rooted in sex role stereotypes and cultural per-
spectives discriminatory to women. The immediate objective was to aid
144. See Report of the Task Force to the Washington State Bar: Washington Proposed Criminal
Code (1974), Washington State Bar Association, Criminal Code Task Force. The task force consisted
of two prosecutors, two defense attorneys, and two attorneys in private, civil practice.
145. After the ratification of the nineteenth amendment guaranteeing universal suffrage, the
women's rights movement declined as a significant political force. "Social feminists," such as the
League of Women Voters, felt their goal of equality was achieved. "Hardcore feminists," who be-
lieved that suffrage was only a first step towards equality, represented the minority viewpoint. W.
O'NEIuL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINISM IN AMERICA 5 (1969). In 1966, the
National Organization of Women was established. Its early leadership was drawn from participants of
the 1963 President's Conference on the Status of Women and from civil rights activists. See generally
J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1975).
146. On the one hand, feminists condemned prostitution. They saw it as degrading to women,
and they criticized the harassment of prostitutes by the criminalization of the activity. On the other
hand, they also opposed the legalization of prostitution because the required medical examinations
and licensing procedures would formalize the degradation. The prostitutes themselves did not wel-
come the attention of the feminists. See generally K. MILLETr, THE PROSTITUTION PAPERS: A CANDID
DIALOGUE (1971). "The women's rights movement today is ambivalent about prostitution." BAB-
COCK, supra note 10, at 897.
147. See generally Largen, History of the Women's Movement in Changing Attitudes, LaIv, and
Treatment toward Rape Victims. SEXUALASSAULT 69-70 (M. Walker & S. Brodsky eds. 1976).
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rape victims. The ostensibly unsympathetic and sometimes harsh treat-
ment of women victims by police, prosecutors, and hospital personnel led
to the establishment of rape crisis centers. By the early 1970's, such cen-
ters were in operation in almost every major urban area, providing coun-
seling and adversary services. During this period, rape task forces were
created at local and state levels; rape research and prevention received
federal attention; 148 and network television programs 149 and feminist pub-
lications 150 on rape nurtured public awareness of the problem.
In the wake of congressional passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
in 1972 and the adoption of equivalent "little ERAs" in several states,
groups began to concentrate on legislative reform in addition to social
service. Existing rape laws were perceived to reflect male-oriented inter-
ests and to be unresponsive to women's concerns for physical integrity
and sexual self-determination. The supposedly inadequate deterrent affect
of these laws-indicated by low rates of reporting, arrest, prosecution.
and conviction-further galvanized these groups into action. In 1974,
women sucessfully lobbied through the Michigan legislature the nation's
first comprehensive rape reform statute. One year later, Washington
women followed suit.
The Seattle Women's Commission (SWC), appointed by the mayor to
advise on women's issues, was the most instrumental group in law reform
in Washington. '5 1 It held in early 1973 a number of public forums on
forcible rape. The discussions, ranging from the needs of local rape vic-
tims to the "alarmingly low" conviction rate, lacked a central focus. 52
Then the SWC discovered the rape law that had been proposed in the
Orange Code some two years earlier. The SWC members considered the
corroboration requirement an affront to women and felt the absence of a
shield rule made the proposed statute fatally defective. This marked the
turning point of the SWC; law reform became its dominant concern. After
one year of drafting 53 and intensive lobbying, its proposal prevailed over
three others and was enacted into law.
148. A National Center for Prevention and Control of Rape was created within the National
Institute of Mental Health. 42 U.S.C. § 2689q (Supp. V. 1975).
149. E.g., ABC-TV's program "Cry Rape" aired in 1971.
150. E.g., N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA (1976): D.
RUSSELL. THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICriM'S PERSPECTIVE (1976): Griffin. supra note 15.
151. The SWC did most of the drafting but other women's groups were also prominent in the
lobbying process. They included the Washington State Women's Council and representatives from
rape crisis centers.
152. This section is based on the Griswold Interview. supra note 84.
153. The drafting committee consisted of an activist (J. Griswold. chair), a prosecutor (P.
Aiken), and an assistant state attorney General who had helped draft the state's ERA (G. Berry)
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C. Crime Control
The third major impetus for rape law reform was the national preoccu-
pation with "law and order." From the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies,
crime and crime control were salient political issues. During this period,
there were more Presidential commissions 154 studying and making rec-
ommendations about the rising incidence of crime in the streets 155 than in
all the preceding years of the Republic. The reports of these commissions
alluded to the upsurge in reported forcible rape, but none suggested
changes in the rape laws.
Proponents of rape reform hitched their wagon to the crime control
movement. Police and prosecutors who supported the reform did not nec-
essarily subscribe to feminist values. They saw it as a means to improve
their enforcement effectiveness. In Washington, the women's lobby
marketed its proposal to the conservative bloc in the legislature as a law
and order bill. It was enacted in part by riding on the coat tails of new
death penalty legislation.
Reform advocates have portrayed almost unanimously a doomsday
scenario of the incidence and prosecution of forcible rape. The women's
lobby in Michigan darkly warned: "The problem of rape is rapidly ap-
proaching epidemic proportions. . .. [I]mmediate legal reform [is
needed] to prevent the rape epidemic before it happens. . . . Without
prompt action on this crisis, hundreds of people will be assaulted while
assaulters continue to go virtually free from any threat of conviction." 157
A "legislative fact sheet" circulated by the women's lobby to Washing-
154. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAV ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoCir (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMM'N]; REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)(better known as the KERNER REPORT,
after its chairman, Otto Kemer); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, To
ESTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L VIOLENCE
CO.IM'Nl NATIONAL AVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A NATIONAL STRAT-
EGYTO REDUCE CRIME (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N].
155. NAT'L VIOLENCE COMM'N, supra note 154, at 18.
156 According to Ms. Griswold, "the biggest support [the women's lobby] got was from Ted
Bundy." Bundy was suspected of murdering several young women in the Seattle area in 1974,
charged with murdering a young woman in Colorado in 1978, and eventually convicted of first degree
murder of three college women in Florida in 1979. Larsen, Judge Sentences Bundy to Die, Seattle
Times, July 31, 1979, at 1, Col. 1. At the time of the hearings on the SWC's rape bill, the legislature
was debating a new death penalty statute, spurred partly by the alleged Bundy killings. "I sat up in
the gallery. There were parents all around, you know, of the women who presumably had been mur-
dered by Bundy. All of the legislators were really scared of these parents coming at them. I sat
listening to the death penalty debate and I thought, 'It's all those ghosts of the murdered women who
are going to pass our rape bill.' You could just feel the law and order atmosphere of that legislature."
Griswold Interview, supra note 84.
157. Michigan Task Force on Rape, Background Material for a Proposal for Criminal Code Re-
form to Respond to Michigan's Rape Crisis, 1973, at 1.
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ton legislators in 1975 stated that "rape is the most rapidly increasing
crime of violence in the United States today;" that "rapes have increased
more than 400% in Seattle in the last decade;" and that "the conviction
rate for rape is lower than for any other violent crime."1 58 Legal com-
mentators 159 too have sounded the alarm. 160
The public's fear of the rise in reported violent crime needs to be recog-
nized and respected. The economic and social costs of that fear are real.
As the President's Crime Commission warned, however, it is necessary
to avoid inducing "distorted perceptions of the risk of crime and exagger-
ated fears of victimization. " 161 Dramatic statistics on rape which are not
seen in context can "needlessly increase [people's] fears"' 162 and color
their judgments as to the appropriate crime control repsonse.
The distinction between better reporting and more crime is often
glossed over in rape literature. It is generally agreed that rape is the most
underreported of violent crimes. 163 The President's Crime Commission
estimate that forcible rape occurs at 3-/2 times the reported rate is a com-
158. Seattle N.O.W., Revising the Laws on Rape: A Legislative Fact Sheet on SB 2196 and HB
208 as Proposed by the Seattle Women's Commission and the Washington State Prosecutors' Associ-
ation, Feb. 1975.
159. BAI-rELLE-LEAA PROSECUTORS' VOL. III, supra note 4, at 3, estimated one out of every 500
women in the country was raped in 1975. VA. Note, supra note 3, at 1500 and n.3 described "the
dramatic increase in the incidence of the crime," indexed by the 62% rise in reported rapes between
1968-72. CLEVELAND STATE Note, supra note 10, at 463, stated the "incidence of rape [is] reaching
dramatic proportions" and that "less than 14% of the reported rapes are successfully prosecuted."
160. This section of the text will discuss only the incidence of rape. The statistics on rape convic-
tions are discussed in section 111.D. I of the text, infra.
161. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. CRIME AND
ITS IMPACt-AN ASSESSMENT 89 (1967).
162. Id.
163. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1977 14 [hereinafter cited as
UCR]; PRESIDENTS CRIME COMM'N. supra note 154, at 21. Reporting is critical to crime detection:
some 87% of all crimes become known to police only after victims report them. Hawkins. Who
Called the Cops?: Decisions to Report Criminal Victimization, 7 L. & Soc'Y REV. 427, 441 (1973).
Reasons for non-reporting are unclear. UCR speculates that underreporting of rape is "due primar-
ily to the victims' fear of their assailants and their sense of embarrassment over the incident." UCR
1977 at 14. But interviews with 27 rape victims suggest that fear of treatment by police and prosecu-
tors ranks at the top. Less frequently given reasons include fear of trial and desire to conceal the
incident from family and friends. BArELL-LEAA FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 15.
The data are also inconsistent with respect to racial differences in underreporting. In a probability
sample survey of 10,000 households in each of 13 cities conducted by LEAA and the U.S. Census
Bureau on behalf of the Criminal Justice Commission, 84% of black victims reported the rape to
police compared to only 65% of white victims. The most frequent reason for non-reporting among
blacks was "fear of reprisal," whereas among whites it was that rape is a "private matter." Hinde-
lang & Davis, Forcible Rape in the United States: A Statistical Profile in Chappell. supra note 10. at
98-99. But see FIELD SURVEYS H: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF A NA-
TIONAL SURVEY SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE 47 (1967). This survey by the National Opinion Research Center found that income
levels, not racial differences account for variances in rates of or in reasons for non-reporting of crime
to police.
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monly cited statistic. 164 Assuming the reliability of this figure, it does not
follow, as is often implied, 165 that the increase in reported rapes means an
increase in the true rate. One commentator, for example, cited the FBI's
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) statistics showing a rise of 49% in re-
ported rapes between 1964 and 1974. Because of "gross underreport-
ing," the reported number was multiplied by a factor of ten to reach a
"considerably more alarming figure" of actual rapes.166 But the same
logic can lead to the opposite conclusion. If forcible rape is so underre-
ported, then the reported increases could be the result of digging deeper
into the well of unreported crime. In view of the public spotlight on rape
and the more supportive climate towards victims, it is possible that more
women are now coming forth to report the crime than before. 167 Accord-
ing to the National Violence Commission, "While the reported incidence
of forcible rape has increased, reporting difficulties associated with this
crime are too great to permit any firm conclusion on the true rate of in-
crease.'" 168
164. PRESIDENTS CRIME COMM'N, supra note 154, at 21. Estimates of underreporting are made by
comparing UCR rates of reported crime with estimated rates of actual crime based on victimization
surveys. The President's Crime Commission surveyed a national probability sample of 10,000 house-
holds. Interviewers asked if any members of the household had been raped. The survey estimated the
occurrence of forcible rape in 1965 at 42.5 per 100,000 population. The UCR rate for that year was
11.6. FILD SuRvEYs n: CRIMINAL VICIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 163, at 8. In general,
victimization surveys "give a more precise estimate of the volume of crime ... than the UCR."
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, supra note 154, at 21. However, this is not necessarily true of rape. In the
first place, the precision of the estimate depends upon the size of the survey sample. If a crinie is a
statistically rare event (and only homicide is less frequent than rape), an inordinately large sample is
needed to detect reliably its volume. A sample of 10,000 households will not reliably measure the
occurrence of rape. "In fact, few people realize that all data on rape in [Field Surveys III are based on
only fifteen rapes reported to interviewers in the national survey." Hindelang & Davis, supra note
163, at 89. In the secod place, the Field Surveys II estimate is likely to be inflated because no "un-
founding procedure" was used by the interviewer. Unfounding is a police procedure to remove cases
in which the legal elements of the crime are not met, the police do not believe the victim, or success-
ful prosecution would be a borderline proposition for some other reason. See Section III.A. 1 infra.
While the Field Surveys II interviewer accepted all claims of rape, the UCR data excluded unfounded
cases.
165. See, e.g., BATrELL-LEAA FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 15; CALIF. Comment supra note
10, at 941; CLEVELAND STATE Note, supra note 10, at 463.
166. Berger, supra note 7, at 5.
167. Such is the conclusion of a study of the impact of a reform in Norway in 1927. Five years
after revising upwards the penalties for sex offenses, the reported rate increased by 68% compared to
the same period before the change. The increase was attributed to more reporting as a result of the
public discussion and agitation that accompanied the penal code revision. This inference was but-
tressed by data showing that the increased reports involved "borderline" cases such as illicit relations
with 16 year old girls, that previously went unreported. Andenaes,,General Prevention-Illusion or
Reality, 43 J. CriM. L.C.&P.S. 176, 191 (1952).
168. NAT'L VIOLENCE COMM'N, supra note 154, at 18. The reporting difficulties unique to rape are
not present with other violent crimes and therefore do not preclude inferences regarding their true
rates of occurrence. "The true forcible rape rate has not necessarily risen significantly over the vari-
ous time spans considered. However, at least since 1958, there has probably been a significant rise in
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More importantly, whatever the true rate is, the reported rate itself
needs to be placed in perspective. 169 Most of the legal commentary on
rape was published in the early and mid-1970's. It typically cites UCR 170
trends showing sharp increases in reported rapes (per 100,000 population)
during a preceding block of five or ten years. In statements about rate
increases attention must be given to the time span involved. Different
time periods give dissimilar rates of change. Trends based on a brief pe-
riod can give rise to divergent inferences unless presented in the context
of other changes over longer periods. The so-called crime wave got un-
derway, according to the Criminal Justice Commission, around the mid-
1960's. 171 The UCR has been criticized for only publishing and illustrat-
ing trends during the decade of the '60's and '70's when crime increases
have been most substantial. 172
Figure 1 presents change rates of reported forcible rape and aggravated
assault for 1949 to 1977 in four-year intervals. 173 The curves for both
offenses rise steeply and closely together around 1965. At the peak in
1969, the increase in reported rape is substantially higher than the in-
crease in reported assault. Thereafter, both curves drop sharply, and con-
verge by the mid-1970's. 174 Except for the momentary extreme in
1965-73, the increase in the rate of reported rape is not consistently
higher than the increase in the rate of reported assault.
the true rates of criminal homicide, robbery and aggravated assault." D. MULVIHILL & M. TU\IIN. I I
CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: A STAFF REPORT SUB1,ITTED TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PRE-
VENTION OF VIOLENCE 49 (1969).
169. Despite the increase in the incidence of reported rapes, and the more substantial increase in
the rate of change of the incidence during 1965-73, it must be bome in mind that the overall volume
of reported rapes remains relatively low. Even during the time when the increases were most dra-
matic, this offense accounted for less than 1% of the UCR Crime Index total and only 5% of violent
crimes. UCR 1967 at 1I. In prior and subsequent years, it has remained a statistically rare occur-
rence. UCR 1977 at 14. By comparison, the volume of aggravated assault is eightfold more than
rape. See rates for 1977 in Figure I of text infra.
170. The reliability and validity of the UCR Index as a measure of criminality has been ques-
tioned. Aside from inadequacies in police data collection and reporting to the central registry, the
UCR statistical procedures themselves are said to be deficient. For instance. UCR index rates reflect
the simple count of crime per 100,000. Indices that weight the seriousness of each crime computed
from the facts of each case, as is done in European criminal statistics, result in quite dissimilar trends.
These methodological issues do not bear directly on the purposes of this article so long as the main
concern here is with rates of change in reported rate, rather than with estimation of the volume of
reported rape.
17 1. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, supra note 154, at 13.
172. MULVIHILL & TUMIN, supra note 168, at 131 n.25.
173. The selection of 1949 as the starting point was somewhat arbitrary. The UCR was first
published in 1933. From then until 1949, the incidence of reported forcible rape showed no major
oscillations. See MULVIHILL & TUMIN. supra note 168, at 47 figure 2. Also, the statistics for the first
two decades of the UCR, according to the FBI itself, are not as reliable as later ones. Id. at 131 n.25.
174. The same inverted-U pattern in change of reported rape for 1969 is found in Seattle. The
number of reported rapes for 1961, '65. '69, '73 and '77 is. respectively. 60. 78, 248. 276. and 370.
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Figure 1
Percent Change in Rate* of Reported Forcible Rape and Aggravated
Assault on National Basis from 1949 to 1977.
Forcible
Rape
Aggravated Assault
+ 50
+ 40
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Change
+ 30
+ 20
0 
1949 '61 '65 '69 '73 '77
Years
*Rate per 100,000 popualtion, based on data from annual Uniform Crime
Reports from 1949 to 1977. Percent change tabulated by the author. The
rates for forcible rape for each of the eight years indicated above are,
respectively: 7.2, 7.3, 8.4, 9.2, 11.9, 18.3, 24.3, and 29.1. The respec-
tive rates for aggravated assault are: 70.7, 77.9, 78.1, 84.4, 109.5,
152.5, 198.4, and 241.5.
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The fall of the change rate from the high point in 1969 cannot be attrib-
uted to the introduction of reform rape legislation. The pioneering statute
of Michigan was not implemented until 1974, after the change rate had
declined. The reform is thus more apt to be an effect rather than, or in
addition to being, a cause. This is an instance of statistical regression 75
in an unstable time series. A crime change rate that has increased to an
atypically high level before a reform is introduced will in and of itself
regress to a more normal level regardless of the legislative interven-
tion. 176
The alarm over the "epidemic" of reported rape during the relatively
brief interruption was not unfounded, and helped support passage of rape
reform legislation. However, it should not be magnified out of propor-
tion. Virtually every generation has felt itself threatened by the spectre of
one type of rising violence or another. 177 As the President's Crime Com-
mission reminded, "It may be that there has always been a crime crisis.
insofar as public perception is concerned." 178
III. PROSECUTION OF RAPE
This portion of the article describes and presents the results of an em-
pirical study of the prosecution of rape. It begins with a description of the
rape law enforcement process, with specific attention to King County.
After presenting the methodology of the study, statistical patterns of rape
in King County are introduced and compared to data obtained in other
jurisdictions. Finally, the impact of rape legislation on case disposition
and charging in King County is analyzed.
SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, STASTICAL REPORT (for the indicated years). The figures do not exclude
unfounded cases as the UCR does. The Seattle population for these years was obtained from STATE O
WASHINOTON. 1970 CENSUS DATA BOOK and 1978 POCKET DATA BOOK. The increase (in four year inter-
vals, except for 1960-65 which is five years) in rape based on reported rate per 100.000 population.
starting in 1960. is: 32% (in '65), 226% (in '69). 34% (in '73), and 17% (in '77).
175. Regression artifacts are perhaps the most common form of self-deception in planned social
changes. See generally D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY. EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-ExPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
FOR RESEARCH 10-1l1 (1963). For another example of regression effects in a legal reform, see. e.g..
Campbell & Ross. The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Tinze-Series Data in Quasi-Experimen-
talAnalysis, 3 L. & Soc'Y. REv. 33 (1968).
176. Public clamor for criminal justice reforms usually arises when there is an upsurge of crime.
an acute crisis. To ensure that proposed crime control measures appear to produce the desired effect.
election-minded legislators can capitalize on the regression phenomenon by introducing the reform at
the point where the crime is "at its worst so far." If the time series has inherent variability, as crime
trends do, the next point on the average will be lower, or nearer the normal level. The decrease in
crime could result from the effectiveness of the reform, but it could also be due simply to the momen-
tary extremity, or to both.
177. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMNI'N, supra note 154. at 12: MULVIHILL & TUMIN. supra
note 168. at 52; PRESIDENT'S CRIME CONINI'N. supra note 154. at 85.
178. PRESIDENT'S CRIME COAM-N, supra note 154, at 85.
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A. Enforcement Process
1. Police
The police function, though not of central concern here, is considered
briefly because it defines the outer boundaries of rape law enforcement.
The police process in Seattle 179 typically begins with a telephone com-
plaint of rape. A patrol officer is dispatched to interview the victim and, if
necessary, to transport her to a hospital equipped with a sexual assault
program. 180 The patrol officer's report is then routed to the head of the
Sexual Crimes Unit who, in turn, assigns the case to one of the five detec-
tives. The time and manner of detective follow-up inquiry bear a signifi-
cant relationship to the availability of the victim as a complaining wit-
ness. 
18 1
The detective's findings include a decision as to whether a complaint is
"founded," i.e., whether an offense has been committed, and gathering
information to make that decision. These functions are discretionary, of
low visibility, and subject to little control. 182 Indeed, police discretion is
perhaps greatest in rape cases. Rape complaints received by police repre-
sent an extremely broad range of conduct, 183 and their judgments inevit-
ably reflect their own social perceptions and assumptions. Detectives
spend substantial resources simply establishing the occurrence of the
crime184 before turning to the identification and apprehension of the sus-
pect..
179. Seattle is the largest city in King County and most offenses prosecuted by the county attor-
ney are committed within the city. Therefore, procedures and statistics of the Seattle Police Dep't are
described in this section. This information was obtained from an interview with Detective Wally
Johnson of the Sex Crimes Unit, on June 5, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Johnson Interview].
180. Hospitals are a vital link in the preparation of rape cases for prosecution. A hospital is often
the first agency to come in contact with the rape victim, sets the tone for subsequent interactions
between the victim and the criminal justice system, and affects the victim's willingness to prosecute.
It also generates forensic evidence. In Seattle, since 1974, a specialized sexual assault unit has been
established at a local hospital to which police usually refer rape victims.
18 1. A questionnaire survey of sex crime detectives in five cities in 1976 showed that the Seattle
Police Dep't was the slowest in assigning cases to detectives for follow-up investigation, with cases
being assigned as late as 3 or 4 days after the initial complaint. Only 49% of the victims were con-
tacted in person by a detective, compared to 89% to 97% in the other four cities. The result is that
victims are more often "lost" in Seattle. BArrELLE-LEAA FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 33-35. At
present, victims are interviewed by detective "if possible" and "sometime shortly" after the com-
plaint. Aggravated cases, however, receive "immediate" attention. Johnson Interview, supra note
179.
182. See generally Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Lowv-Visi-
bility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
183. See, e.g., PENN. Comment, supra note 11, at 278.
184. This is not necessarily because they disbelieve the victim's account. Without evidence of
penetration and nonconsent, there is simply no prosecutable case. BA-rELLE-LEAA FINAL REPORT,
supra note 4, at 46. Penetration evidence usually consists of results of the medical examination (semen,
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The national and Seattle average of all forcible rape complaints deter-
mined by police to be baseless is 15%.185 Articulated standards for the
founding decision do not exist in most police departments. 186 A study of
Philadelphia police records revealed, however, that detectives generally
relied on legally appropriate criteria in founding rape cases. 187 Where the
information was inconclusive, the police presumed the complaint's ver-
acity and filed the case with the prosecutor. Interestingly, when prosecu-
tors aided Philadelphia police in their decisions by offering advisory opin-
ions, the unfounding rate remained unchanged. 188 A national survey of
police reported a high degree of agreement among police departments on
the factors used in founding decisions, although the weight attached to
each factor may differ from department to department. 189 The factors
used by police were those they believed were important to successful pro-
secution. 190 Of the founded cases, not all are sucessfully "cleared" by
arrest or other means. Rape cases, it should be noted, pose a unique di-
lemma. Most violent crimes that are solved are those in which the victim
knows the perpetrator. For example, because most homicide suspects
are either related to or acquanted with their victims, police consistently
"clear by arrest" a greater proportion of homicides than any other per-
sonal or property offense. 191 The number of rape suspects known to the
victims is also high, but the prior social relationship makes nonconsent
more difficult to prove. Therefore, rapes perpetrated by strangers (hence
vaginal abrasions) and crime scene evidence to corroborate likelihood of penetration (stains on cloth-
ing. furniture, etc.). Id. at 37. Despite the importance of nonconsent, usually evidenced by victim's
testimony, police in one-half of the cases do not record a formal statement by the victim of the crime.
Patrol officers or detectives summarized the victim's account in 4 or 5 short sentences, which is
"hardly adequate to describe the full circumstances of the assault." Id. at 40.
185. UCR 1975 at 24. SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T, STATISTICAL REPORT 1971 at 29. (The more recent of
these annual Seattle police reports do not include unfounding rates.) Other local studies show un-
founding rates of about 20%. PENN. Comment, supra note 11, at 308; Galton. Police Processing of
Rape Complaints: A Case Study, 4 AM. J. oF. CRI. L. 15, 19 (1975); Schiff. Statistical Features of
Rape, 14J. FOR. SCI. 102, 109 (1969).
186. In a 1975 national survey of police departments, only 20% reported the existence of written
guidelines for unfounding rape complaints. BA-rELLE-LEAA POLICE SURVEY, supra note 4. at 43-44.
187. These criteria included promptness of complaint, victim injuries, prior social contact be-
tween victim and suspect, victim resistance, and suspect's use of force. PENN. Comment. supra note
11, at 282, 287, 291, 295, 298. Although police were using the criteria established by law. they did
not apply the same weight as would be required at trial; e.g.. they did not require the proof to rise to
the level of beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, a non-legally relevant factor that was also deter-
minative of founding was race of victim and actor. Intraracial black incidents were unfounded more
frequently. Id. at 302. This study did not, however, assess the relative impact of each of these factors
on the founding decision.
188. !d. at 308.
189. BATrELLE-LEAA POLICE SURVEY, supra note 4, at 82-84.
190. Id.
191. Only 13% of homicides are by strangers. The arrest clearance rate in 1977 for homicide was
7%, compared to 51% for forcible rape. UCR 1977 at 10, 14.
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seldom identified) 192 or aquaintances who do not use physical force
(hence difficult to prosecute), often "simply die a bureacratic death and
are 'exceptionally cleared' or filed as inactive." 193
In 1961, shortly before the start of the "crime wave," the national
clearance rate for rape was 73%. In comparison, the clearance rate for
aggravated assault was only somewhat higher (79%). With the rise in re-
ported crime, not matched by similar increase in police resources, the
clearance rate for both offenses steadily declined, leveling off in the mid-
1970's. In 1977, the clearance rates for forcible rape and aggravated as-
sault were 51% and 62% respectively. 194 A similar trend occurred in
Seattle. 195
Some women activists, as well as proponents of rape law reform drawn
from the crime control movement, have decried the low arrest rate, which
they usually express in relation to the total volume of initial complaints
rather than to founded complaints. 196 They have also criticized police
diffidence and insensitivity towards women victims. 197 These claims con-
tain a measure of validity, and rally support for legal reform. Seen in
context, however, the police process-while needful of improve-
ment 198 -is not inherently biased agaist rape victims. While the clearance
rate of founded rape cases has been consistently lower, by an average of
about 9%, than that of aggravated assault, the nature and circumstances
of rape cases render their successful investigation difficult. A survey of
reporting victims in three cities (including Seattle) found that 61% said
192. The usual police identification techniques-previous offender files, modus operandi files,
police artist sketches, fingerprints-are seldom successful. In five cities, it was found that unless the
rape victim could supply identification information, typically because of prior acquaintance with the
actor and sometimes because the victim remembers the actor's car license number, identification and
hence arrest of the actor was unlikely. BATrELLE-LEAA FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 30-39.
193. Id. at 46. "Exceptionally cleared" is an umbrella category that includes cases in which the
victim or prosecutor refuses to prosecute, the perpetrator has died or left the jurisdiction, or other
situations where he has been identified but is not prosecuted.
194. The forcible rape clearance rates for 1961, '65, '69, '73, and '77 were: 73%, 64%, 56%,
51%, and 51%. The aggravated assault clearance rates for the same years were 79%, 73%, 65%,
63%, and 62%. These figures are from UCR for the indicated years.
195. The forcible rape clearance rate in Seattle for 1960, '65, '69, '73, and '77, were: 68%,
62%, 46%, 42%, and 45%. SEATrLE POLICE DEP'T, STATISTICAL REPORT (for indicated years).
196. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 6; BATTELLE-LEAA FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 3, at 2.
197. According to victims, "Although the rape was really bad, the police interrogation was six
times as horrible." Wood, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, in RAPE VICTIMOL-
oGY 194, 210 (L. Schultz ed. 1975)(footnote omitted). "The rape was probably the least traumatic
incident of the whole evening. If I'm ever raped again ... I wouldn't report it to the police because of
all the degradation." Griffin, supra note 15, at 30. See also BROWNSMLLER, supra note 109, 364-65.
198. For reform proposals regarding police rape procedures, see generally the REPORTS BY BAT.
TELLE LAW AND JUSTIcE CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL INSrTITTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION: FORCIBLE RAPE: A MANUAL FOR PATROL OFFICERS (Po-
LICE VOLUME I1) (1978); FORCIBLE RAPE: A MANUAL FOR SEX CRIME INVESTIGATORS (POLICE VOLUME IIU)
(1978).
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they were treated with considerable understanding by police, 23% with
indifference, and 15% with disrespect. 199 The evidence belies popular
conceptions of harsh police treatment of rape and victims as the norm. 2°°
2. Prosecutor
Founded cases are further screened by the prosecutor, who has almost
unfettered discretion in charging. 201 By discretion is meant not the judg-
199. The survey included 117 victims in Seattle, Detroit, and Kansas City. BATnELLE-LEAA FI-
NAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 45.
200. A reason frequently given for non-reporting is fear of police treatment. See notes 163 and
197 supra. Most non-reporting victims did not acquire this view of the police from personal experi-
ence. Public attitudes about the criminal justice system are generally learned vicariously, through the
media or personal reports of the experiences of others. The finding that, in reality, most rape victims
are treated by police with solicitude underscores the damaging consequences of even occasional in-
stances of police officiousness or bias. These instances tend to be widely circulated, creating the
impression that they are common rather than exceptional practices, and thereby tend to inhibit report-
ing.
201. Judicial recognition of prosecutorial discretion can be traced to English common law. The
Attorney General of England had power to decide whether to prosecute subject only to the control of
the High Court of Parliament when there was abuse of discretion. Regina v. Allen, 121 Eng. Rep.
929 (Q.B. 1862). In federal courts, the prosecutor "is clothed with the power and charged with the
duties of the Attorney General of England under the common law." United States v. Brokaw. 60 F.
Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. I11. 1945). State prosecutors also possess the common law powers of the Attor-
ney General of England in the absence of limiting statutes. See, e.g., People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli.
415 I11. 79, 112 N.E.2d 156, 160-61 (1953). In addition the discretionary authority is said to rest on
the nature of the prosecutor's office and the doctrine of separation of powers. See F. MILLER. PROSECU-
TION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 165 (1969). In principle, private citizens can
through formal means (e.g., an action of mandamus) influence filing decisions. In practice, they have
been effective in extraordinary circumstances only. See generally Ferguson, Fornulatton of Enforce-
ment Policy: An Anatomy of the Prosecutor's Discretion Prior to Accusation. I I RUTGERS L. REV
507,517-521 (1957).
"[L]egislative supervision of exercise of the prosecuting power is seldom, if ever, meaningful."
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 209 (1969). Statutes reveal at most a legislative desire that prosecu-
tors exercise discretion actively and not be lax in enforcement. They prescribe remedies for instances
of corruption, gross incompetence, or unusual indolence, though the administration is left to trial
judges or attorneys general. But legislation does not attempt to codify what factors should be consid-
ered or not considered in the charging decision. See generally F. MILLER. supra at 293-346 (control
of prosecutor discretion).
The policy reasons for prosecutorial discretion in filing have been recognized. but not always arti-
culated, by the courts. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 381 U.S.
929 (1965). Some of the reasons include the preservation of limited prosecutorial resources, mainte-
nance of a high conviction record, and various social concerns unrelated to guilt or evidence (e.g..
avoidance of undue harm or stigmatization to first time offenders). Prosecution Standard 3.9(b) of the
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 92 (1971) enumerates several "good cause" reasons for non-prosecution
despite evidentiary sufficiency: (ii) extent of harm caused by the offense, (iii) disproportion of autho-
rized punishment to particular offender, (iv) improper motives of complainant, (vi) reluctance of
victim to testify, and (vii) cooperation of accused in apprehension of another. However. Standard
3.9(c) rejects the desire to enhance a record of convictions as a legitimate factor in charging. Id. at
92. Prosecutors themselves use insufficiency of evidence as a shorthand notation to mask policy
reasons for not charging or charging less than fully.
Rape Reform: An Empirical Study
ment of evidence sufficiency, but the judgment whether to charge fully,
less than fully, or not at all those who meet the probable guilt standard. Its
exercise leads normally to under rather than overenforcement. 202 When
prosecutors refer to discretion, they have in mind the influence of "practi-
cal factors" (e.g., likelihood of conviction, victim credibility, office
caseload, personal values) on day-to-day charging decisions rather than
"statutory factors" (elements of the crime). 203 In the prosecution as in
the police investigation of rape, the role of these practical factors looms
large by reason of unique problems inherent in rape law enforcement:
cases usually have weak fact patterns (no corroborative evidence of force
or injury; pre-existing relationship between suspect and victim); victims
are often reluctant to report or testify even though they normally are the
sole witnesses; local community attitudes may insist on aggressive rape
prosecution and, at the same time, their representatives on the jury might
not convict except in the most compelling of circumstances, placing an
added burden on the prosecutor to charge and plea bargain selectively;
and not least, discretionary decisions are more susceptible in rape than in
any other types of crime to the interjection of personal attitudes toward
women, sexuality, race, and class.
There are four principal steps in prosecution: pre-filing screening of the
case, filing procedure to determine probable cause, plea bargaining, and
trial. Rape cases pose special prosecutorial issues of an administrative
and organizational nature primarily at the first two stages. These issues
include the specialization and training of personnel and the standardiza-
tion of the filing process.
In King County, the prosecution process typically begins with the filing
by police of a rape case with the Sexual Assault Unit of the King County
Prosecuting Attorney's (KCPA's) office. The chief of the Unit assigns the
case to a deputy prosecutor for screening and possible filing. The Sexual
Assault Unit is the only specialized branch within the criminal division of
the KCPA. 204 Established in 1970 with four deputies (two women), it was
202. The commentary to Prosecution Standard .1(a) states that the prosecutor's "obligation is
to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty .. '" Id. at 44. In reality, the risk of false
positives (prosecuting the innocent) is remote; the likelihood of false negatives (not prosecuting the
probably guilty) is high. This is due to personal convictions and institutional pressures. Prosecutors
believe it is "morally wrong to prosecute a man unless one is personally convinced of his guilt."
Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 N.W.U.L. REv. 174, 178 (1965). Limited
resources preclude charging every case in which there is reasonable basis for believing that a crime
has been committed. Efforts expended in weak cases are considered wasted. Id. at 180.
203. Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1, 11 (1971).
204. Specialization at the filing level is uncommon. F. MiLLER, supra note 201, at 19. Most
prosecutor offices are organized by function, such as filing, plea bargaining, or trying cases, rather
than by type of crime. The Sexual Assault Unit of the KCPA represents a compromise structure in
Washington Law Review Vol. 55:543, 1980
expanded in 1974-the height of the rape law reform movement in Wash-
ington. It currently has 14 deputies; half of them are women. 205 Special-
ization facilitates the accummulation of experience, enables continuous
case responsibility by a single deputy, and enhances consistency in filing
decisions. On the other hand, rape prosecutions are the most emotionally
demanding of felony cases and can quicky "burn-out" trial attorneys.
Hence, while Unit deputies handle all of the pretrail functions they do not
try rape cases exclusively. The only special training 206 given to deputies
is in interviewing skills to increase sensitivity to victim trauma. No spe-
cial training in trial skills is provided since they are considered generic to
all prosecutions.
Rape cases are the only cases in which a pre-filing interview of the
victim is conducted. 2°4 This interview is considered "critical because the
state's case stands or falls on the victim." 20 8 The interview enables the
prosecutor to gather information about the crime and support the victim
by allaying her apprehensions and by explaining the workings of the judi-
cial process. At the same time, it also permits the prosecutor to evaluate
the victim's credibility 20 9 as a jury might do, and probe her determination
that it specializes only in screening and filing, but not in trying rape cases. Its structure indicates
where the unique problems of rape prosecution lie. Nationwide, 16% of prosecutor offices have a
special unit for rape cases, principally for pretrial functions. BATrELLE-LEAA PROSECUrOR SURVEY.
supra note 4, at 55-56. Given a choice, most prosecutors (68% of those surveyed) shun specializa-
tion of rape cases. The reasons include: rape cases are "too emotional," "a pain in the ass." and
"not good for one's career." BATrELL-LEAA FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 56.
205. Over three-fourths of a national sample of prosecutors felt that sex of prosecutors made no
difference in the evaluation and trial of a rape case. BArELLE-LEAA FINAL REPORT. supra note 4. at
55. This question merits further inquiry because there is evidence that there are clear sex differences
in the perception of the crime. Feldman-Summers & Lindner, Perceptions of Victims and Defendants
in Criminal Assault Cases, 3 CRiM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 135, 136-37, 144-47 (1976).
206. In-service training of prosecutors is mostly "accidental and haphazard." BATTELLE-LEAA
PROSECUTORS' VoL.. ii, supra note 4, at 30. In a national survey, only 19% of prosecutor offices were
found to have special training in rape cases, and this training consisted primarily in victim interview-
ing techniques. Learning was by intensive case assignment, resulting in the accumulation of case
experience in a few select individuals. BAT-rELLE-LEAA PROSECUTOR SURVEY, supra note 4. at 92. This
practice aggravates the perennial problem of prosecutor "bum-out." The average turnover rate in the
Sexual Assault Unit is less than three years, about the same as the national average for specialist rape
prosecutors. Reich Interview, supra note 107.
207. Less than one-half of the prosecutors (41%) nationally interview victims routinely prior to
filing. BAT-rELLE-LEAA FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 51. Constraints of time and resources are more
determinative of the procedure than the merits of the interview itself. Id. at 50-51. Among those who
interview, over one-half (53%) require three or more interview sessions in addition to any police
interviews. BATrELL-LEAA PROSECUTOR SURVEY, supra note 4, at 7. This practice tests the victim's
will to persevere in prosecution of the case. Id. at 7-8.
208. Canova Interview, supra note 18.
209. Nationally. 69% of prosecutors occasionally ask victims to undergo polygraph examina-
tions, especially when the factual circumstances of the case are weak. BArrELLE-LEAA FINAL REPORT.
supra note 4. at 5 1.
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to persist in a prosecution that might take months to come to trial. Even
with the most sympathetic of prosecutors, a certain antagonism colors the
interview that can be misinterpreted by the victim. For this reason, victim
advocates are sometimes present at the interview. 210
Following the interview and factual investigation by detectives, a deci-
sion on charging is made. In the absence of effective external controls
over filing discretion in routine cases, 21' some prosecutors, including the
KCPA, have established and published administrative standards for
charge selection and reduction. 212 In the KCPA's office, a deputy recom-
mends a rape charge "if sufficient admissible evidence exists which when
considered with the most plausible, reasonably foreseeable defense that
could be raised under the evidence, would support conviction by a rea-
sonable and objective fact-finder." 213 The Unit chief reviews the recom-
mendation and makes the final decision. It is important to note that only
one person is ultimately responsible for selecting rape charges. This
centralization of decisionmaking, office specialization, and promulgation
of guidelines are attempts to limit and standardize the influence of per-
sonal factors so as to achieve "tolerable consistency" 214 in the exercise
of discretion. The KCPA standards contribute only partially to this pur-
pose. The guidelines for charge selction of forcible or statutory rape
merely reiterate the statutory elements for the respective degrees of each
210. Despite the growth of rape crisis centers throughout the country, only 1% of prosecutors in
a national survey reported that crisis counselors or victim advocates were normally present at the
interviews. Victims were more commonly accompanied by a family member or friend. BATTELLE-
LEAA PROSECUToR SURVEY, supra note 4, at 63-64. The relationship between prosecutors and victim
counselors may be adversarial. Counselors perceive their main task as victim advocacy, since crisis
centers were initially established partly in reaction to the supposedly harsh treatment of the victim by
police and prosecutors. Prosecutors see themselves as representatives of the criminal justice system,
not necessarily of individual victims. On the other hand, counselors may be co-opted to prosecutorial
interests, especially if they are "in-house counselors" sponsored by and located in prosecutor of-
fices.
211. See F. MiLLER, supra note 201, at 297-344.
212. Most prosecutor offices do not have guidelines. In fact, prosecutorial policy was the lowest
priority among possible areas for improvement in handling of rape cases, according to the prosecutors
themselves. BAra-rLE-LEAA PROSECUrOR SURVEY, supra note 4, at 93. Better police investigation and
public education were ranked highest in priority. Id.
213. King County Prosecuting Attorney Filing and Dispositions Policy, § 1061(I)(A) (1977)
[hereinafter cited as KCPA Policy]. Permissible reasons for declining prosecution other than insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, include: a request by the victim, a grant of immunity to the accused, the
accused's confinement or pending prosecution on another charge, the highly disproportional cost of
prosecution, or the complainant's improper motives. Id. at § 1051(II)(B). The last two reasons, how-
ever, are not supposed to be considered in rape cases. Id. at § 1051 (II)(B)(8) and (9)("high impact
crimes").
214. Abrams, supra note 203, at 6-7.
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offense. 215 They do not describe the emphasis, if any, deputies are to give
to those practical factors that constitute the essence of discretionary judg-
ment.
The formal criterion for charging is probable cause. The aforequoted
KCPA standard, however, specifies a higher test, that of beyond a reason-
able doubt as applied by a jury. 216 This is common practice among prose-
cutors. Because of limited resources, the political need for a high convic-
tion record, concern about wrongful convictions, and other reasons,
prosecutors insist that in charging "there must not only be a very strong
probability of guilt, there must also be a strong probability of convic-
tion." 217 The application of a convictability standard at filing, compared
to the probable cause standard at the police founding stage, explains the
additional attrition rate as cases progress through the criminal justice pro-
cess.
The procedure by which probable cause is determined-preliminary
hearing, grand jury proceeding, or direct filing-can affect the develop-
ment and outcome of prosecution. The victim is often a vulnerable though
key witness, and the impact of a probable cause hearing may affect not
only the quality of her testimony, but also her willingness to pursue pro-
secution to its conslusion. 2 8 In King County, virtually all rape cases are
filed directly in Superior Court, thereby avoiding such hearings. 219
Rape prosecutions do not give rise to unique issues with respect to plea
bargaining. Legal and policy considerations 220 reflected in rape charge
215. The guidelines add the following gloss to the statutory definitions of aggravating elements
of first degree rape: "threatens to use" deadly weapon means it must actually be visible to the victim:
and "serious physical injury" means injury requiring medical treatment of more than a first aid na-
ture. KCPA Policy, supra note 213, at § 1061 (I)(B)(1)(a).
216. Id. at § 1061(1)(A).
217. F. MILLER, supra note 201, at 42. See also Kaplan, supra note 202, at 180.
218. The hearing can serve a useful function by enabling the state to test and evaluate its case.
On the other hand, an adversarial preliminary hearing can be traumatic for the victim if a harried
prosecutor, as frequently happens, has been unable to prepare her for cross-examination. It also poses
risks of exposing the case to the defense, and creating a record for impeachment. The grand jury
proceeding allows the prosecution to achieve the screening advantages of the preliminary examina-
tion while the nonadversarial nature of the proceeding shields the victim. However. many jurisdic-
tions have dispensed with the grand jury for all but exceptional cases. Direct filing provides the least
exposure of the case and of the victim. It places a greater burden on prosecutors to engage in careful
pre-filing screening and application of the convictability standard. See generally BATTELLE-LEAA F-
NAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 51-52.
219. State court rules require the filing in all criminal proceedings of an information or indict-
ment in Superior Court or of a complaint in Justice Court to determine probable cause at a preliminary
hearing. WASH. SuP. CT. CRR 2.1; WASH. JCRR 2.03(d). Local prosecutorial policy is to file all "high
impact crimes" directly in superior court "unless there are specific evidentiary reasons for a prelimi-
nary hearing." KCPA Policy, supra note 213, at § 105 1(1)(A)(1). About 98% of all rape charges are
directly filed.
220. See generally Alschuler. The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50
(1968).
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negotiations are not dissimilar from those in other felony cases.22' For
purposes of a study of prosecutorial discretion, the initial charge (by com-
plaint or directly filed information) is "the heart of the charging pro-
cess," 222 not the final charge after preliminary hearing 223 or reduced
charge after plea bargaining. The initial charge is an ex parte decision that
reflects solely the influence of statutory and discretionary factors on pro-
secutorial decisionmaking.
When a case is set for trial, a single deputy undertakes all the responsi-
bilities of preparation, pretrail hearings, trial, and sentencing recommen-
dations. No issues unique to rape prosecutions arise at this stage.
B. Research Methodology
A before-after study was conducted of the impact of Washington com-
mon law and reform rape statutes on the charging and disposition of 445
rape complaints filed by police with the KCPA for prosecution during a
six year period, from 1972 to 1977. The sample included 208 cases filed
from the beginning of 1972 to June 30, 1975 when the common law stat-
ute was in effect, and 237 cases filed from July 1, 1975 to the end of 1977
under the reform law. It included almost every adult suspect (over 18
years) presented for prosecution. Cases involving juvenile suspects (esti-
mated at about 100 during the six years)224 are prosecuted by the youth
division, not the Sexual Assault Unit, of the KCPA and adjudicated sepa-
rately in Juvenile Court. Because of the incompleteness or unavailability
of these files, juvenile suspects are not included in the present study ex-
cept for the handful who were prosecuted as adults in Superior Court. The
221. Plea bargaining has drawn particular criticism, however, in prosecutions under common
law rape statutes. Rape charges were believed to have been reduced to assaults or other lesser of-
fenses too routinely. The impact of reform rape legislation, with its gradations of culpability, on plea
rates remains to be determined. KCPA guidelines recognize difficulty in proving the basic allegation
or the aggravating factor as the only reason that may normally be considered in charge reduction.
Caseload pressure and prosecution costs are expressly excluded from consideration. KCPA Policy,
supra note 213, § 1061(II)(A)(1). There is also centralization of plea bargaining decisions. Every
plea must be approved personally by the head of the criminal division. Interview with David Boemer,
Chief, Criminal Division, KCPA, April 12, 1979.
222. F. MILLER, supra note 201, at 14.
223. A final charge after a preliminary hearing reflects judicial involvement in the charging pro-
cess and not just the prosecutor's own discretion. Although formally there is a sharing of power in
filing, in practice the magistrates' scrutiny of the evidence is perfunctory and their bind-over deci-
sions usually rubber stamp the prosecutor's initial decision. Id. at 45-46.
224. Estimates and data provided by the research office of the Juvenile Division, KCPA. Be-
tween 1973 and 1977, there were 96 complaints of rape and 64 of indecent liberties. No figures are
available on complaints of statutory rape or cases declined for prosecution. Data for 1972 were una-
vailable. In 1978, there were 18 complaints filed as rape, 24 as indecent liberties, and 16 as statutory
rape; again, no figures on declined cases were kept.
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adult sample plus the estimated juvenile sample, totalling 545 cases,
comprise about one-third of all the rape complaints (about 1844)225
lodged with the Seattle Police Department during the period of this study.
In addition, there were 25 homosexual male rape complaints in the after
period (as a result of the sex neutral definitions of the reform law), but the
small number precludes detailed analysis.
These cases were obtained from KCPA and Seattle Police Deparment
files. 226 Trained coders recorded about 100 items of information on each
case on a questionnaire. 227 As a reliability check, all of the coders re-
corded 12 randomly drawn case files. The intercoder agreement averaged
93%, indicating high reliability of the data.
C. Statistical Patterns of Rape
This section sketches statistical profiles of the victim, 228 the suspect, 229
and the circumstances of the crime. 230 These are not profiles, however, of
all alleged rapes that occur, or even of all rapes reported to police. The
data represent only the minority of cases that reach the prosecutorial
stage. A complaint that is reported, founded, cleared by arrest, and pre-
sented for prosecution is probably quite dissimilar (e.g., stronger factual
circumstances from a prosecutorial viewpoint) than one that suffers early
attrition in the criminal justice process. Only the after data patterns will
225. Figures were derived from the annual SEATrLE POLICE DEPT STATISTICAL REPORT for 1972 to
1977.
226. Cases involving forcible and/or statutory rape charges were readily identifiable in the
KCPA's files. Cases of attempted offenses were few and. therefore, were combined in the sample
with completed offenses. However. the process of identifying rape complaints that were declined or
resulted in other charges (e.g., assault, other sex crime. etc.) was more complex and subject to the
coder's discretion. Every other violent and sex offense filed during the six year period was screened
to see if there had been an initial rape allegation by the victim. If the coder determined the complaint
included a rape claim, regardless of whether the facts satisfied the statutory definition of rape, the
case was tracked down. Cases of other charges were located in KCPA files. Declined cases had to be
found in police files.
Only cases closed at the time of data collection were recorded. Some rape case files were unavail-
able and hence not recorded, but the number in the sample still includes nearly all (about 95%) of the
total cases charged. The sample of declined and other charge cases underrepresents to a somewhat
greater extent the total population of such cases. Due to resource limitations, only declined cases in
the Seattle Police Department, and not in other departments within the county, were located. The
majority of offenses, however, occur in Seattle. so the underrepresentation is probably not substan-
tial.
227. See Appendix A.
228. See Appendix B.
229. Id.
230. See Appendix C.
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be described in the text, since they essentially replicate the before data.23'
The statistical profiles combine forcible and statutory rape cases except in
instances when there are substantial differences between them, and then
they are separately presented. 232 To illustrate the basic uniformity in rape
patterns across jurisdictions and time, these results will be compared to
those of a 1960 Philadelphia study233 and a 1967 national study,234 both
of which were based on police records.235
Victims' ages ranged from 4 to 61 years, with a median age of 17.5.236
As a result of lowering the age of consent from less than 18 to less than 16
years, the proportion of forcible rape (adult victim) cases has increased
from one-half in the before data to two-thirds in the after data, with a
corresponding reduction in statutory rape (juvenile victim) cases. Most
victims (80%) are white. Since the population is composed predomi-
nantly of teenagers, 237 most (82%) are single and over one-half are stu-
dents. In the nonstudent group, more victims hold blue collar rather than
white collar jobs. A succession of studies have shown higher victimiza-
tion rates among lower income persons for rape as well as other violent
crimes. 238 The arguement that rape is as much a middle class as a working
class phenomenon-but middle class women report more often to private
physicians than to police and therefore are underrepresented in criminal
231. The match between the two sets of data, collected by different coders at different times,
reinforces confidence in the reliability of the figures.
232. See Appendix D.
233. M. AM,,IR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971) [hereinafter cited as AMIR]. This was the first
major statistical study undertaken of forcible rape. The sample consisted of 646 cases in police files in
1958 and 1960. Id. at 11-12. The author does not say whether they were founded or unfounded
cases. But since the sample is described as consisting of "all complaints" one may assume that
unfounded cases are included. Id. at 334.
234. MULVIHILL & TUMIN, supra note 168, at 207-258. The survey consisted of a 10% random
sample of all police case files in 17 large cities, including Seattle. Id. at 207-08. The basic unit of
analysis was victim-offender interaction, and there were 465 such units in the sample. Id. at 208.
235. These are the two principal local and national empirical studies, respectively, using case
files. The present study based mainly on prosecutor files is more comparable to them (even though
they rely on police files and include unfounded cases) than to victimization surveys (Hindelang &
Davis, supra note 163; FIELD SURVEYS H: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note
163). Statistical profiles constructed from victim interviews (which include nonreported cases) are
likely to differ from those based on reported cases due to the sampling differences.
236. The most frequent age bracket of victims according to Amir is 15 to 19 years. AMIR supra
note 233, at 51.
237. Reports on rape based on victim interviews usually involve adult women, not adolescents.
See, e.g., D. RUssEU., supra note 150 (victim interviews). There is a positive correlation between the
victim's age and the extent of physical force used by the suspect (contingency coefficient or
C = .37); see note 312 infra. As a result impressionistic profiles of rape possibly portray a more
aggravated crime than statistical studies with broadly based samples.
238. M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 37 (1958); NAT'L VIOLENCE COMM'N, supra
note 154, at 22-23.
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statistics, 239-is not supported by existing victimization surveys. 240 All
victims do not have unblemished, law-abiding records; nearly one-fifth
have a history of adult arrests, usually for sex offenses. 241 These arrests
pose credibility obstacles to successful prosecution.
Suspects' ages ranged from 15 to 73 years, with a median age of 25.242
About one-half (53%) are white, 38% are black, and 9% are other minor-
ites. The majority (83%) are in lower occupational ranks or are unem-
ployed. 243 Most are unmarried (71%) and have adult arrest records
(66%),244 but only one-fourth of prior arrests were for sex offenses. In
addition, nearly 20% have prior incarceration records. The profile of the
rape suspect, then, is that of a lower income, young white or black male,
who has a background of criminal activity.
The circumstances of the offense are important to a determination of
the practical (if not legal) element of nonconsent. These will be described
in three phases: before, during, and after the criminal conduct.
There is often a sequence of events involving interaction between vic-
tim and suspect that sets the stage for the crime. The modal statistical
pattern is not one of "hardcore" rape-an unexpected assault by a
stranger. It is more commonly a "softcore" crime. 245 In the majority of
instances (61%) the victim and suspect are acquainted with each other or
239. Weis & Borges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim. in RAPE VICTI-
MOLOGY 91, 130 (L. Schultz ed. 1975). The authors base this proposition on conjecture, not data.
240. "'The risks of victimization from forcible rape, robbery, and burglary, are clearly concen-
trated in the lowest income groups and decrease steadily at higher income levels." PRESIDENT s CRIME
COSsNI'I, supra note 154, at 38.
241. Amir also found 19% of victims in his sample had arrest records. AtIIR, supra note 233. at
112.
242. The most common age bracket for suspects in Amir's sample was 15-19 years. AtIIR. supra
note 233, at 51-52. Nationally, the modal age range is 18-22 years. UCR 1977 at 13. The age in the
present study is a little higher because of the exclusion of juveniles.
243. About 90% of suspects of both races were in the lower part of the occupational scale accord-
ing to Amir. AsiR, supra note 233, at 70. This finding reflects social class norms and socialization
practices. Aggression is not absent in the middle class but its expression and approval are more com-
mon in the working class. Frequent rehearsals of toughness and exploitation of women serve to prove
masculinity. NAT"L VIOLENCE CosIsIN, supra note 154, at 36-37. "Like physical aggression, sexual
relationships and motivation are far more direct and uninhibited in lower-class adolescents." Davis.
Socialization andAdolescent Personality, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 148 (T. Newcomb & E.
Hartley eds. 1947). See generally M. WOLFGANG & F. FERRACUTI, THE SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE
(1967).
244. One-half of Amir's sample had arrest records. AIIR, supra note 233. at 112.
245. According to police, for example, complaints often involve "couples who met initially in a
bar or in a similar social setting, and who subsequently misinterpreted one another's sexual inten-
tions." Chappell & Singer, Rape in New York City: A Study of Material in the Police Files and Its
Meaning, in Chappel, supra note 10, 245, 257-58. The point is only that these situations are more
frequent than those involving violent assaults, not that the actors should necessarily be prosecuted
any less vigorously.
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belong to the same family; 39% involve strangers. 246 The pre-existing
social or blood relation between victim and suspect is not unique to rape.
The proportion of suspects who are known to aggravated assault victims
is almost identical to that of rape victims. 247
A related finding is that in 68% of the cases, the victim agreed to have
prior social contact with the suspect (e.g., meeting at a tavern, at work,
etc.). One-fourth had no social contact at all, and 7% of the victims were
hitchhiking. Only a small number of victims (10%) had consensual sexual
relations with the suspect prior to the alleged offense. The significance of
prior relationship or contact 248 is that it constitutes one of the objective
circumstances weighed by the fact finder in inferring consent. The less
forceful or aggravated the conduct of the suspect, the more determinative
the social interaction factor is likely to become. In 25% of the cases, both
victim and suspect had ingested alcohol and/or drugs prior to or at the
time of the act.249 This fact may affect the victim's credibility as a com-
plaining witness.
Rape is committed primarily at night and slightly more frequently dur-
ing the warm months of the years. It is principally an intraracial crime.
250
About one-half of the cases involved only whites, 17% involve only mi-
norities (mostly black), and 31% involve white victims and black sus-
pects. Typically, rape occurs indoors: 44% take place in the suspect's
residence or car, 27% in the victim's residence or car, 9% outdoors, and
20% elsewhere. When the rape occurs in the victim's residence, in 38%
of the cases the suspect was invited, in 33% entry was uninvited but non-
forcible, and in 20% entry was forcible or by deception. Because it is
unlikely that a suspect would risk identification by taking the victim to his
246. According to Mulvihill & Tumin, 53% of the cases involve strangers, MULVIHILL & TUMIN,
supra note 168, at 249 n.62. In Amir's sample, 42% were strangers. AMNI, supra note 233, at 234.
A survey in the District of Columbia found, however, that only 36% of the interviewed victims
reported their assailant was unknown. PRESIoNrs CRIME COMM-N, supra note 154, at 40. Victimiza-
tion surveys purportedly represent crime patterns more accurately than criminal statistics because
there is no underreporting bias in the former. The likely explanation for the discrepancy between the
survey and case file figures, then, is that rapes by strangers are more likely to be reported.
247. Assailants are known in 43% of rape cases and 45% of aggravated assault cases. MULVIHILL
& TriJIN, supra note 168, at 217, Table 6.
248. Prior social contact also has implications for crime control policy. If rape is primarily a
.street crime," committed by strangers, then increased police patrols would be an appropriate re-
sponse. If it is primarily a "social crime," however, other preventive measures, such as public edu-
cation, would be called for.
249. In Amir's study, alcohol had been used by both the victim and the suspect in 20% of the
cases. AMNi, supra note 233, at 101.
250. The national survey found 90% of rapes to be intraracial. There were twice as many black
victim/black suspect rapes (60%) as white victim/white suspect rapes (30%). MULVIHILL & TuMiN,
supra note 168, at 209. See also AMIR, supra note 233, at 336.
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own residence, place of the offense is another circumstance from which a
fact finder might infer consent. 251
The typical sexual assault itself is not of an aggravated kind. One-
fourth of the assaults involve no physical force (other than the act of pene-
tration). 252 When extrinsic force is used, it is moderate (restraining; 42%)
rather than high (choking, hitting; 32%). Weapons are employed in 18%
of the cases. Verbal or physical resistance by the victim occurs half of the
time; 253 one out of five victims attempts to flee. The only noticeable dif-
ference between the before data and the after data is the increase (18%) in
the number of women who are physically resisting the sexual assault.
This may be a product of the increase in women's self-defense training in
recent years. Physical injury rates have remained the same. The majority
of victims (63%) suffer no injury;254 28% need only minor or first aid
attention; and 8% require medical treatment. Additional acts of sexual
humiliation are not prevalent. The incidence of repeated intercourse was
22%, sodomy 7%, and oral intercourse 33%.
There is a direct correlation between pre-existing social relationship
and use of force. 255 A high degree of force (including the use of a
weapon) occurs in 28% of rapes by strangers, 17% by casual acquain-
tances, 14% by close acquaintances, and 3% by relatives. There is also a
direct relationship between these two factors and the verbal resistance of
victims. In assaults by strangers, one-half of victims resist, but in assaults
by close acquaintances or -relatives, less than one-third resist. 256 Simi-
larly, in rapes by strangers the physical injury rate (40%) is higher than in
rapes by close acquaintances or relatives (23%).257 Greater social dis-
tance thus is associated with greater force, greater resistance, and greater
physical injury.
After the crime, victims tend to report it first to friends or relatives
(64%) other than to police (20%), a medical facility (2%), or a rape crisis
center (6%). Three-quarters of the victims who report the crime to the
251. One-third of rapes in Amir's sample occurred in the victim's residence, and 7% in the sus-
pect's residence. AvR, supra note 233, at 139.
252. In 87% of the cases in Amir's study, only verbal coercion was initially used to subdue the
victim. There was no physical or verbal force in 15% of the cases. When physical force was used.
one-half of the victims were "manhandled." AMIR, supra note 233, at 336.
253. One-half of the victims in the Amir study did not resist in any way. AmR. supra note 233. at
337.
254. In the national sample, 76% had no injury at all. MULVIHILL & TUMEN. supra note 168. at
235, Table 10.
255. C = .37, p < .001 ("p" refers to the probability level of significance: here. the likelihood
of the contingency coefficient of .37 occurring solely by chance is I in 1000). See note 312 infra.
256. C = .19, p < .04.
257. C = .17, p < .05.
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police do so within 24 hours of the offense. Prompt reporting is consid-
ered by juries as an indicator of victim credibility.
The statistical pattern of statutory rape258 is similar to that of forcible
rape, except that the circumstances of the former point much more
strongly to the possibility of consent. One-quarter of the juvenile victims,
but none of the adult victims, are involved in long term, continuing rela-
tions with the suspect. One-half of the statutory rape suspects are close
friends or relatives of their victims, compared to 17% of forcible rape
suspects. Statutory rape offenses occur more frequently in the suspect's
residence. The extent of physical force, resistance, and physical injury-
are substantially higher in forcible rape cases. The few cases of homo-
sexual (exclusively male) rape also show strong likelihood of consent; the
pattern is more like that of statutory than forcible rape. 259
D. Impact of Rape Statutes on Disposition
1. Prosecutorial Success
Table 1260 presents the success rate (conviction after trial or by guilty
plea) in prosecuting the initial charge under common law and reform rape
statutes. The results for forcible rape (top row of table) will be discussed
first. Under the old law, of the 106 cases initially charged with forcible
rape, 37% resulted in convictions of rape or carnal knowledge, 23%
ended with dismissals or acquittals of rape or carnal knowledge, and 35%
resulted in convictions of other charges (e.g., assault, indecent liberties,
etc.). Under the new law, of the 122 cases initially charged with one of
the three degrees of forcible rape, 56% resulted in convictions of some
degree of forcible or statutory rape, 28% were unsuccessfully prosecuted,
and 15% resulted in other convictions.
With reform legislation, the conviction rate for rape has increased 19%
(from 37% to 56%).261 This is brought about primarily by the decline in
258. See Appendix D.
259. Of the 25 homosexual rapes, for example, 52% involved no force at all, compared to 52%
of heterosexual statutory rapes and 13% of forcible rapes. 75% of the victims suffered no injury,
compared to 80% of female juvenile victims and 55% of adult victims. 88% of the victims had prior
social contact with suspect, compared to 68% of the victims in all heterosexual rape cases.
260. The numbers and the notation "N" enclosed in parentheses in this and all subsequent tables
represent the number of cases.
261. This increase cannot be unequivocally attributed to the operation of the new law. In any
field study that does not consist of a true experimental design (i.e., random assignment of cases to
independently established treatment and control groups), there are alternative plausible explanations
for observed results. Here, changes in public attitudes toward rape, in prosecutorial aggressiveness,
in police investigation, etc., can all be related to changes in conviction rates. Moreover, it is not
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TABLE 1
SUCCESS IN PROSECUTING THE INITIAL CHARGE
UNDER OLD LAW
RAPE OR CARNAL
KN.. RESPECTIVELY
PROSECUTION OF:
OTHER
CHARGE
SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS*
UNDER NEW LAW
ALL DEGREES OF
RAPE OR STAT. R..
RESPECTIVELY
OTHER
CHARGE
INITIAL NO
CHARGE. SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS'
RAPE 37% 23% 35% RAPE 1,2, 3 56% 28% 15%
(N = 106) (39) (24) (37) (N = 122) (68) (35) (19)
RI (N=41) 66% 17% 17%
R2 (N=79) 51% 35% 14%
R3 (N = 2) 50% - 50%
CARNAL KN. 42% 15% 36% STAT. R 1,2,3 57% 17% 24%
(N=33) (14) ( 5) (12) (N=46) (27) ( 8) (II)
SRI (N= 13) 31% 23% 46%
SR2 (N = 17) 77% 6% 17%
SR3 (N = 16) 63% 19% 12%
OTHER N/A N/A 77% OTHER N/A N/A 71%
(N=27) (21) (N=24) (17)
*The difference between 100% and the sum of the percentages in each
row indicates the no success of prosecuting "other charge." Thus, the no
success rate in prosecuting "other charge," when the initial charge was
"rape" (under old law) is 5% = (100%)-(37% + 23% + 35%).
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convictions of other offenses. Formerly, 35% of initially filed rape cases
were convicted of other offenses. 262 Now, only 15% of rape filings result
in convictions of other crimes. In other words, the increase in the rape
win rate simply reflects a change in labelling of the conviction. Rape
cases .that under the old law (when there was only one degree of culpabil-
ity) resulted in convictions of, for example, assault, are under the reform
law being convicted of rape 2 or 3. However, the overall conviction rate
(i.e., rape plus other offenses) is constant: 72% before (37% + 35%),
and 71% after (56% + 15%).
Increasing rape convictions was one of the principal motivations of law
reform advocates. This objective has been achieved. However, this does
not mean that the total pool of offenders has expanded, only that within it
there is more precise labelling. 263 The new statute, then, is not a bigger
mousetrap, only a better mousetrap. The symbolic significance of calling
a convicted defendant a "rapist" rather than "assaulter" should not be
underestimated. 264
strictly correct to speak of "impact" or "effect" on conviction to the extent that such terms imply
causation. At most, one can only conclude that legal reform correlates-not necessarily causes-
changes in convictions (or in charging). It is in this sense that "impact" is used in the text.
The cases initially charged with other offenses (27 before, 24 after) can serve as a "control" group
to test the correlational effect. The reform law pertains only to rape, and cases so charged show an
increase in rape convictions. The reform law does not, however, deal with other offenses (e.g., as-
saults), and the conviction rate for such cases (the "controls") show virtually no change from before
to after (77% v. 71%). They provide a comparison baseline for assessing the effect of the law on rape
convictions.
The particular statutory provision that correlates with conviction cannot be empirically determined.
It would seem, though, that the enhanced prosecution success is not related to the evidentiary rules.
Even before the new statute was enacted, Washington courts had abolished the corroboration require-
ment and excluded evidence of victims' prior sexual history. It is probably more likely related to the
gradations of the crime, the new distribution of penalties, or both.
262. In support of the establishment of degrees of rape, it is often said that juries under the old
law had to acquit rather than convict in instances of lesser culpability. This undoubtedly occurred in
some cases. The more common result, as these data show, was to convict of another lesser offense
when that option was available. The jury, in effect, created its own lower degree of "rape."
263. This relabelling has occurred primarily in the less aggravated cases. Under the new law, the
most successful prosecutions are those filed under rape 1. Their conviction rate for rape is 66%. Of
the 39 cases in which forcible rape was charged under the old law, 21 (or 53%) were of an aggravated
nature. These cases could have been filed as rape I had the new law been in effect; under the old law
61% of them resulted in rape convictions, approximately the same conviction rule as for rape I cases.
Thus, prosecutors have been highly successful in securing rape convictions in "hardcore" cases re-
gardless of the substantive law. The more aggravated the circumstances, the less probable the infer-
ence of victim consent, and the more likely a conviction.
264. Nonconsensual intercourse is considered criminal because of the outrage committed on the
victim's personhood, and the infringement of the individual's freedom of choice. If the reason for
punishment was mainly the physical violence involved, the crime would be simply a species of as-
sault. To highlight the outrage involved, many women victims prefer to see their assailants convicted
of third degree rape rather than first or second degree assault, even though the penalty for the rape
offense is much lower. Johnson Interview, supra note 179. The rape label carries far more social
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Reform proponents assert that rape convictions are unusually low and,
therefore, indicative of "a law gone awry."265 A criminal statistic cannot
be adjudged high or low by itself but only in relation to other figures used
as baselines. 266 The "very low" 267 rape conviction rate must be measured
over time and against conviction rates for equivalent 268 violent offenses.
The bottom half of Figure 2 presents the overall conviction rates for forci-
ble rape and aggravated assault on a national basis from 1961 to 1977.269
It is obvious that each offense trend is best fit by a straight line. This
means that the conviction rate for both offenses, even during the 1965-75
"crime wave" period, remains relatively stable270 when seen in longitu-
dinal perspective. Moreover, the conviction trend for assault is only
slightly higher than for rape, with a temporary deviation in 1969 (the apo-
gee of the reported crime upsurge) 271 when the difference reached 9%.
Otherwise, during this entire period, the average conviction rate for as-
sault is 59%, and for rape 57%. Since the evidentiary difficulties in prose-
cuting rape are typically greater than in assault, it is notable that their
respective conviction rates are not more discrepant. 272
stigma than assault. Indeed, to brand someone as a rapist is a kind of "status degradation," whereby
he is "transformed into something looked on as lower in the local scheme of social types ... "
Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SocIOLOGY 420 (1956).
More accurate identification of rapists qua rapists teaches others that society deems this form of
conduct to be criminal.
265. VA. Note, supra note 3, at 1500.
266. Conviction rates must be considered in relation to the figures used as baselines. Some com-
mentators report conviction rates based on total rape complaints or arrests. BATrELLE-LEAA FORCItL
RAPE, supra note 3, at 2-4 (rape convictions in Seattle and Kansas City are less than 2 percent of the
total rapes reported); Chappell & Singer, supra note 245, at 246 (in New York City, "In no recent
year have more than 8 percent of rape arrests resulted in rape convictions."). Although there is no
inherently correct baseline for comparison, the use of complaint and arrest rates can be misleading,
since a high proportion of cases are screened out before they are presented for charging.
267. Berger, supra note 7, at 6.
268. The convictions rate for all Index Crimes (including property offenses) has been used as a
standard of comparison. Berger, supra note 7, at 6. But prosecuting rape is not the same as prosecut-
ing burglary or auto thefts. Even so, over time, the two rates converge: in 1977, they are the same.
UCR 1977 at 216.
269. The national conviction rate for forcible rape in 1977 was 60%. The rate in King County
was 72% for the period of this study, but this figure includes statutory rape convictions. Excluding
these cases, the local conviction rate is 63%. Hence, disposition of charges as well as factual circum-
stances of the crime are representative of national patterns, enhancing generalizability of the conclu-
sions of this study.
270. The constancy in convictions during the crime wave decade provides indirect support for
the possibility that the increase in rape represents primarily an increase in reporting, not an increase in
the actual incidence of the crime. See note 168 and accompanying text supra.
271. See Figure 1 supra.
272. During this 16-year time span rape convictions have consistently averaged only 10% below
convictions for homicide, which is the most successfully prosecuted violent offense. In view of the
unique problems of rape prosecution, and the not substantially higher conviction rates for other, more
easily prosecuted violent offenses, it cannot be said that rape convictions are disproportionately low.
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Figure 2
Percent of Charges (of those arrested) and Overall Convictions (of
those charged) for Forcible Rape and Aggravated Assault on National
Basis from 1961 to 1977.
Charge: Aggravated
Assault o o
Charge: Forcible Rape
Overall conviction
for
Aggravated
Assault
0 ... - O
Forcible
Rape
0---
I I
1961 '65 '69 '73 '77
Years
Note: These figures are taken from Uniform Crime Reports for the indi-
cated years. "Overall convictions" include convictions (by plea or after
trial) for the initially charged offense and for lesser offenses.
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The results for statutory rape prosecutions are presented in the second
row of Table 1. The pattern is identical to that of forcible rape. Under the
reform legislation, there is an increase of 15% (42% to 57%) in statutory
rape conviction, but the non-conviction rate remains the same (15% be-
fore, 17% after). There is also a decrease of 12% (36% to 24%) in other
convictions. This again suggests that the reform law has resulted in a rela-
belling of assault and other offenses as statutory rape convictions. The
overall conviction rate remains relatively stable273 (78% before, 81%
after). It is somewhat higher than that of forcible rape (72%), as would be
expected when nonconsent is conclusively presumed and the offense is
consequently easier to prove.
Most felony charges are disposed by plea.2 74 Rape is no exception, al-
though pleas to it are much less frequent than for other crimes. Table 2
presents the plea dispositions of the various initial charges. The overall
proportion of pleas in forcible rape cases (top row) is only slightly lower
from before to after: 62% (28% + 34%) to 55% (39% + 16%). This
variation is probably within the range of chance and no substantive signif-
icance can be attached to it.275 The content of the plea, however, shows a
273. The fact that conviction rates (not only for rape, but for other offenses such as assault and
homicide as well) are basically stable, suggests the possibility of a natural ceiling. The source of this
idea is Durkheim's proposition of a stable, optimal level of crime in every society. Society requires
some normative code of conduct in order to maintain social order. Labelling certain conduct as devi-
ant or criminal is necessary to define and reinforce the normative code, but can undermine social
stability if it is done excessively. There is thus an optimal level for the amount of conduct society
labels as deviant. E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 66-68 (1964).
Because criminal conduct is formally identified by conviction, Durkheim's idea can be extended to
explain a stable level of convictions. Changes in conviction rates are not consciously regulated but
reflect the interaction of different social processes. In Durkheim's view, sharp increases in reported
rape would lead to a temporary increase in convictions, but the balance would be restored by less
vigorous prosecution of nonaggravated cases. Decreases in reported rape, on the other hand. would
produce an interim drop in convictions, but more aggressive prosecution would return convictions to
its optimal level. If too many persons are labelled as rapists, the basic stability of society is under-
mined. Likewise, if too few persons are so labelled, the rule proscribing such conduct is weakened
and social order is threatened. Hence, societal processes operate to maintain a constant level of con-
duct labelled deviant, evidenced by a constant level of convictions. The same reasoning applies a
fortiori to charging.
The present data indicate that the proportion of convictions (whether for rape or other lesser of-
fenses) of those initially charged with rape is at or near the built-in upper limit. The 72% rate is
constant. However, within this stable pool, the labelling of "rapists" has not yet reached the optimal
ceiling. The 19% increase indicates there is (or was) room for additional labelling.
For applications of Durkheim's theory in other contexts, see K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITArS 3-29
(1966); Blumstein & Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 64 J. CRIri. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
198 (1973).
274. Plea rates vary by offense, with homicide and forcible rape at the low end. Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 (4th ed. 1974).
275. The "control" group of cases charged with other offenses also shows a decline, from 59%
to 54%. Assuming that this 5% drop represents the error margin, the "true" decrease in rape pleas is
2%(=7% - 5%).
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TABLE 2
DISPOSITION BY PLEA OF INITIAL CHARGE
UNDER OLD LAW UNDER NEW LAW
PLEA TO: PLEA TO:
RAPE RAPE 1,2,3
&IOR OTHER &/OR OTHER
CARNAL KN. CHARGE STAT.R. 1,2,3 CHARGE
INITIAL INITIAL
CHARGE: CHARGE:
RAPE 28% 34% RAPE 1, 2, 3 39% 16%
(N= 106) (30) (36) (N= 122) (48) (19)
PLEA TO:
RI/SRI R21SR2 R31SR3
RI (N=41) 25% 17% 7%
R2 (N=79) - 18% 13%
R3 (N= 2) - - -
CARNAL KN. 33% 35% STAT.R. 1, 2, 3 45% 24%
(N=36) (I1) (12) (N=46) (21) (11)
PLEA TO:
SRI SR2 SR3
SRI (N= 13) 15% - -
SR2 (N = 17) - 65% -
SR3 (N = 16) - - 50%
OTHER NIA 59% OTHER N/A 54%
(N=29) (16) (N=24) (13)
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distinct shift. Defendants are more likely now to plea to rape or statutory
rape than to another charge, just as they are more likely to be convicted of
the charged offense rather than of assault. Pleas to rape or statutory rape
are up by 11% (28% to 39%), whereas pleas to other charges are down by
18% (34% to 16%). Almost one-half of rape 1 charges are disposed by
plea (25% + 17% + 7% = 49%), compared to about one-third of rape 2
charges (18% + 13% = 31%). The more serious the degree of the of-
fense and the more severe the penalty, the more likely a defendant is go-
ing to plea than risk a trial. As law reform proponents had hoped, cali-
brating degrees of rape has enhanced substantially the negotiating
flexibility of the prosecutor.
The pattern of pleas to statutory rape is the same as for forcible rape.
Total pleas remain unchanged: 68% before, 69% after. There is a 12%
increase in pleas to statutory rape276 (33% to 45%) and an 11% decrease
in pleas to other offenses (35% to 24%).
The slight decline in total pleas has been accompanied by a small incre-
ment in the number of forcible rape cases that go to trial. Before, 22%
went to trial; now it is 30%. The proportion of statutory rape charges that
go to trial is much smaller. 277 The conviction rate for rape or statutory
rape after trial has risen 17% (37% to 54%).
2. Sentencing
The sentencing innovation wrought by the reform law was to match
punishment to culpability. The sanctions prescribed for the degrees of
rape are generally more lenient than under the prior one-degree rape
law. 278 The women's lobby wanted more to enhance apprehension and
conviction of suspects than to visit harsh retribution on convicted offend-
ers. 279 This approach was sound from the perspective of general deter-
rence. 280 "Severity acting alone is not associated with lower rates of
276. The small number of cases precludes reliable statements regarding the rates of plea by de-
gree of statutory rape.
277. Before enactment of the reform law, 3 out of 33 cases, or 9%, went to trial: thereafter, 9 out
of 46 cases, or 19% did so. Because of the small numbers, these figures may not be reliable. The
number of other charges that went to trial is also too small for reliability, and is not presented.
278. The possible exception is punishment for first degree rape, which excludes any deferred
or suspended sentences unless for commitment to inpatient treatment. WASH. REV. CODE §
9.79.170(2)(1979). Such sentences were permissible under the old law. Ch. 154, § 122, 1973 Wash.
Laws 1198 (repealed 1975).
279. Griswold Interview, supra note 84.
280. General deterrence refers to the capacity of the criminal law, via the threat of sanctions. to
make citizens law-abiding. Andenaes, supra note 77, at 179. Special deterrence, in contrast, refers to
"the threat of further punishment of one who has already been convicted and punished" in order to
render him less likely to recidivate. Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 627,
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crime. ' 281 There is "anecdotal but persuasive" evidence 282 that an in-
crease in the certainty of detection, prosecution, and punishment has
greater general preventive effect than an increase in the severity of pun-
ishment. 283 Moreover, severe penalties not attuned to degree of culpabil-
ity are thought to reduce the likelihood of conviction, thereby defeating
the statutory purpose. 284
Sentences under the new law reveal striking changes. Deferred and
suspended jail sentences have decreased threefold compared to under the
common law statute (42% before, 17% after). 285 Punishment is clearly
more certain now-fewer offenders are being released. Mindful of the
crime control climate that produced the rape law reform movement,
judges are stricter in sentencing. This strictness does not necessarily mean
sending more rapists to prison. In fact, the incarceration rate has declined
slightly (35% before, 27% after). The emphasis instead is on rehabilita-
tion. The commitment to inpatient sexual offender treatment facilities has
more than doubled (22% to 55%). Courts are reflecting the public mood
that rapists should be certain of conviction and confinement (including
treatment), but not necessarily of harsh imprisonment terms (at least in
nonaggravated cases). 286 It is this kind of pattern, according to general
deterrence theory, that should eventually result in a lower incidence of
crime.
632 (1966). In both, the essence of deterrence or prevention is threat. See generally F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, DzrERRENcE 91-248 (1973).
281. Antunes & Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications for Crim-
inal Justice Policy, 51 J. URB. L. 145, 158 (1973). Because of the limited empirical evidence, others
are more cautious in their assertions, saying only that the deterrent effect is "doubtful" or "equivo-
cal" at best. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs PROcEssES BB 16:2 31 (3d ed.
1975)(hereinafter KADISH & PAULSEN). Substantial increases in punishment for rape have been shown
to have no effect on the frequency or aggravated circumstances of the crime. Schwarz, The Effect in
Philadelphia of Pennsylvania's Increased Penalties for Rape and Attempted Rape, 59 J. CRIM. L. C.
& P.S. 509 (1968).
282. KADISH & PAULSEN, supra note 281, at 30.
283. "[I]ncreasing severity in a condition of low certainty will have little effect on crime rates."
Antunes & Hung, supra note 281, at 158. Since the effectiveness of the deterrence or threat must be
judged from the viewpont of potential offenders, the certainty of these practices is important only as it
contributes to the appearance of certainty-that is, how they are perceived by the public. Andenaes,
supra note 77, at 970. The combination of certainty and severity may produce the maximum general
deterrence.
284. See note 77 supra.
285. The percentages in this section of the text are based on 124 cases in the before data and 143
in the after data.
286. Actually, judges usually issue sentences recommended by the prosecutors. There is an aver-
age overlap of 90% between the two in the present study. In the few instances in which judges differ
from prosecutors, it is in the direction of greater leniency. Since the new law, the KCPA has followed
a policy of recommending deferred sentences of at least 5 years conditioned upon successful inpatient
treatment. Canova Interview, supra note 18; KCPA Policy, supra note 213, at § 1061(II)(B)(3).
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The draconian sanctions of common law rape statutes were counterpro-
ductive in that they discouraged juries from convicting in other than the
most "hardcore" cases. The severity of the sentence in practice was more
formal than real. 287 If severity is measured by the number of convicted
persons sentenced to incarceration, 288 this study suggests that sentences
under the old law were no more severe than are sentences under the new
law. 289 Nonetheless, the prescribed penalty is important from the deter-
rence viewpoint because it is the threat, rather than the imposition, of
sanctions that is correlated with jury dispositions to convict. Juries may
know of the penalty in the books, but normally they are unaware of actual
sentencing practices. Now that life imprisonment is no longer possible.
and penalties are scaled to the gravity of the crime, rape convictions are
more frequent than before.
E. Impact of Rape Statutes on Charging
This section examines two related issues in the charging process. The
first is the effect of the old and new statutes on the proportion of rape
charges filed out of the total number of rape cases presented to the prose-
cutor. Without an increase in the number of cases charged, an overall
increase in convictions-a prime objective of the reform legislation-is
not likely to occur. The second issue is how prosecutors decide whether
to charge and what to charge in a particular case. By identifying and
weighing the factors used by prosecutors, it will be possible to reconstruct
empirically the decision making process. The resulting model provides an
empirical basis for formulating guidelines for the exercise of charging
discretion and for evaluating afresh the substantive law of rape.
287. Most offenders under the common law statutes were sentenced to far fewer years than the
allowable maximum. BATrELLE-LEAA FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 3, at 14.
288. Data on the years of incarceration were not available in the KCPA files. Prosecutors esti-
mated that the average imprisonment sentence has not varied significantly. Canova Interview, supra
note 18; Reich Interview, supra note 107, at 20.
289. There is little difference in terms of incarceration between those convicted of carnal knowl-
edge under the old law and those convicted of statutory rape (all three degrees combined) under the
new law. Before, 32% of the convicted offenders were imprisoned; now, 26% are imprisoned. As-
suming that many of the rape cases under the old law would, if prosecuted under the new law, be
charged as rape 1, see note 23 supra, there is again little difference in incarceration rates: 60% v.
63%. Most offenders who commit aggravated rapes (which are usually easier to prove) are going to
be convicted and imprisoned no matter what the content of the statute. Finally, 29% of those con-
victed of other offenses under the old law were incarcerated; today the proportion incarcerated for
rape 2, 3, and other convictions (many of whom, in the past, would have been convicted of assault) is
22%.
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1. Initial Charge
Table 3 presents the distribution of initial290 charges291 under both stat-
utes, and reveals that the reform law has had no impact on the proportion
of cases charged. Before enactment of the new law, 51% of all com-
plaints were filed as rape and 16% as carnal knowledge. Today, despite
the substantial increase in the number of complaints presented by the po-
lice for prosecution and the refinement in the definition of rape designed
to enhance prosecutorial flexibility, 292 the experience under the reform
law is the same: 51% are filed as rape2 93 and 19% as statutory rape294
(combining the three degrees in both offenses). Other charges also remain
essentially unchanged (13% before, 10% after). 295 The proportion of rape
complaints declined for prosecution is nearly identical: one out of five. 296
290. The initial (rather than final or reduced) charge is the primary focus in the study of the
exercise of charging discretion. See text accompanying note 222 supra. As a result of pleas, there are
fewer final rape charges than initial rape charges, and more final other charges and declines or dismis-
sals than initially. Under the old law (N = 201), the distribution of final charges was as follows:
25% rape, 8% carnal knowledge, 35% other charge, 31% decline/dismiss. Under the new law
(N = 213): 32% rape, 13% statutory rape, 22% other charge, 33% decline/dismiss.
291. Most cases (134 of 208 before; 93 of 237 after) were charged with one or more offenses in
addition to rape. They were normally prosecuted as rape cases. In this study, a case filed as rape 2 and
robbery, for example, would be coded as initially charged with rape 2. "Other charge" includes
those cases in which only a charge other than forcible or statutory rape was filed, despite the founded
complaint of rape.
292. Prior to the reform, 208 such complaints were made during a three and one-half year period.
In a two and one-half year period thereafter, there were 237 such complaints.
293. Of the three degrees of forcible rape, rape 2 is charged twice as often as rape 1. Rape 3 is
virtually never filed. It is primarily a residual category for plea bargaining (Table 3). In effect, then,
for initial filing purposes there are only two degrees of forcible rape.
294. Unlike forcible rape, all three degrees of statutory rape are filed. The second and third
degrees are charged more frequently than the first. See figures at the bottom of Table 3.
295. Although the overall proportion of other charges before and after the reform is about the
same, the types of other charges vary. Under the old law, there were a total of 134 cases (out of 208)
that contained some other charge(s), distributed as follows: 40% were for other sex crimes (sodomy,
indecent liberties, etc.), 34% were crimes against a person (assault, kidnapping), 29% were crimes
against property (robbery, burglary, trespass), and 4% were miscellaneous offenses. Under the new
law, the 93 cases with other charge(s) (out of 237) consisted of: 29% other sex crimes, 29% crimes
against a person, 32% crimes against property, and 10% miscellaneous. There are fewer sex crimes
as a result of the sex-neutral definitions and gradations of culpability. A case formerly filed as so-
domy would now be filed as rape. Charges of crimes against a person have also decreased; assaults,
for example, would now be filed as rape 2. However, property crimes and miscellaneous charges
increased correspondingly, so that the overall proportion of other charges relative to rape charges is
unchanged. The pattern of other charges in relation to the age of the victim differs in that other sex
offense filings are more common in statutory rape cases, while personal and property crime filings are
more common in forcible rape cases.
296. To refine this analysis of charging, Appendix E presents the distribution of charges under
both statutes according to the victims' age. With adult victims, the proportion of charges and declines
is basically constant. The lowering of the age of nonconsent increased the number of adult victims,
from one-half to two-thirds of the population. Nonetheless, the proportion of forcible rape charges is
about the same (65% before, 68% after). We already know that total convictions did not change
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE AND (NUMBER OF CASES) OF INITIAL
CHARGES FILED
INITIAL CHARGE:
RAPE
(106)
CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE
(33)
OTHER
(28)
DECLINE
(41)
(208) 100% (237) 100%
* RAPE I
RAPE 2
RAPE 3
(40)
(80)
17%
33
1
TOTAL: (122) 51%
** STAT. RAPE 1 (10) 4%
STAT. RAPE 2 (18) 7
STAT. RAPE 3 (18) 7
TOTAL: (46) 19%
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UNDER
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UNDER
NEW LAW
51%
13
20
TOTAL
CASES:
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As shown earlier, the factual circumstances of rape cases in the two
time periods of this study match rather closely. There are practically no
noteworthy distinctions in the setting, circumstances, and evidentiary
background, 297 or in the personal characteristics of victims and sus-
pects, 298 between the cases presented for prosecution before and after the
law reform. The stability in charging rates suggests that prosecutors (who
normally would not file unless they believed a conviction could be se-
cured) are applying the same "convictabilit;j" standard now as before the
law was changed. 299
Given the consistency in charging and similarity in fact patterns, it is
not surprising to find that the total conviction rate also remains the
same. 300 The reform law, then, has not affected the proportion of cases
charged or declined, nor has it affected the proportion of cases convicted.
The percentage of persons out of the total pool of rape complaints who are
deemed "offenders" (by charge or conviction) has remained relatively
constant.
(Table 1). Thus, contrary to initial concerns of prosecutors, converting a substantial number of statu-
tory rape cases into forcible rape cases has not adversely affected prosecution (charging or convic-
tion) despite the additional burden of proving nonconsent. In fact, prosecutors should have been able
to predict that outcome. Under the old law, they were already charging over one-third of the suspects
in juvenile victim cases with forcible rape when they could have charged them with carnal knowledge
(Appendix E). With the new law lowering the statutory age, prosecutors were simply obliged to
charge what they had always charged in the past at their own discretion.
With respect to juvenile victim cases, the distribution of rape charges differs. Before, 33% were
charged with carnal knowledge; afterwards, statutory rape charges increased to 54%. Under the new
law, fewer cases are filed as forcible rape (36% before, 20% after) and as other charges (18% before,
12% after). This change may simply reflect the age of nonconsent, since forcible rape was more
likely to be charged in cases involving older (16-18) victims. See note 237 and notes 23-64 and
accompanying text supra. The proportion of juvenile victim cases perceived to be nonconvictable
remains the same: 13% were declined before, and 14% after.
297. See Appendix C.
298. See Appendix B.
299. Deputies in the KCPA believe, and claim, however, that since the implementation of the
new law, the office has adopted a more aggressive prosecutorial posture. It has bolstered its prosecu-
tion capability by establishing a specialized Sexual Assault Unit, recruited more women deputies,
sensitized its staff to the unique problems posed by rape, and pursued a tougher enforcement policy.
According to the Unit chief, cases that in the past might have been declined or charged with a lesser
offense because of their marginal evidentiary basis, might now be filed as a lower degree forcible or
statutory rape. Canova Interview, supra note 18. If prosecutors are in fact more aggressive in filing,
that is, if they are applying a lower convictability standard, then an increase in rape charges ought to
ensue given the unchanged evidentiary strength of the cases.
The results of this study suggest that "convictability," unlike probable cause, is a standard that
does not leave much room for the exercise of discretion. So long as the fact patterns of the complaints
are essentially the same, and prosecutors rely on these facts to the same extent before and after the
reform, the filing outcome can be expected to stay the same. Prosecutors today might be more solici-
tous of and sensitive to the needs of victims than their predecessors, but this attitudinal change does
not necessarily translate into a filing change if the record is bereft of the evidence needed to prevail.
300. See Table I and text following note 262 supra.
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Rape law reform advocates have asserted that charges, like convic-
tions, of rape are disproportionately low. 30 1 The top half of Figure 2 plots
national trends of forcible rape and aggravated assault charges as percen-
tages of those arrested for each offense from 1961 to 1977.302 In 1969,
filings of assault were indeed 10% higher, but in 1961, rape filings were
even higher. Averaging over the highs and lows of the entire time period,
the charging rates of rape and assault are identical: 71%. Except for tem-
porary oscillations (± 10%), the proportion of persons in society identi-
fied as probable offenders stays relatively unchanged over time, thereby
ensuring social stability. 303
2. A Decisionmaking Model of the Charging Process in Forcible Rape
In order to formulate a decisionmaking model of charging in rape
cases, a three-step statistical analysis was undertaken. 304 The results of
each step will be described sequentially.
a. Identifying the factors.
The first step was to condense the 50 or so items of information (vari-
ables) available for each case,305 which were assumed to be related to
charging, to a more limited number of homogenous clusters of variables
(called factors). Using the technique of factor analysis, 306 all of the vari-
301. See note 265 supra.
302. In 1977, the national charging rate for forcible rape was 65%. Under the new law
(1975-77) the KCPA charging rate is nearly the same, 68% (Appendix E, forcible rape cases only).
303. See note 273 supra.
304. Despite entreaties for systematic study of these factors (see Kaplan, supra note 202, at
193), only two investigations have been conducted with respect to rape filings. Weninger, supra note
11 (based on case files); BATrELLE-LEAA PROSECUrrOR SURVEY, supra note 4 (based on opinion inter-
views). One commentator doubts that these factors "lend themselves to much meaningful system-
atization." Abrams, supra note 203, at 11. Prosecutors, too, say that each case is unique and general-
izations about charging factors cannot be made. Yet, there is no reason to suppose that charging, as a
cognitive process, is any different from other types of decisionmaking that have been shown to reflect
certain constant factors (e.g., sentencing, parole release). See, e.g.. J. HOGARTH. SENrTENCINO ASA
HUMAN PROCESS (1971); Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process. 84
YALE L.J. 810 (1975). One needs to look at large numbers of cases and enlist the aid of multivariate
statistical techniques that weigh the independent and combined effects of multiple variables in order
to uncover the common patterns of human behavior hidden beneath the welter of individual case
details.
305. These variables are found in the questionnarie, Appendix A: for Card 1. variables 33 to 80
(excluding the following: 35-36, 41-46, 47-52, 53-54.56-59, 76 to 78): for Card 11. variables 5 to
28.
306. See generally P. HORST. FACTOR ANALYSIS OF DATA MATRICES (1965). There are several vari-
ations in the method of condensing variables into factors. The one used here is the most common
type: principal axes analysis with Varimax rotation. It is the procedure that extracts the most variance
for any set number of factors. J. NUNNALY, PSYCHOMETRIC THEORY 316 (1967).
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ables are intercorrelated, and a small number of independent clusters that
"hold together" are identified. Each cluster or factor reflects a distinct
conceptual dimension.
The results under the old law and under the reform law were similar, so
only the latter are presented. 307 In the prosecution of forcible rape, five
factors were identified (in descending order of importance): 30 8 physical
force (both aggravated and nonaggravated), 30 9 social interaction between
suspect and victim prior to alleged rape, corroborative evidence, victim
credibility, and race. In prosecution of statutory rape, the following five
factors emerged (in descending order of importance):310 corroborative ev-
idence, social interaction, nonaggravated physical force, suspect and vic-
tim credibility, and race. The similarity in before and after data factors
indicates that prosecutors use the same set of factors regardless of the
governing substantive law. Thus, in forcible rape prosecutions, under
both statutes, force is the primary factor and social interaction is secon-
dary. It should be noted, however, that the five factors explain most of the
statutory rape prosecutions (92% of the variance), but only somewhat
more than one-half of the forcible rape cases (58% of the variance). Pro-
307. See Appendix F. Under each extracted factor are the percentage of variance explained by
that factor, and the variables with the highest factor loadings used to define the factor. For example,
in the factor analysis of adult victim cases, the fifth factor of race accounts for I 1% of the variance.
The two principal variables that compose this factor are race of suspect (with a loading of .91) and
race pairing (with a loading of .87). These loadings are correlations between the individual variable
and the composite factor. High loading variables (only these are listed in Appendix F) are the princi-
pal determinants of the given factor. One looks at these variables to interpret and label the factor. For
a complete description of each of these listed variables, see Appendix G. For example, "race pair-
ing," presented in Appendix G (item 7-C), refers to race (white/minority) of suspect of victim, and
consists of four possible pairing combinations.
308. The study of rape prosecutions in Texas examined the effect of several similar variables:
force/resistance, prior social contact, prior social relationship (the preceding two variables combined
to form the social interaction factor in the present study), and medical corroboration. They were not
empirically generated, but were chosen a priori. Weninger, supra note 11, at 371-73.
309. Statistically, aggravated and simple physical force are highly correlated and form a single
factor. Conceptually, however, they should be kept separate because aggravation is the statutory
element that distinguishes rape 1 from rape 2. It is defined by the presence of a deadly weapon,
kidnapping, serious physical injury, or felonious entry. WASH. REV. CoDE § 9A.44.040 (1979).
Hereinafter, the force factor will be separated into aggravated and nonaggravated components.
Force and resistance have been treated separately in rape law. Empirically, however, they are
highly interrlated. The greater the physical force, the more the resistance (product-moment correla-
tion = .58). See text accompanying notes 255-56 supra. In defining "forcible compulsion" as
"physical force which overcomes resistance," Washington reform law reflects the practical reality
that one does not occur without the other in most cases. WAsH. REV. Coo § 9A.44.010(5) (1979).
Thus, regardless of the legal standard, proof at trial will be the same. Evidence of force almost
always entails evidence of resistance, and vice versa. In this study, the factor of physical force will be
understood to include victim resistance.
310. See bottom half of Appendix F.
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secutions of forcible rape are more complex, and not all of the determin-
ing factors can be statistically identified.
b. Correlating aggregated factors with charging.
Grouping of similar variables into factors does not say anything about
their correlation with an external criterion such as charging. The second
step, then, was to ascertain that these factors as a whole are indeed associ-
ated with charging.
This was accomplished by summing the various factors to create a
"convictability scale." 311 If there is an association between the factors
and charging, one would expect the degree of convictability according to
this scale to be correlated with charging. When a prosecutor screens a
case and evaluates the array of available information (mostly condensable
into five factors), the assumption is that he adds the information together
to determine whether and what to charge. The more pertinent evidence
available, the more convictable the case at trial, and therefore the more
likely a rape charge. Table 4312 confirms the positive linear relationship
between convictability and charging under both the old and reform stat-
utes.
Three results should be noted. First, this simple scale is a fairly accu-
rate predictor of charging. Given any case in the after data a charge of
statutory rape, other offense, rape 2 or 3,313 or decline of charge can be
predicted on the average with better than even chance. The accuracy rises
to 78% for rape 1 charge. This means that prosecutorial decisionmaking
311. The scale was composed of 23 variables that appeared under one or another of the five
factors (Appendix F), regardless of the size of their factor loadings. A basic principle of measurement
theory is that the longer a test, the more reliable it is (i.e., the greater the number of variables.
including variables with low loadings, the more reliable the scale). J. NUNNALLY, supra note 306. at
223-25. These variables are listed in Appendix G. The scale scores could range from 0 to 38. For
example, the variable "verbal resistance" was scored I if yes, 0 if no; "attempted flight" was I if
yes, 0 if no; and so on. For each case, the values of each variable were summed to produce the
convictability score. The higher the score, the more convictable the case. These scores were categor-
ized into four levels of convictability: low (0-11), moderate (12-14). high (15-22). and very high
(23-38). See Table 4. The same procedure was applied to the before-and-after data.
312. The notations at the bottom of the table signify the following: the chi-square (x2), with a
value of 142.1, tests the statistical significance of the association between the two measures. convic-
tability and charge. With 12 degrees of freedom (df), the probability (p) of this relationship occurring
solely by chance is negligible (I in 10,000). The contigency coefficient (C) is another way of express-
ing the relation between two measures. It ranges from zero (no association) to an upper limit near
unity (about .80), depending on the number of cells per table. A coefficient of .61 would be consid-
ered very high. See generally S. SIEGEL. NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES,
104-11I, 196-202 (1956). hereinafter, these same notations will be used in presenting statistical
analyses.
313. Rape 2 and 3 charges in this analysis and subsequent ones will be combined since there
were only two initial filings of rape 3.
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TABLE 4
Relationship Between "Convictability" and Charge
UNDER OLD LAW Charge
Convictability knowledge Decline Other Rape
very high (2) (3) (5) (49)
4% 42%
high (3) (16) (13) (44)
4%
moderate (6) (18) (2) (7)
low (22) (4) (8) (6)
N = 33 41 28 106 208
UNDER NEW
Convictability
very high
high
moderate
low
N=
x2 = 80.4, 9df, p = .00001, C = .53
LAW
Charge
Statutory
Rape Decline Other Rape 2, Rape 1
78%
(1) (4) (6) (18) (32)48% 
58%/
(8) (10) (11) (47) (8)
(10) (25) (4) (10) (1)
((/(27) (7) (2) (6) (0)
46
x 2 = 142.1,
46
12df,p 
23
.00001, C
81
= .61
3
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can be simulated by an additive scale. 314 This scale makes intuitive sense
because degrees of rape imply a continuum of culpability, and the more
incriminating factors present, the higher the charge.
Second, the same linear trend occurs in the before data. 315 This sug-
gests, as did the data on proportion of charges and the factor analysis, that
prosecutors employ the same convictability standard in screening cases
irrespective of the law of rape. As a practical matter, certain factors must
be present in order to win at trial, and these remain unchanged despite
reforms in the legal elements of the crime.
Third, the "convictability" of carnal knowledge and statutory rape
cases is low. Even declined forcible rape cases, were they to be prose-
cuted, would be more likely to succeed. The possibility of abolishing stat-
utory rape or lowering further the age of nonconsent was considered by
the Washington legislature. 316 The enactment of either notion would have
resulted in a drop in convictions. The fact that convictions are presently
obtained at all despite the judgment that juvenile victim cases are much
weaker than forcible rape cases, indicates the importance of the conclu-
sive presumption of nonconsent. 317
c. Correlating individual factors with chaiging.
The final step in constructing a decisionmaking model of the charging
process was to correlate individual factors with charging. This involved a
two-pronged analysis. First, the association between the variable repre-
senting each factor and the charging outcome was examined by crosstabu-
lation and its statistical significance was assessed by the chi-square test.
This procedure identified those variables that have a significant impact
314. This simple scale serves the purpose of showing the relationship with charging. However.
more complex scales could be constructed (e.g., by differential weighting of the factors) that would
enhance substantially predictive accuracy. A practical application of this scale would be its adapta-
tion for use in prioritizing rape cases for filing. A similar scale that assesses the gravity of offenses.
based not on legal definitions of the crime but on practical factors such as extent of injury, intimida-
tion, criminal history of the suspect, etc., was used in devising a computer-based management infor-
mation system for prosecutors to prioritize pending criminal cases. See Hamilton & Work, The Pros-
ecutor's Role in the Urban Court System: The Case for Management Consciousness. 64 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGV 183. 185 (1973).
315. The lower accuracy of predictions in the pre-reform data can be attributed to the absence of
gradations of the crime.
316. See Table I supra.
317. There is a positive correlation between age of juvenile victims and convictabilit (C =
.40). The older the juvenile, the more convictable the case. This is why lowering the age on noncon-
sent to 16 has not adversely affected prosecution. See note 27 supra. The presumption is most needed
for successful prosecution with child and younger adolescent victims.
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upon charging. 318 For example, two significant variables were the "ag-
gravating conditions" of the rape and the corroborative "circumstantial
evidence." Crosstabulation shows that when aggravation is present the
filing of a rape charge is more likely than when it is not.319 The high
statistical significance means that this relationship is unlikely to be a
product of chance. The association between the presence of corroborative
evidence and charging 320 is interpreted in a like manner.
These significant variables were entered into a stepwise multiple re-
gression analysis to determine their respective relative impacts on charg-
ing decisions. This enabled the ordering of the variables, and the factors
that they represent, in terms of their impact upon the different types of
charges. 321 Whereas the chi-square test only indicates whether there is a
significant correlation between any given variable and charging, the re-
gression analysis reveals the differential effect of any variable compared
to any other. For example, this analysis shows that "aggravating condi-
tions" has a greater effect than "circumstantial evidence" in the prosecu-
tor's decision to charge the suspect with first degree rape.322
A sequence of binary choices provides an ideal model of the charging
process for forcible rape. Upon screening a case, the prosecutor initially
318. See Appendix G. The chi-square values exclude the carnal knowledge and statutory rape
cases (presented in separately marked columns) because they are sufficiently different from the other
types of cases (e.g., low convictability; see Table 4) that they need to be analyzed and discussed
separately. The notation p = n.s. in some of the tables means that the probability level is not statisti-
cally significant.
319. Appendix G, Table 1.
320. Appendix G, Table 4.
321. See Appendix H (after data) and Appendix I (before data). Multiple regression is a tech-
nique for predicting a dependent variable (the charge) from any number of independent variables (the
23 variables of Appendix G). It is based on the equation Y = A + BIX 2 + . . . BNXN, where Y is
the dependent outcome, X is hn independent variable, A is a constant, and B is the regression or beta
coefficient. Beta represents the change in Y associated with a given change in one of the X's, while
holding the remaining independent variables constant. The larger the beta of a given X, the more
influential it is in predicting the Y. In the stepwise variation of multiple regression, the variable that is
most predictive of the outcome is selected first, then the second most predictive variable is selected,
and so on. The dependent variable consisted of paired comparisons of charges. The first charge of the
pair is the charge of interest, and is compared against the other member of the pair. For example, the
dependent variable "decline v. rape + other" means that the regression is examining the factors that
influence non-prosecution, as compared to any rape charges and other charges. See generally H.
BLALOCK, JR., SocIAL STAnsTics 429-33, 450-53, 498-502 (2d ed. 1972). Separate regression ana-
lyses were performed. for adult and juvenile cases in order to formulate separate charging models of
forcible and statutory rape.
In describing the results in the text, the two sets of data were analyzed as follows: First, I looked at
the regression analysis to identify the principal variables that influence the charge. The size of the
beta coefficients indicates the relative weight of each variable. Next, I turned to the crosstabulations.
The distribution of percentages shows the relationship between each of these variables and the
charge.
322. Appendix H, Regression Analysis A.
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decides whether to file or not to file. If he opts to file, then he decides
whether to charge the suspect with rape or some other offense. If the
charge is rape, he must choose between rape 1 or rape 2. The determina-
tive factors of each of these choices are identified by regression analysis
and summarized in Table 5.
Three main fact patterns are involved in an initial decision to decline
prosecution. In descending order of importance, they are: (1) the absence
of aggravation and the use of only moderate physical force (e.g., few of
the declined cases involved choking of the victim when compared to the
charged cases); 323 (2) the lack of corroborative evidence (e.g., there is a
relative absence of circumstantial evidence 324 and identification wit-
nesses 325 in the declined cases); and (3), the presence of a white victim
and a minority suspect. 326 The first two elements are understandable. Ab-
sent convincing proof of the legal element of forcible compulsion and the
practical requirement of corroboration, filing would be futile. 327 Selective
enforcement based on judgments of convictability arguably represent
good faith exercises of discretion.
More troublesome, however, is the influence of race in the decision not
to charge. Under the old statute, it was primarily the minority vic-
tim/minority suspect cases that were declined. 328 Although prosecutors
nationwide deny that race enters into their decision making, 329 studies
have shown that in black intraracial assaults as well as in rapes, suspects
323. Appendix H. Regression Analysis C, shows that the principal predictor of non-prosecution
is the (lack of) aggravation factor. It has the largest beta coefficient, .21. Next, Appendix G, Table
2b, shows the crosstabulation of the "degree of physical force" (one of the variables that constitutes
the forcible compulsion factor) with the charges. 19% of declined cases involved high force (chok-
ing), compared to 43% of all charged cases.
Unless otherwise indicated, all the percentage differences from the crosstabulations reported in this
and subsequent notes, and in the text, are statistically significant.
324. Appendix G, Table 4b. 61% of the declined cases lacked circumstantial evidence, com-
pared with 15% of the filed cases.
325. Appendix G, Table 4e. 60% of the declined cases lacked identification witnesses, as op-
posed to 38% of the filed cases (averaging 35% + 44% + 22%).
326. 77% of the declined cases involved minority, mostly black, suspects, compared to only
41% of all prosecuted cases. Appendix G, Table 7a. 55% of the declined cases involved interracial
couples, while only 29% of the filed cases did. Appendix G, Table 7c. This relationship between race
and non-prosecution holds even after controlling for the effect of the following variables: aggrava-
tion, social interaction, and corroboration.
327. Declined cases also involved high social interaction and low victim credibility. See Appen-
dix G, Tables 3a, 3c, 6a, & 6b. According to the Regression Analysis, however., these two factors are
less important than aggravation, corroboration, and race.
328. Appendix G, Table 7c. 41% of the declined cases under the old statute involved a minority
victim and a minority suspect, as opposed to 14% of the filed cases. Again, the relationship persisted
after controlling for the possible influence of third variables: aggravation, social interaction, and cor-
roboration.
329. Less than 1% of the surveyed prosecutors acknowledged that race was a factor in their
charging decisions. BATrELLE-LEAA PROSECUTOR SURVEY, supra note 4, at 52.
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are often released without charge. 330 Prosecutors claim black victims are
unwilling to prosecute because such offenses are not deemed serious by
black cultural norms. 331 Currently in King County, this kind of racial bias
has disappeared in rape prosecution. Cases involving minority couples
are not declined or charged more often than others. 332 At present, how-
ever, there is no adequate explanation for the increase in the failure to file
charges in black suspect/white victim cases.333
If a decision to file is made, then the next choice is between rape or
some other charge. The profiles of defendants charged with other offenses
and with rape 2 are almost indistinguishable. Both involve low to medium
forcible compulsion, 334 medium to high social interaction, 335 and victims
who are at least moderately credible. 336 Race is not a factor. 337 These
results explain the near identity in appraisals of convictability of rape 2
and other charge cases. In other words, prosecutors just as well could be
filing rape 2 charges as assaults or some other sex crime. The fact that
prosecutors do not file these other charges means either that their filing
choice is not made on a generally consistent basis, or the statistical tech-
niques employed do not discern the relevant factors. 339
Once the prosecutor decides to file a rape charge, the choice of degree
is determined easily. Rape 3 is filed rarely. The single most important
330. F. MILLER, supra note 201, at 174. See also Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 519, 527 (1969). ("[I]t is the policy of some
offices to be lenient in charging assault and sex offenses occurring within minority groups.")
331. According to one Detroit prosecutor, the "moral code among the Negro subgroup was so
low that if all such offenses were prosecuted, the courts would be overloaded." F. MILLER, supra note
201, at 175 n.5.
332. Appendix G, Table 7c.
333. One prosecutor has suggested that the increase is the result of a temporary police attempt.
begun in 1975-76, for a crackdown on prostitution by arresting pimps and presenting them for rape
prosecution. The Sexual Assault Unit of the KCPA refused to prosecute these cases, in which the
pimps were often black and the prostitutes were white. Canova Interview, supra note 18. It should be
noted, however, that this explanation is not reflecting a change in the racial composition of suspects
and victims in complaints from before and aftei the law was changed. See Appendix B.
334. Appendix G. Tables 2a & 2d.
335. Appendix G, Tables 3a & 3b.
336. Appendix G, Tables 6a & 6c.
337. Appendix G, Tables 7a, 7b, & 7c.
338. Appendix G, Table 4.
339. In interviews, prosecutors said that they filed other charges when there was no penetration.
a central definitional element of rape. The data showed a higher frequency of lack of penetration
evidence in other charges, but it was not statistically significant. Appendix G, Table 4a. The non-
significance could be due to the small number of cases involving other charges. The only variable that
distinguished these cases was the suspects' credibility. Whereas most rape suspects claim consent or
mistaken identity, suspects charged with other offenses often raise the defense of prostitution or
intoxication. Appendix G, Table 5b. It is not clear why these exculpatory claims result in other
charges.
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factor in charging rape 1 is aggravation. 340 This is not unexpected since it
is, after all, one of the definitional elements of the crime. When there are
aggravating circumstances there usually also is forcible compulsion, 341
the parties normally are unknown to each other, 342 corroborative evidence
is substantial, 343 and the victim has considerable credibility. 344 Thus, the
presence of aggravating circumstances renders the discretionary factors
relatively unimportant. For the prosecutor, it is practically tantamount to
a presumption of nonconsent by the victim.
In sum, because of the aggravated force, a rape 1 charge is readily
predictable and filed in highly convictable cases. Two-thirds of rape 1
filings in fact result in rape convictions. 345 Declined cases are also easily
predicted. The minimal levels of force and the minimal corroboration
present in those cases render them the least convictable. Cases filed with
rape 2 or other charges are of intermediate convictability. They have mid-
range values on statutory and discretionary factors. As a result, only one-
half of rape 2 filings lead to convictions for the substantive charges. 346
The impact of Washington's reform legislation on the charging process
has been negligible. The same five factors that currently are influential
were relied upon and given approximately the same weight in the charg-
ing process under the previous statute. There are some differences, 347 but
the similarities overshadow them. Before, as now, cases were declined
when there was little force and little corroboration. 348 The factors that
determined a rape charge were the same as the ones that now influence the
filings of rape 1 and rape 2 charges. For example, 51% of former rape
charges were against suspects unknown to victims; now, 48% of rape 1
and rape 2 charges are against strangers. 349 Before, there was circumstan-
340. Appendix H, Regression Analysis A (beta = .51). Appendix G, Table 1: 80% of rape I
cases involve aggravation, compared to 18% of rape 2 and 3 cases.
341. Appendix G, Table 2b: 53% of rape I cases involve high force, compared to 36% of rape 2
and 3 cases.
342. Appendix H, Regression Analysis A (beta = .23). Appendix G, Table 3a: 61% of rape 1
cases involve strangers, compared to 42% of rape 2 and 3 cases.
343. Appendix H, Regression Analysis A (beta = .21). Appendix G, Table 4a: 55% of rape 1
cases have evidence of penetration, compared to 38% of rape 2 and 3 cases.
344. Appendix G, Table 6a, 6b.
345. See Table 1.
346. Id.
347. One difference, already discussed, is race. See notes 328-33 and accompanying.text supra.
Another is victim's chastity as an aspect of her credibility in determining a rape charge. Appendix I,
regression analysis A (beta = .46). Now that prior sexual history is for the most part inadmissible,
this variable is no longer taken into account in the filing process. See notes 88-95 and accompanying
text supra.
348. Appendix I, Regression Analysis D. Appendix G, Tables 2b-e & 4b-e.
349. Appendix G, Table 3a.
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tial evidence in 92% of rape filings; under the new law, circumstantial
evidence is present in 84% of the rape 1 and rape 2 filings. 350 On the
whole, the statistical evidence cannot be more persuasive that prosecuto-
rial decisions to charge rape or not to charge at all have not been affected
by the definitional overhaul of the common law rape statute. The consis-
tency of the factors used by prosecutors and the weight attached to them
before and after enactment of reform legislation further indicates that the
factual proof required at trial has not been affected by the change in the
statutory definition of the crime. Except for expressly excluded evidence
such as prior sexual history, the same kinds of evidence are used to show
nonconsent, regardless of whether the legal standard is framed in terms of
the victim's resistance, the actor's force, or both.
3. A Decisionmaking Model of the Charging Process in Statutory Rape
Table 6 presents the effects of the two statutory and three discretionary
factors on statutory rape prosecutions under the new law. 351 The pre-
sumption of nonconsent makes prosecution easier, so the charging pro-
cess in juvenile victim cases shows a much clearer configuration than in
forcible rape. Again, a possible analogue of the filing process consists of
a sequence of choices: first, to decline prosecution or to file; second, if a
charge is to be filed, then to charge statutory rape, forcible rape, or some
other offense; and third, if statutory rape is charged to select the appropri-
ate degree.
Like forcible rape complaints, statutory rape complaints are declined
principally for want of corroboration and lack of physical force. In most
declined cases, the suspect (modal age 20 years) is approximately the
same generation as the putative victim (modal age 14-15 years). Prosecu-
tors also perceive the complainant as in an uncooperative witness.352 The
prototypical case involves a consenting adolescent who is pressured by
disgruntled parents to file a complaint against an older boyfriend. In these
situations, prosecutors are taking consent into account in deciding not to
file.
The next decision is to charge statutory rape, forcible rape, or some
other offense. The use of physical force, although uncommon in juvenile
350. Appendix G, Table 4b.
351. The five factors are derived by factor analysis (Appendix F). See note 306 and accompany-
ing text supra. The factor of race is not included in Table 6, because it only indicates that statutory
rape is principally a white crime. Black suspects or interracial couples in juvenile victim cases are
rare.
352. The respective beta coefficients for non-corroboration, the suspect's age, and the victim's
credibility, are .24, .19, and. 10. Appendix H, Regression Analysis F.
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cases, is an important factor. 353 When forcible compulsion is present,
mostly in cases involving 14-15 year old victims, the charge is either
forcible rape or some other charge, but rarely statutory rape. 354 The dis-
tinguishable factor between forcible rape and other charges appears to be
the extent of social interaction. Forcible rape is filed when the victim is
credible and there is little or no prior social contact. The typical pattern
involves a chaste mid-puberty juvenile (14-15 years) forcefully raped by
an unknown, relatively young man (under 30 years). 355 Another charge is
filed when, despite the suspect's use of some force and the victim's credi-
bility, the parties are acquainted with each other. The suspect in this situ-
ation is usually a relatively older man (31 years and over). 356 The deci-
sion to charge or not to charge a given offense does not, in practice,
reflect a strict liability approach based on the age differential of the parties
as prescribed by the statute. Inferences about the juvenile victim's con-
sent affect the filing decision. As in forcible rape cases, the factor of so-
cial interaction weighs heavily in determining what charge, if any, to file.
The most common filing is of statutory rape. 357 Compared to forcible
rape, 358 it is charged when there is virtually no forcible compulsion, and
there is high social interaction: two-thirds of the suspects are close ac-
quaintances or relatives of the victim. 359 The victim is perceived as less
credible because of the long-term nature of the proscribed conduct. 360
The specific degree charged is solely a function of the victim's age.
Victims are mostly in the 11-13 and 14-15 age brackets and thus within
the statutory definitions of second and third degree statutory rape, respec-
tively. 361 The suspects are generally over 30 years old, although the stat-
ute requires only that they be over 16 for statutory rape 2, and over 18 for
statutory rape 3.362 The policy behind defining these age categories was to
protect the immature from exploitation by older persons. By their charg-
ing practices, prosecutors have in effect redefined these age categories:
353. In the cases studied, there were no instances of aggravation, and only 6% involved a high
degree of force. Appendix G, Tables I & 2b.
354. Of all juvenile victim cases studied, 20% were charged with forcible rape and 12% with
another charge. Appendix E.
355. Appendix H, Regression Analysis D. Over three-fourths of all forcible rapes, both of juve-
nile and of adult victims, were perpetrated by men under 30 years old.
356. Appendix H, Regression Analysis E.
357. The distribution of charges for statutory rape 1.2, and 3, is, respectively: 12%, 21%. and
21%, totaling 54% of all juvenile cases. Appendix E.
358. Appendix H, Regression Analysis D.
359. Appendix G, Table 3a.
360. Appendix G, Table 6d. 63% of statutory rape cases involved long-term offenses, compared
to 16% of forcible rape cases.
361. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.79.210, .220 (1979).
362. Id.
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exploitation is deemed to exist only when the age gap is substantially
wider than that provided for in the statute. In otherwise similar circum-
stances, younger men (30 years or less) are not prosecuted, while older
men (31 years or more) are charged with statutory rape.363
Juvenile victim cases, then, are of three basic types, each associated
with a different filing practice: consensual intercourse with an older boy-
friend ("dirty young man" type), which is not prosecuted; consensual
intercourse with an older relative or friend ("dirty old man" type), which
is filed as statutory rape and occasionally as another charge if some force
is used; and forcible rape by a young man, which is filed as such.
Under the common law statute, the fact patterns and prosecutorial prac-
tices of juvenile victim cases were essentially the same as they are now.
The reform law changed the distribution of the charges (fewer forcible
rape and more statutory rape filings) by lowering the age of nonconsent.
The factors that determine whether and what to charge, however, and the
relative weights accorded those factors, remain unaltered. 364 The way
prosecutors perceive and evaluate rape complaints for filing purposes,
whether of juvenile or adult victims, has not been affected by the law
reform.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
The movement to change rape laws is nearing completion of the tradi-
tional reform cycle. Beginning in the early 1970's, there was lively public
discussion on the problem of rape and how the law should be modified.
Then, popular and parliamentary majorities were swiftly marshalled in
support of the legislative reform proposals. Now, at the end of the de-
cade, there is review of the performance, and the results, in turn, re-open
discussion on the law and its implementation. This article will conclude
with an analysis of the implications of the findings of the present study for
the definitional standards of rape law and for administrative policy in rape
prosecution.
363. Younger men account for 75% of the declined cases and older men account for 65% of the
statutory rape cases.
364. Before, as now, low force, high social interaction, and low to medium victim credibility
distinguished carnal knowledge from rape charges. Charges other than carnal knowledge are filed
when more force is used. Appendix I, Regression Analyses B & C. Most forcible rape charges (79%)
involved men under 30 years; 48% of the carnal knowledge charges involved men 31 years and older;
and 55% of the declined cases involved younger men. Because of the similarity, a separate model of
charging in juvenile victim cases under the old statute (equivalent to Table 6) is not presented.
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A. Rape Law
1. Probable Impact of the Michigan Reform Statute
Compared to the common law statute, the findings clearly indicate that
the Washington reform legislation has not changed how prosecutors
screen and file cases, with the consequence that the total proportion of
convictions remains the same. However, within this offender pool, there
is more accurate identification of rapists. The next question, then, is
whether these results would be any different under another reform ap-
proach, such as the Michigan statute. Until impact studies are conducted
in other jurisdictions, one can only conjecture, relying upon the presently
available data.
A principal definitional feature of the Michigan statute is the rather
elaborate and finely detailed calibration of four degrees of culpability
based exclusively on the nature of the sexual assault. 365 Commentators
have lauded it as "a much needed consolidation and simplification." 366
However, there is impressionistic evidence, based on interviews with
judges and prosecutors, that Michigan's new law is probably not having a
different impact on filing. One year after the law went into effect, Detroit
prosecutors complained it was "a law professor's dream" (in recognition
of its draftsman), formulated "at the highest level of abstraction," but "a
prosecutor's nightmare.' '367 Despite training seminars, the general senti-
ment was that it was too complex and ambiguous with respect to the de-
grees of the crime. 368 The interviews led to the conclusion that "the new
[Michigan law] had little influence on the daily filing decisions of these
prosecutors. . . . If anything, they perceived that the new statute en-
couraged weaker complaints which they felt bound to discourage.'"369 It
is an institutional characteristic of prosecution everywhere that charges
are filed only if there is a high likelihood of conviction. Consequently,
there is little reason to expect that the charging process will be changed.
The same evidence is used at trial whether the crime is called rape or
criminal sexual assault. If charging is the same before and after the Mich-
igan reform, the overall number of convictions relative to charges is
likely to remain the same too.
A related question is whether the Michigan reform results in more
offenders labelled as "rapists" than does the new Washington law. On its
365. See MICH. CotP. LAWS § 750.520 (b)-(e) (Supp. 1977-78).
366. MIcH. Note, supra note 10, at 219.
367. J. Reich & D. Chappell, supra note 9, at 5.
368. In contrast, "The old law was simple .... The only requirements for conviction were
vaginal penetration and force, and cases were won or lost on the facts, not the law." Id.
369. Id. at 16.
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face, it should, because involuntary sexual contact is criminalized as a
fourth degree sexual assault, whereas in Washington the same offense is
termed indecent liberties. Michigan elevates to "rape" an act that the
average person probably does not perceive to merit that severe a stigma.
If the crime has been defined with too broad a brush, the more likely
alternative is that prosecutors will not charge and juries will not convict.
Indeed, for a period of time, prosecutors in Detroit did not authorize a
single warrant for this fourth degree offense. 370 The likely outcome, then,
is that the proportion of convictions denominated "rape" will be in-
creased by the Michigan reform statute, but not necessarily more than that
brought about by the Washington reform legislation.
The gradations of the crime in the Michigan statute have an appealing
conceptual symmetry. In practice, though, it encumbers the filing process
because it is difficult to establish culpability with that degree of refine-
ment. The three-degree Washington law-two degrees for charging and
one for plea bargaining-is simpler and more flexible from an enforce-
ment viewpoint.
2. A Standard of Nonconsent
Neither the Michigan nor the Washington reform legislation defines the
crime in a manner which reflects fully the evidentiary factors which are
important at trial. The critical issue in rape trials is nonconsent, but nei-
ther statute incorporates all of the factors used by prosecutors, and pre-
sumably juries, in determining nonconsent. A principled standard of non-
consent, which reflects the realities of rape prosecution, should offer the
greatest potential for increasing rape convictions.
The determination of voluntariness of confessions in police interroga-
tions under the fourteenth amendment, 371 and of assent to warrantless
searches under the fourth amendment, 372 can contribute to the analysis of
consent in rape law. The constitutional test of freedom of choice in both
types of police intrusions is the totality of circumstances. Voluntariness
does not turn on the presence or absence of any single controlling crite-
rion. Instead, it is an issue of fact inferred from the balancing of police
behavior, the individual's capacity and will to resist, and the surrounding
circumstances of the incident. 373
370. Id. at 8.
371. The most extensive judicial exposition on voluntariness is found in pre-Miranda (Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966)) confession cases under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). All of these cases used the
balancing test.
372. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,223-27 (1973).
373. Id. at 224-29. See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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The development of a legal standard of consent for rape cases is further
aided by a consideration of consent as a social psychological concept.
Consent can be conceptualized as an attitudinal disposition or inten-
tion.374 A person may be cognizant of his own disposition to act in a
certain manner and later be able to recall and report that mental state ac-
curately. Others, however, can only infer it from observable, external
cues. The observer not only sees but perceives another's conduct-that
is, he seeks to comprehend the observed person's actions by inventing or
attributing reasons for it based upon inferences from behavioral and situa-
tional cues.
The three elements of the totality test represent three means of opera-
tionalizing consent. It is not meaningful in an empirical sense to speak of
consent independently of its observed basis, and this consists of the ac-
tor's conduct, the victim's conduct, and the social context in which the
act occurs. The fact finder in a rape trial is cast in the role of a third party
observer, and has to take into account the actions of both sides prior to
and upon the occasion of the crime in reaching a judgment as to consent.
To focus solely on one or the other party is to make attributions in a social
vacuum.375
Whether one consents to a search, to confess, or to have intercourse,
there is no other practical way of determining the subjective state than by
examining all the relevant objective indicia. The common law rape statute
considers only the victim's resistance. Michigan's reform law looks only
at the actor's force. Each, then, takes into account only half of the situa-
tion. Washington's reform law recognized the reciprocal influences inher-
ent in human conduct and perception and defines forcible compulsion
partly in terms of victim's resistance. 376 What all three statutes have in
common is an exclusive focus on conduct at the time and scene of the
crime. None expressly considers the surrounding circumstances, such
as prior social interaction. Yet, "events leading up to allegations of rape
are important in the final determination whether consent was
given.... 377
Only the Model Penal Code incorporates this factor, by making "vol-
374. An attitudinal disposition, sometimes called a behavioral intention, is a specifically-targeted
attitude, inferred from conduct that can "serve as raw material for further inference about values."
E. JONES & H. GERARD, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 264 (1967).
375. Most of the research in this area has concentrated on the types of factors used in the inter-
pretation of conduct. One key factor is the perceived degree of choice of an individual. Applied to the
rape context, the greater the choice of a victim in engaging in antecedent social contact with the actor,
the more likely the attribution of voluntariness. Id. at 306.
376. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(5) (1979).
377. Commonwealth v. Goodman, 182 Pa. Super. Ct. 205, 211, 126 A.2d 763,766 (1956).
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untary social companion[ship]" an element of second degree rape. 378 Al-
though one commentator has summarily dismissed this element as "irrel-
evant, 1379 the data of this study show that it is consistently the second
most important factor, after physical force, in determining charging-under
the old and new Washington statutes. In assault, robbery, and homicide
cases too, a recent study has found that "[t]he social relationship between
the victim and defendant frequently appeared to make a difference in de-
ciding whether to prosecute. '380 The Code directs attention to the chain
of causative events leading to the incident. These events may be reflected
in the antecedent social relationship or contact between the actor and vic-
tim. In other words, the prior social interaction is an indicator of consent
in addition to actor's and victim's behavioral interaction during the com-
mission of the offense. It is an umbrella category or a shorthand label for
any of a number of specific circumstances, including victim precipita-
tion, 381 that are normally associated with voluntary companionship and
from which one could possibly infer consent.
378. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213. l(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
379. STAfOoRD Note, supra note 10, at 688-89 n.42.
380. Prosecutors Find Victim's Role Makes or Breaks Case, 8 LEAA NEwsLErrER 6 (May 1979).
In assault, robbery, and homicide, as well as rape, cases a recent study has found that the social
relationship between victim and defendant frequently appeared to make a difference in deciding
whether to prosecute. The reason is that a prosecutor "anticipates that a victim who has a close
relationship with the defendant will become an uncooperative witness as the case progresses. Thus,
even though the victims may be willing to file charges initially, the prosecutor may decline prosecu-
tion in anticipation of reconciliation or restitution being achieved outside the court setting." Id. See
Table H and I.
See also C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 265-66 (1978). ("No single factor
has so large an impact on what happens to felons after they have been arrested [as the prior relation-
ship between victim and suspect]." Id. at 266.) One court has recognized that "events leading up to
the allegation of rape are important in the final determination whether consent was given." Com-
monwealth v. Goodman, 182 Pa. Super. Ct. 205, 211, 126 A.2d 763,766 (1956).
381. The term refers to those circumstances in which the victim agrees or appears to agree to
sexual relations but retracts that agreement before intercourse. The incidence of victim precipitated
rape is variously estimated at 4% and 19%. NAT'L VIOLNCE COMM'N, supra note 154, at 228; and,
AMIR, supra note 233, at 266, respectively. Some commentators criticize the concept as having sexist
overtones: "It is the personificiation and embodiment of the rape mythology cleverly stated in aca-
demic scientific terms." Weis & Burges, supra note 239, at 112. Ideology aside, the evidence shows
that victim precipitation is not unique to rape. In fact, the concept originated in the context of homi-
cide. One-fourth of homicides in Philadelphia are incited by the victim. M. WOLGANG, supra note
238, at 254. Victims who first used force or insinuating gestures and language, thereby triggering an
attack, make up 14% of aggravated assault cases. NA'rL VIOLENCE COMM'N, supra note 154, at
227-28. The issue in the rape context, then, is not whether victim precipitation exists, but the extent
of its occurrence and the legal effect that should be given to it. Some women acknowledge the role of
victim precipitation and do not define the incident as rape. Schultz & DeSavage, Rape and Rape
Attitudes on a College Campus, in RAPE VICrIMOLOGY 77, 81 (L. Schultz ed. 1975).
Although the law does not formally recognize the victim's role in the occurrence of the crime, the
notion of victim precipitation has seeped into legal thinking under different names. It is an element in
the definitions of certain crimes, and basis for reduced charges and affirmative defenses. See Gobert,
Victim Precipitation, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 512, 517-36 (1977). In addition, it has always been infor-
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A model law of rape, then, that includes a principled standard of non-
consent and reflects the policies served by the criminalization of the con-
duct, would combine the definitional elements of the Washington reform
statute and the Code. It would embody the totality test by recognizing the
element of social interaction in the lesser gradations of culpability defined
by forcible compulsion.382 This proposed reformulation of the Washing-
ton reform law makes the legal treatment of nonconsent in rape consistent
with principles of nonconsent in other areas of the law, and with the so-
cial psychological principles of interpersonal attributions. It also reflects
more accurately the evidentiary realities of the crime. Whether it will ac-
tually lead to an increase in rape convictions remains to be ascertained,
but based on the results of this study, a possible ramification for prosecu-
tion can be hypothesized.
The disposition of cases at the ends of the convictability continuum is
not much affected by definitional standards. Most cases, however, lie in
the mid-range. They involve low to moderate force, so practical factors-
especially social interaction-are determinative. The public does not find
rape in these circumstances 383 and prosecutors are reluctant to file.
Chances for a conviction of rape are about even. It is here, not at the
extremes, that room for augmenting rape convictions may exist. The sta-
bility of conviction and charging rates in Washington is not inconsistent
with this suggestion, since the reform legislation does not define these
mid-range cases any differently than the common law statute. 384 The
Code, however, considers it inappropriate not to give formal, legal effect
to the social circumstances in this type of rape. Its statutory recognition
does not exonerate the actor, but only reduces the degree of the offense. It
puts juries on notice that they should not automatically infer consent, as
they are now wont to do, whenever social interaction is present. 385
mally recognized in arrest, charging, jury decisions, and sentencing. Id. at 536-40. Because victim
precipitation, as such, does not exist in the law, courts have had to struggle with it on an individual-
ized basis. The Code's inclusion of voluntary social companionship as an element that mitigates
defendant culpability is an attempt to incorporate the notion of victim precipitation in the law of rape.
382. The reform statute (WASH. REv. CoDE § 9A.44.050) could be reformulated as follows: "A
person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, under circumstances not constituting rape in the
first degree, the person engages in sexual intercourse with another person, not married to the perpe-
trator: (a) by forcible compulsion, notwithstanding the fact that the victim was a voluntary social
companion of the perpetrator upon the occasion of the crime."
383. Schultz & DeSavage, supra note 381, at 81.
384. The definition of rape 2 in the Washington reform law overlaps with the prior statute's
definition of rape. Compare WASH. REV. COD § 9A.44.050 (1979) with 1973 Wash. Laws (1st Ex.
Sess.), ch. 154, § 122, at 1198 (repealed 1975).
385. The factor of social interaction could be included in jury instructions instead of in the statu-
tory definition of the crime. The jury might be charged as follows: "There has been testimony about
the prior social interactions between the complainant and the defendant. Even if you find it credible,
you should not infer that, because a woman was the voluntary social companion of the accused upon
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B. Rape Prosecution
Legislative reform is necessary but not sufficient for effective enforce-
ment of the criminal law. As important as the formulation of legal rules is
their day-to-day discretionary implementation by criminal justice offi-
cials. It is in case-by-case decisions-in little solutions for each little bite
of the big problem-that the purposes of reform are realized.
At the prosecution stage, implementation of reform requires a coherent
and aggressive policy of enforcement formulated at the top administrative
echelons. Although the specific design of the office policy will depend on
local practice and resources, a key issue is the use of administrative
guidelines in filing. This internal control is "the most significant means
of assuring responsible exercise of charging discretion.', 386 As noted be-
fore, office standards are the exception, not the rule. 387 They are particu-
larly necessary in rape prosecution because the nature of the crime makes
charging susceptible to personal biases. The guidelines need to state not
only when rape is to be charged or declined, but also when other charges
are to be filed in lieu of rape. They must articulate the weight to be at-
tached to different practical factors in charging, especially to the social
interaction element. The filing standard of convictability also has to be
defined. Depending on the risk of loss an office is willing to tolerate for
the purpose of increasing rape convictions, the standard could be set
lower for rape than for other violent felony offenses. Finally, the adminis-
trative policy must provide for regular review of the guidelines in light of
accumulated experience, so that a "common law" of filing can be estab-
lished for the office.
Other administrative actions would also enhance the effectiveness of
rape law enforcement. These include the creation of specialized rape
prosecution units, 388 the coordination of functions with police and hospi-
tals,389 and the establishment of liaisons with rape crisis centers and other
the occasion of the alleged crime, she necessarily consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant
in this instance." Similar compensatory instructions have been proposed with respect to testimony
about prior sexual history of the victim. BABcoCK, supra note 10, at 842. It may be true that "[t]he
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury.., all practicing
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949)(Jackson, J. concurring). Such an instruction can nonetheless be justified on symbolic if not
instrumental grounds. See text accompanying note 393 infra.
386. Miller, supra note 201, at 344.
387. See note 212 supra.
388. See text accompanying note 204 supra.
389. The success of prosecution obviously depends in large measure on the evidence obtained by
police and the preservation for trial of the results of medical examinations. For a discussion of the
need and means to improve prosecutor relations with police and medical personnel, see BATrELL-
LEAA P: osEcuroRs' VOL. 1H, supra note 4, at 33-35.
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victim advocate groups. 390 The rationale for such measures is that the
prosecution of rape is not just like the prosecution of any other violent
felony-rape cases need special processing. Unless there is a commit-
ment to vigorous prosecution from the highest levels, backed by the nec-
essary resources and administrative actions, the best-drafted reform legis-
lation is unlikely to alter the pattern of charging and convictions. What
the reform has done is to create a climate for change in prosecutor offices
that legitimates and encourages the enforcement of rape laws as a top
administrative priority. Thus, the assessment of the impact of reform leg-
islation will always be intertwined with the effect of administrative
changes in prosecution.
C. Conclusion
The effectiveness of rape law enforcement will depend, ultimately, on
official and lay attitudes toward the crime. Those attitudes influence the
will of victims to prosecute, of prosecutors to file, and of juries to con-
vict. As a catalyst for change in such attitudes, the impact of the reform of
rape law may be greater than its immediate impact on the criminal justice
system. The criminal law serves more than a deterrent function. It also
has a "moral or sociopedagogic"391 purpose to reflect and shape our
values and beliefs. The new rape law symbolizes and reinforces newly
emerging conceptions about the status of women and the right of self-
determination in sexual conduct. The success of the reform law in aiding
accurate labeling of offenders has an educative effect. Conviction of rape,
rather than of some surrogate offense, is a dramatic lesson of society's
disapprobation of the act. In this way, the criminal law complements and
enhances the moral learning initially acquired through non-legal pro-
cesses.
One Detroit judge expressed the view that the values of reform legisla-
tion are, at this time, philosophically ahead of law enforcement officials
390. Less publicized than substantive changes in the rape law is legislation that mandates the
establishment of assistance programs for rape victims, including counseling and compensation for
medical expenses. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 241.51-58 (West Supp. 1979). It may well be that
these social service programs, in the long run, have a greater effect on victim reporting of the crime
than any definitional or evidentiary changes (e.g., exclusion of prior sexual history) in the law itself.
391. Andenaes, supra note 77, at 950 (emphasis in original).
624
Vol. 55:543, 1980
Rape Reform: An Empirical Study
and the general citizenry. 392 "Perhaps in a few years," she mused,
"Michigan could return to a simpler statute that called a rape, a rape. By
then . . . the word would capture not only the reality of the crime but a
newer understanding among the people.' ,393
392. Prosecutors say that the single, most important means for improving law enforcement is
increased public education about rape. BAraLLt-LEAA PROSEcuroR SuRvEy, supra note 4, at 93-94.
If so, they and other criminal justice officials should spearhead the educational effort. They are the
middlemen who can retail the values of the criminal law to the citizenry at large. Attitude change is
most effective when the public identifies with and absorbs the values of opinion leaders in the com-
munity. R. LANE & D. SEMts, PUBuc OPIION 38-39 (1964). Of course, the officials themselves must
first embrace the value assumptions of the reform legislation.
393. Quoted in J. Reich & D. Chappell, supra note 9, at 22-23.
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APPENDIX A
RAPE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
Card #1
(1-3) _____CODE NUMBER [Code]
(4) 1 CARD NUMBER [Card]
(5) Researcher [Coder]
1 = Dan 5 = Val
2 = Shelley 6 = James
3 = Lynda 7 = Collette
4 = Karen 8 = Rand
(6) -Year Charge Filed [Yr]
1 = 1972 5 = Aug.-Dec. 1975
2 = 1973 6 = 1976
3 = 1974 7 = 1977
4 = Jan.-July, 1975 8 = 1978
CHARGES FILED
0 = Not filed 1 = Filed
(7) ----- _No charge filed [NC]
(8) --- Rape [Rape]
(9) -Carnal knowledge [CK]
(10) -Sodomy [SOD]
(11) Indecent liberties [IL]
(12) -Other sex crime [OSC]
(13) Assault, 1st degree [AI]
(14) Assault, 2nd degree [Ail]
(15) Assault, 3rd degree [AIII]
(16) ------ Murder [MUR]
(17) ----- Kidnapping [KID]
(18) -Contributing to the delinquency of a minor [CDOM]
(19) Burglary [BUR]
(20) Robbery [ROB]
(21) -Trespass [TRES]
(22) -Other [OTH]
(23) Rape, 1st degree [Rape 1]
(24) - -Rape, 2nd degree [Rape 2]
(25) Rape, 3rd degree [Rape 3]
(26) Statutory rape, 1st degree [SRAPE 1]
(27) -Statutory rape, 2nd degree [SRAPE 2]
(28) -Statutory rape, 3rd degree [SRAPE 3]
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(29-30) -FINAL DISPOSITION [FIN DIS]
00 = decline
01 = conviction of rape or carnal knowledge
02 = conviction of other charge
03 = plea bargain to rape or carnal knowledge
04 = plea bargain to other charge
05 = acquittal on all charges
06 = dismissal of all charges
07 = case still open
08 = dismissal due to conviction or plea in other case
10 = conviction of Rape 1st deg. or Stat. Rape
1st deg.
11 = conviction of Rape 2nd deg. or Stat. Rape
2nd deg.
12 = conviction of Rape 3rd deg. or Stat. Rape
3rd deg.
13 = plea bargain to Rape 1st deg. or Stat. Rape
1st deg.
14 = plea bargain to Rape 2nd deg. or Stat. Rape
2nd deg.
15 = plea bargain to Rape 3rd deg. or Stat. Rape
3rd deg.
(31-32) SENTENCE [SENT]
00 = N/A
01 = deferred, no jail
02 = deferred, with jail
03 = deferred, to Western state
04 = deferred, conditions unknown
05 = suspended, no jail
06 = suspended, with jail
07 = suspended, to Western State
08 = suspended, conditions unknown
10 = incarcerated
(33) Defendant released prior to trial [DREL]
0 = N/A
1 = yes
2 = no
9 = unknown
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(34) 1f yes, defendant released on: [RELON]
0 = N/A
1 = personal recognizance
2 = Bail
9 =.unknown
(35-36) - Age of the victim [AGEV]
(37-38) - -Age of the defendant [AGED]
(39) Race of the victim [RACEV]
1 = white 5 = Asian
2 = black 6 = other
3 = Chicano 9 = unknown
4 = Native American
(40) ----- Race of the defendant [RACED]
1 = white 5 = Asian
2 = black 6 = other
3 = Chicano 9 = unknown
4 = Native American
(41-46) D ate first charge filed
List month/day/year
[MOCHG] [Day CHG] [YRCHG]
(47-52) Date of final disposition
List month/day/year [MOFD] [DAYFDJ [YRFDI
(53-54) Prosecutor's sentence Recommendation [PROSREC]
00 = N/A 05 = suspended, no jail
01 = deferred, no jail 06 = suspended, with
02 = deferred, with jail jail
03 = deferred, to 07 = suspended, to
Western State Western State
04 = conditions 08 = suspended,
unknown condition unknown
10 = incarceration
(55) -Types of physical force [PHYSF]
0 = no force 5 = 1&2
1 = restraining 6 = I &3
2 = choking 7 = 2&3
3 = hitting 9 = unknown
4 = all three
(56) Polygraph of victim [POLYV]
1 = yes 2 = no
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(57) --- Results of victim polygraph [VRES]
0 = N/A
1 = results supportive of victim's allegations
2 = results not supportive
3 = results inconclusive
(58) Polygraph of defendant [POLYD]
1 = yes 2 = no
(59) -- Results of defendant polygraph [DRES]
0 = N/A
1 = results supportive of victim's allegations
2 = results not supportive
3 = results inconclusive
(60) Photo ID of defendant attempted [PHOTO]
1 = yes 2 = no
(61) 1f yes, defendant identified [PHOTO ID]
0 = N/A 1 = yes 2 = no
(62) Defendant participated in line-up [LINEUP]
1 = yes 2 = no
(63) 1f yes, defendant identified [LINEUPID]
0 = N/A 1 = yes 2 = no
(64) __Confession by defendant to rape [CONFESS]
1 = yes 2 = no
(65) Jf yes, confession was: [HOW]
0 = N/A 1 = written 2 = oral
(66) lnitial denial, at police stage, was: [DENIAL]
0 = N/A 4 = intoxication
1 = other 5 = other
2 = victim consent 6 = prostitution
3 = no penetration 9 = unknown
(67) -Occupation of the victim [OCCV]
1 = unemployed 5 = 1&2
2 = blue collar 6 = 1&3
3 = white collar 9 = unknown
4 = student
(68) -Occupation of the defendant [OCCD]
1 = unemployed 5 = 1&2
2 = blue collar 6 = 1&3
3 = white collar 9 = unknown
4 = student
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(69) - -Marital status of victim [MARV]
1 = single 4 = divorced
2 = married 5 = widowed
3 = separated 9 = unknown
(70) ---- Marital status of defendant [MARD]
1 = single 4 = divorced
2 = married 5 = widowed
3 = separated 9 = unknown
(71) _Victim-defendant relationship [RELVD]
1 = stranger 3 = close acquaintance
2 = casual acquaintance 4 = relative
(72) _Prior Consensual Sexual History Between Victim and
Defendant [PREVSX]
1 = yes 2 = no 9 = unknown
(73) ___Non-marital sexual activity of victim [NONMSX]
1 = yes 2 = no 3 = probable 9 = unknown
(74) Adult arrest of victim [ARRESTV]
0 = N/A 1 = yes 2 = no 9 = unknown
(75) ----- Adult arrests of defendant [ARRESTD]
0 = N/A 1 = yes 2 = no 9 = unknown
(76) -Type of defendant arrests [DEFARR]
0 = N/A 1 = sex crime(s) 2 = other
(77) ----- Previous incarceration of defendant [INCARD]
1 = yes 2 = no 9 = unknown
(78) -Time of rape [TIME]
1 = daylight 2 = dark
3 = both, or long term offense
(79) Place of rape [PLACE]
1 = victim's home 5 = outside
2 = defendant's home 6 = other
3 = victim's car 7 = 1&2
4 = defendant's car 9 = unknown
(80) -- __How entry was gained [ENTRY]
0 = no entry involved 4 = invitation
1 = forced entry 9 = unknown
2 = open window or door, uninvited
3 = deception, tricked victim
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Card #2
(1-3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10) -_Type of force [FORCE]
0 = N/A
1 = verbal threats only
2 = physical force
3 = use of weapon
4 = 1,2,&3
1&2
1&3
2&3
unknown
(11) -Use of weapon [WEAPON]
1 = firearm 2 = other 3
(12) Injuries to victim [INJV]
1 = none
2 = minor, no medical
treatment
3 = required medical
treatment
both 9 = unknown
4 = required hospitaliza-
tion
5 = death
9 = unknown
631
____ CODE NUMBER
2 CARD NUMBER
---- _Nature of contact between victim and defendant, prior
to offense [PRVCON]
1 = hitch-hiking
2 = with victim's agreement (other than hitch-hik-
ing, party, or tavern)
3 = not with victim's agreement
4 = party or tavern
9 = unknown
Alcohol or drug involvement [ALCDRG]
1 = none 4 = only victim
2 = both defendant & 9 = unknown
victim
3 = only defendant
SEXUAL ACTS OTHER THAN VAGINAL
INTERCOURSE:
Additional Acts of Vaginal Intercourse [ADDIC]
______Oral only [ORAL]
----- _Anal only [ANAL]
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RESISTANCE BY VICTIM
1 = yes 2 = no 9 = unknown
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
PROSECUTION WITNESSES
1 = yes 2 = no 9 = unknown
(21) Accomplice [WITAC]
(22) -Other eyewitness [WITEYE]
(23) -Corroborating witness with identity information [WI-
TID]
(24) -Corroborating witness as to victim's physical & emo-
tional state [WITPHEM]
(25) -Corroborating witness as to circumstantial evidence
[WITEVID]
Evidence of penetration [EVPEN]
1 = none
2 = yes (seminal matter and/or genital injury)
9 = unknown
_flight [FLITE]
______verbal [VERBAL]
-_physical [PHYS]
-. weapon [WEAP]
__ other [OTHERS]
Jnjuries to defendant by victim [INJD]
1 = none 4 = required hospitaliza-
2 = minor, no medical tion
treatment 5 = death
3 = required medical 9 = unknown
treatment
Incident first reported to: [REPTO]
1 = police 5 = other
2 = medical facility 9 = unknown
3 = friend/relative/neighbor
4 = crisis center/counselor
__ Time between Incident and Report to
Police [REPTIME]
0 = long term offense 4 = within one month
1 = within one hour 5 = more than one
2 = within 24 hours month
3 = within one week
(19)
(20)
(26)
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(27)
(28)
1972-75 data
N %
1. AGE*
juvenile
adult
2. RACE
white
black
other
3. OCCUPATION
blue collar
unemployed (mostly blue collar)
white collar
student
4. MARITAL STATUS
single
married
divorced, widowed, separated
98
107
205
10
47
24
107
188
140
15
12
167
1975-77 data
N %
48% 81
52 156
237
76%
16
7
5%
25
13
57
81%
91
10
183
30
13
226
37
45
16
114
212
160
19
16
195
Extent of victim's cooperation with prosecutor's
office [VCOOP]
0 = victim deceased 3 = unpredictable
1 = full 9 = unknown
2 = partial
-- Prosecutor's evaluation of the victim as a
witness [VASWIT]
0 = victim deceased 3 = poor
1 = good 9 = unknown
2 = unpredictable
APPENDIX B-PART I
DFsclurnvE PROFLE oF THE Vicrn
34%
66
80%
13
6
17%
21
8
54
82%
10
8
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1972-75 data
N %
1975-77 data
N %
5. ADULT ARRESTS
yes 6 30% 12
no 14 70 58
20 70
* Under common law (1972-75 data): juvenile less than 18 years.
Under reform law (1975-77 data): juvenile less than 16 years.
17%
83
APPENDIX B-PART II
DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF THE SUSPECT
1972-75 data
N %
1975-77 data
N %
1. AGE*
15 to 20 years
21 to 35 years
36 to 73 years
2. RACE
white
black
other
3. OCCUPATION
blue collar
unemployed (mostly blue collar)
white collar
student
4. MARITAL STATUS
single
married
divorced, widowed, separated
634
21%
59
20
55%
39
6
50%
31
8
10
40%
36
24
53
135
48
236
125
91
20
236
125
64
33
12
234
108
62
45
215
22%
58
20
53%
38
9
54%
27
14
5
50%
29
21
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1972-75 data
N %
5. ADULT ARRESTS
yes
no
6. NATURE OF PRIOR ARREST
sex crime 28
other charge 101
129
7. PRIOR INCARCERATION RECORD
yes 58
no 72
130
1975-77 data
N %
78% 146
22 77
223
22% 35
78 107
142
45% 40
55 169
209
APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF THE CRME:
SETIrING, CIRCUMSTANCES, AND REPORTING
A. TIME AND PLACE OF RAPE
(1) Time of year
fall
winter
spring
summer
(2) Time of day
day
night
long term offense
(3) Place
victim's home or car
suspect's home or car
outside
other location
1972-75 data
N %
33
36
43
53
165
47
137
24
208
73
82
22
30
207
20%
22
26
32
23%
66
11
35%
40
11
14
1975-77 data
N %
40
46
51
53
190
61
144
29
234
65
105
20
46
236
21%
24
27
28
26%
62
12
28%
44
9
19
635
66%
34
25%
75
19%
81
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1972-75 data 1975-77 data
N % N %
B. SOCIAL CONTACT BETWEEN
VICTIM AND SUSPECT PRIOR
TO THE OFFENSE
(1) Victim-suspect relationship
strangers 79 38% 91 39%
casual acquaintances 80 38 76 32
close acquaintances 29 14 42 18
relatives 20 10 25 11
208 234
(2) Victim's agreement to social
contact with suspect
yes (e.g., met at tavern,
work) 141 68% 160 68%
no (e.g., assault by stranger) 51 25 59 25
hitchhiking 15 7 17 7
207 236
(3) Race of accused/race of
victim
white sus./white vict. 84 47% 112 49%
minority sus./white vict. 52 29 71 31
minority sus./minority vict. 36 20 39 17
white sus./minority vict. 7 4 6 3
179 228
(4) Prior sexual history between
victim and suspect
yes 20 10% 21 10%
no 179 90 201 90
199 222
C. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY
SUSPECT
(1) Type offorcible compulsion
low (verbal threats only) 27 23% 15 26%
medium (incl. physical force) 102 57 131 56
high (incl. weapon) 40 19 39 18
169 185
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1972-75 data 1975-77 data
N % N %
(2) Degree of physical force
none
medium (restraining)
high (choking, hitting)
(3) Sexual acts other than
vaginal intercourse
yes
no
(4) Oral intercourse only
yes
no
59 29%
86 42
60 29
205
40 19%
167 81
207
57 28%
150 72
207
61 26%
97 42
73 32
231
52 23%
78 77
130
78 33%
157 67
235
D. RESISTANCE BY AND INJURY
TO VICTIM
(1) Verbal resistance
yes
no
(2) Physical resistance
yes
no
(3) Attempt toflee
yes
no
(4) Physical injury to victim
none
minor
medical care needed
death
114 55% 104
93 45 108
207 212
58 28%
149 72
207
28 14%
179 86
207
51
181
232
114 57% 150
54 27 67
31 16 19
1
200 236
49%
51
47%
53
22%
78
64%
28
8
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1972-75 data
N %
1975-77 data
N %
E. REPORTING OF THE CRIME
BY VICTIM
(1) First report is to:
friend, relative
police
medical facility
crisis/counseling center
other
(2) Time interval between
offense and report to police
within 1 hour
within 24 hours
more than 24 hours
long term offense
127
52
2
5
19
205
120
45
15
28
208
62%
25
1
2
9
58%
22
7
13
APPENDIX D
DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME:
AGE OF VICTIM, SETTING, CIRCUMSTANCES, AND REPORTING
(SELECTED DATA)
1975-77 data only*
Juvenile victims
N %
Adult victims
N %
Time of day of rape
long term offense
Place of rape
victim's home or car
suspect's home or car
Victim-suspect relationship
close friend or relative
Type offorcible compulsion
medium (physical force)
Degree ofphysicalforce
none
24 24% 0 0%
19% 49
47 56
31%
36
51% 26 17%
40% 99 63%
52% 17 13%
149
46
5
13
19
232
119
56
37
24
236
64%
20
2
6
8
50%
24
16
10
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Sexual acts other than vaginal
intercourse
yes
Verbal resistance by victim
yes
Physical injury to victim
none
First report to:
friend, relative
police
Time interval between offense and
report to police
within 1 hour
long term offense
21 26% 31 22%
34% 79 56%
80% 85 55%
82% 85
8 40
28% 96
26 0
55%
26
62%
0
* There are no major differences between the 1972-75 and 1975-77 data
sets, so only the later data are presented.
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APPENDIX H
FACTORS SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHARGE UNDER THE NEW LAW:
RESULTS OF STEPWISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Beta p-level
A. Rape I v. Rape 2, 3
(adult victims)
1. Aggravation
2. No social interaction
no prior contact
3. Corroboration
circumstantial evidence
B. Rape 2, 3 v. Other
(adult victims)
1. Suspect's credibility:
defense of consent or wrong i.d.
C. Decline v. Rape + Other
(adult victims)
1. No aggravation
2. No corroboration
no circumstantial evidence
no witness identification
3. Race of suspect (minority)
D. Rape 1, 2, 3 v. Statutory Rape
(juvenile victims)
1. Force
2. No social interaction
victim-suspect are strangers
3. Victim credibility
no non-marital sex
long term offense
E. Other v. Statutory Rape 1, 2, 3
(juvenile victims)
1. Force
2. Victim's credibility
good witness
F. Decline v. Rape + Stat. Rape + Other
(juvenile victims)
1. No corroboration
no circumstantial evidence
2. Victim's credibility
uncooperative victim
3. Suspect's age
under 30 years
.51 .001
.23 .002
.21 .03
.21 .04
.21 .005
.15 .004
.15 .001
.43 .05
.13 .01
.24 .001
.10 .04
.19 .01
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APPENDIX I
FACTORS SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHARGE UNDER THE OLD LAW:
RESULTS OF STEPWISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Beta p-level
A. Rape v. Other
(adult and juvenile victims)
1. Victim credibility
no non-marital sex
2. No social interaction
Victim-suspect are strangers
3. Corroboration
circumstantial evidence
B. Rape v. Carnal Knowledge
(juvenile victims only)
1. Force
2. No social interaction
victim-accused are strangers
victim attempt to flee
3. Victim credibility
cooperative victim
C. Carnal knowledge v. Other
(juvenile victims only)
1. No force
2. Victim credibility
no non-marital sex
.0001
.001
.16 .04
.006
.18 .001
.12 .05
.17 .004
.33 .01
D. Decline v. Rape & Other & CK
(adult and juvenile victims)
1. Race
minority suspect/ minority victim
2. No corroboration
no witness of physical-emotional state
3. No aggravation
4. No force
no verbal resistance
5. No victim credibility
non-marital sex
poor witness
6. Social Interaction
prior contact
victim-suspect are friends
.0001
.27 .0001
.12 .02
.11 .03
.001
.005
.05
.01
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APPENDIX J
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The principal empirical findings and conclusions can be summarized
briefly.
(1) The incidence of forcible rape. Fears of a rising tide of forcible
rape, which fueled in part the law reform movement during the high
crime decade of 1965-75, are probably overdrawn. While the incidence
of rape rose sharply, it cannot be said unequivocally that the actual rate
increased. The reported increase was a temporary deviation, peaking in
1969 and returning to normal levels by 1974 shortly before the enactment
of reform legislation. The drop in reported crime, therefore, cannot be
credited to the new laws.
(2) Arrest rates in forcible rape. There is a basis for the concern over
low arrest rates. From 1961 to 1977, clearances by arrest declined from
73% to 51% of founded complaints. It was not, however, unique to rape.
Arrests for other violent offenses also declined as all violent crime rates
soared during this period.
(3) Statistical patterns of rape.
a. The typical rape suspect is a blue collar or unemployed white
or black male, about 25 years old, with a history of arrests. The victim is
usually white, 18 years of age, of working class background, and some-
times has a record of arrests for sex offenses.
b. Most forcible rapes do not involve brutal assaults by strang-
ers. In the majority of cases, forcible compulsion is low to moderate and
victims resist verbally, and suffer no physical injury. The crime is usually
intraracial.
c. Statutory rape is a long-term offense, with little or no physi-
cal force, and involves older white males. The pattern of homosexual
male rape is more similar to statutory than forcible rape.
(4) Impact on convictions. The reform objective of increasing rape
convictions by creating gradations of culpability was successful.
a. Convictions for forcible and statutory rape have increased by
nearly one-fifth due to a decline, not of rape acquittals or dismissals, but
of convictions for assault and other offenses. The overall conviction rate
remained the same both before and after the reform: 72%. The proportion
of convicted defendants is unchanged, but more offenders are labeled as
"rapists" under the new law.
b. The claim of unusually low conviction rates in forcible rape
is not founded. Over the years, the national conviction rate (57%) has
remained stable and is only slightly below the rate for equivalent violent
offenses.
650
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(5) Impact on manner of disposition. Calibrating rape degrees has en-
hanced the prosecutor's negotiating flexibility as desired by reform pro-
ponents. The total proportion of forcible and statutory rape cases disposed
by plea has declined slightly (accompanied by an increase in cases tried),
but the plea is now more often to a lower degree of rape rather than to
some other offense.
(6) Impact on sentencing. Reform legislation matched punishment to
culpability because the prescribed sanctions under the common law stat-
ute were severe. In fact, the severity of sentences for forcible and statu-
tory rape, as measured by the proportion incarcerated, is the same under
the old and new statutes. The difference is in prescribed, not actual, sev-
erity. However, there are now fewer convicted persons given deferred or
suspended sentences and more confined to inpatient treatment. Punish-
ment is more certain but not harsher.
(7) Impact on charges filed. The distribution of all types of rape and
other charges and non-prosecution is virtually identical before and after
the reform. The stability of the pool of charged and convicted offenders
supports the Durkheim theory of the relative constancy of criminal con-
duct in society.
a. Prosecutors apply the same convictability standard in screen-
ing cases prior to filing despite the increased caseload. This suggests the
possibility that the increased number of reported rapes comes from dig-
ging deeper into the well of previously unreported cases, and that they
were unreported because of weak fact patterns.
b. Charging rates are not disproportionately low as claimed by
reform advocates. Over time, the national filing rates for forcible rape and
equivalent violent offenses are basically stable and similar.
(8) Impact on the process of charging forcible rape. Since the distri-
bution of charges is the same, the process of charging-i.e., the factors
relied upon and their respective weights in the decisionmaking-is also
the same under both statutes. This is because the same kinds of evidence
are used to prove nonconsent regardless of the statutory definition of rape.
a. The statutory and practical factors that determine forcible
rape are (in descending order): physical force, social interaction, corrobo-
rative evidence, victim credibility, and race. Prosecutors aggregate these
factors to judge convictability. The more factors present, the more con-
victable the case, and the higher the charge.
b. Cases of an aggravated nature are always charged and con-
victed of the substantive offense whether it is called rape or rape 1. Cases
low in force and corroboration are declined under both the old and new
statutes. Rape 3 is rarely filed; it is a plea category. The majority of cases
fall in the mid-range of convictability. There is low to moderate forcible
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compulsion and moderate to high social interaction. This can result in a
credibility contest between victim and suspect. It is here, in cases that
could be filed as rape 2 or another offense, that charging discretion is
greatest and actual conviction least certain.
(9) Impact on the process of charging statutory rape. The way prose-
cutors perceive and evaluate juvenile victim cases has not been altered by
the reform. Statutory rape cases are even less convictable than forcible
rape complaints that are declined, indicating the importance of the pre-
sumption of nonconsent.
a. The determinative factors are age of victim and suspect, cor-
roborative evidence, social interaction, non-aggravated physical force,
credibility, and race.
b. There are three distinctive fact patterns. The "dirty-young
man" type is not prosecuted; the "dirty old man" is charged with statu-
tory rape; and forcible rape (by a young man) is filed as such.
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